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Abstract
This thesis investigates the consequences of exchange-traded fund industry
growth. In particular, I study the ETF arbitrage mechanism, the impact of ETF
trading on international diversification and on price efficiency of distressed stocks.
In the first chapter, I show that, although low on average, ETF premi-
ums/discounts can be as high as 16% when considering international country-level
ETFs. I propose a risk-based limits to arbitrage explanation of such deviations. I
show that while currency and equity illiquidity risks are important in explaining
ETF premiums there is still a large portion of premium that remains unexplained. I
argue that ETF premiums represent a reward arbitrageurs demand for being exposed
to financial frictions risk and show that the absolute value of ETF deviations is a
good proxy for multiple dimensions of financial frictions such as funding illiquidity,
credit risk and information uncertainty. I show that it can be used as an aggregate
financial friction proxy at the country-level and that it is priced in the cross-section
of stock returns internationally.
In the second chapter, I show that investment decisions of ETF market
participants when trading country ETFs are driven by shocks to U.S. fundamentals,
rather than local risks. Investors react only to negative news about local economies.
When U.S. economic uncertainty increases, investors switch to Cash ETFs. I
demonstrate that ETF arbitrage mechanism is one of the key channels through which
U.S. shocks propagate to local economies leading to increased return correlation with
the U.S. market, limiting the benefits from international diversification. I find that
countries with stronger ETF price discovery and lower limits to arbitrage have a
higher comovement with the U.S. market.
In the third chapter, I examine the effect of exchange traded funds on the
underlying stocks conditional on the credit quality of securities in the basket. I show
that U.S. industry ETFs help to alleviate the short-selling constraint present for
distressed securities at the individual stock level by providing the alternative trading
route to gain the negative exposure via cheap short-selling of ETFs. As a result,
ETF basket membership has a positive effect on distressed stocks price efficiency. In
addition, I show that distressed stocks that are members of ETF basket do not show
signs of distress anomaly unlike the non-member securities.
x
Introduction
The Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) industry has experienced a significant growth
in the recent years.1 According to Investment Company Institute, as of July 2019,
the total assets under management of global ETFs reached 3,990.9 billion dollars
including 807.1 billion in international ETFs and 390 billion in the U.S. industry
ETFs2, which are the focus of this thesis. As a result, this type of investment product
became systematically important and is now under a close scrutiny of major global
regulators. Yet, the ETFs are still understudied in the academic research. The
aim of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the consequences of such
double-digit growth on the equity markets. This is important as recent regulations
such as MiFID II, introduction of “non-fully transparent ETFs” (i.e. funds that
do not need to disclose holdings daily) and lowering of fees to zero by major ETF
sponsors will lead to even large inflows of funds from retail and active investors in
the future.
The previous academic research is mainly focused on the negative effects of
ETFs. For example, recent studies show that ETFs adversely affect the information
efficiency, liquidity and volatility of the underlying stocks (e.g. Ben-David, Franzoni,
and Moussawi, 2018; Israeli, Lee, and Sridharan, 2017). In contrast, this thesis
consists of three empirical papers where I examine multidimensional impact of ETFs
on the financial markets. In the first paper, using country-level funds, I look at
the ETF arbitrage mechanism, show that it is not necessarily risk-free (as often
1Blackrock estimates the growth of 19% per annum from 2009 through 2017
https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/insights/etf-growth
2https://www.ici.org/research/stats/etf/etfs 07 19
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assumed) and relate the discrepancies in the ETF pricing to aggregate financial
frictions. In the second paper, I continue with country-level ETFs and show the
negative consequences of ETF arbitrage on the correlation of developed and emerging
markets with the U.S., that limit the potential for diversification when investing
internationally. Finally, in the third paper, I look at the positive consequences of
ETF trading and show that industry ETF short-selling improves the efficiency of
the distressed stocks by providing an alternative route to gain a negative exposure
when it is restricted directly.
In Chapter 1, I look at the cross-section of 22 country-level ETFs traded
in the U.S. and empirically investigate the ETF premiums/discounts3. The ETF
arbitrage mechanism is a unique property of this type of investment products that
differentiates them from open-ended and closed-ended mutual funds. It allows ETF
dealers to continuously create and redeem fund shares while maintaining a liquid
secondary market. This mechanism is usually efficient in maintaining ETF prices
close to the net asset values (NAVs) with deviations being low on average. However,
I observe that for country-level ETFs this is not always the case. On some days,
deviations can be as high as 16%. Such differences constitute a violation of law of one
price since ETFs represent the direct claim on the assets in the basket and therefore,
they should be valued identically. Previous research relates such deviations to ETFs
tracking countries with non-synchronised trading periods (e.g. Levy and Lieberman,
2013). When the U.S. market is open and the underlying stock market is closed
the arbitrageur is unable to close the deviations directly. Following Delcoure and
Zhong (2007) and using two NAV adjustment models proposed by Goetzmann et al.
(2001) and by Engle and Sarkar (2006) I correct the NAV for stale pricing, but still
observe significant deviations even for the U.S. and Canada where time-difference is
not a concern. In the paper I provide a risk-based limits to arbitrage explanation
of premiums. I argue that ETF arbitrage is exposed to financial frictions (factors
3Through out this thesis, depending on the context, I often use the term “premium” and “discount”
interchangeably to represent any deviation of price from the NAV
2
that are often not accounted in basic asset-pricing models, but that interfere with
trades and affect risk exposure of stocks) and that any deviation of prices from NAVs
represent a reward the arbitrageurs demand for being exposed to such friction risk. I
start with currency and equity market illiquidity risks and show that they are related
to the magnitude of the deviation. However, liquidity can only explain up to around
24% of the variations in premiums. I then show that the absolute value of ETF
premium is related to multiple dimensions of the financial frictions including credit
risk, funding illiquidity and information uncertainty. I argue that country-ETFs are
better than many other products used in the literature (e.g. ADRs, bonds etc.) in
capturing frictions risk at the aggregate country-level due to cross-sectional data
availability. Finally, I show that my financial friction proxy is priced internationally,
implying the investor hedging demand against risks discussed above.
After investigating the risks affecting the arbitrage mechanism of ETFs at the
country-level I proceed to study the consequences of arbitrage in the country-ETFs
on international diversification. To the best of my knowledge, chapter 2 is the first
paper looking at the impact of ETFs on the cross-country correlations. Using a
broader sample of 41 developed and emerging country-ETFs I show that since the
majority of ETFs are traded in the U.S. its market conditions impact the decisions of
ETF investors when trading international funds. In particular, in order to understand
such impact I proxy for economic uncertainty using U.S. and local VIX variables and
compute order imbalances for different versions of ETF investors for every country
in our sample at a daily level. Our first contribution is in showing that investors
mainly react to changes in the U.S. uncertainty rather than the local one. In fact,
the evidence suggest that they only react to significant bad developments affecting
the local economy. I show that when U.S. VIX increases investors leave the foreign
market and move money to cash ETFs. Secondly, I develop a shock transmission
mechanism that via ETF arbitrage incorporates U.S. uncertainty into the local prices
of foreign stocks. Using staggered introduction of ETFs I demonstrate that in line
with wake-up call hypothesis significant increases in the U.S. VIX force investors to
3
reassess the fundamentals of the local economies and via ETF arbitrage increase the
equity return correlation of foreign countries with the U.S. market. If the arbitrage is
one of the channels that is responsible for correlation increase, then any impediments
to such mechanism should prevent the shock transmission. In the cross-sectional
sort I confirm that countries with higher limits to arbitrage (proxied by liquidity
mismatch of Pan and Zeng (2019), as well as by Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure
of the underlying stock market) in the ETF market have a lower return correlated
with the U.S.. Finally, I show that our shock transmission mechanism relies upon
investors treating any shock coming from the U.S. as fundamental. If they consider
such shocks as noise (i.e. the ones arising due to liquidity reasons) the effect on
prices should be reverted and no impact on correlation should exist. Following
Broman (2016) I measure the degree of price discovery in the ETF (i.e if fundamental
information is generated in the ETF market) and show that countries where such
measure is high are more correlated with the U.S. market. Overall, in this paper I
demonstrate that such increase in return correlation of countries with the U.S. makes
it more difficult to achieve international diversification for U.S. investors who use
country-ETFs for such purposes.
After showing a new channel via which ETFs negatively impact the financial
markets, I investigate whether there are positive consequences of ETF growth. In
chapter 3, I look at the industry ETFs and show the positive impact of such funds
on the price efficiency of the distressed stocks. The novelty of this paper is that I
highlight the increasing heterogeneity of type of stocks traded in the ETF basket. As
such, I show that in contrast to previous ETF research that often does not differentiate
between securities, the impact of ETF trading should be assessed conditionally on
the individual stock characteristics. I demonstrate that credit quality is one of them.
It is often hard to negatively bet against stocks in the financial distress due to
costly short-selling. This paper demonstrates that industry ETFs (funds with one
of the highest level of short-selling) provide an alternative route to sell distressed
stocks indirectly. While the industry ETF short-selling has a limited impact on
4
the non-distressed stocks, it is more likely to reduce the overpricing of distressed
stocks by creating a downwards price pressure. I show that the impact of ETFs
on such stocks is fundamental irrespective of the trading motives. I directly test
the effect of indirect short-selling on the efficiency of stocks and find the positive
relationship. I then turn to the distressed anomaly (reflects under-performance of
riskier stocks with low credit rating) and show that stocks with low S&P rating
that are members of industry ETFs are less likely to be under-priced in comparison
to non-member securities. This effect is robust to alternative explanations of the
anomaly and different measures of distress. Overall, this paper contributes to the
ETF literature by showing the positive consequences of the development of such
products.
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Chapter 1
Financial Frictions Risk and
ETF Premium
1.1 Introduction
Markovitz’s portfolios theory and many asset pricing models make a crucial as-
sumption of no frictions in the financial markets. From one side, this means that
there is no constraint on how much leverage investor can take and subsequently
no limits to investor’s position on capital allocation line. However, studies such
as Boguth and Simutin (2018) demonstrate that in reality the ability to borrow
is limited and leverage constraint tightness is a priced risk factor. From another
side, no frictions means that theoretical market portfolio is combined of all the
world assets. In real life, the substantial transaction costs, barriers to international
investments, inability to short-sell, search costs and many other factors limit the
value of international diversification and leave investor portfolios concentrated in
their home market (home bias). Many attempts were made to identify some of the
friction components discussed above and to determine their relationship to asset
pricing. Usually, to measure an individual component, a proxy variable is used.
The issue is with those frictions that are not easily quantifiable, such as degree of
asymmetric information, or with generating a measure for non-U.S. frictions. In this
6
paper I provide a new aggregate country-specific measure of financial frictions in 22
markets based on the absolute value of international exchange-traded fund (ETF)
premiums/discounts, show that it is able to capture multiple dimensions of frictions
risk and that it is priced internationally.
Many ETF studies investigate fund premiums, but with a limited success. A
large portion of ETF premium is still left unexplained (e.g. Delcoure and Zhong,
2007). The deviation of fund price from its net asset value (NAV) is a violation of
the law of one price. It represents the arbitrage opportunity, which in theory should
be corrected immediately. However, due to numerous limits to arbitrage related to
financial frictions this is not always the case with significant deviations observed
across many ETFs. I provide a risk-based explanation of premium and identify its
main driving forces. Since any authorised participant (AP) has a limited risk-bearing
capacity, they may not be willing to engage in an ETF arbitrage when it is too risky
(relative to the possible reward). In addition, studies show that while domestic ETF
premiums are quickly corrected, international ETF premiums may last for days (e.g.
Engle and Sarkar, 2006). In this paper, I focus on country-level ETFs which are
defined as those funds that are tracking a single country index (e.g. iShares MSCI
Germany). I argue that premiums/discounts are not pure arbitrage opportunities and
represent a reward for being exposed to numerous risk factors. When such reward is
high enough, the deviation is corrected via unique ETF arbitrage mechanism. Often
ETF deviations are related to liquidity. I proxy for market illiquidity with global
equity illiquid-minus-liquid (MILLIQ) risk factor based on Amihud, Hameed, Kang,
and Zhang (2015) and currency illiquidity using IML factor of Mancini, Ranaldo, and
Wrampelmeyer (2013). I show that while market illiquidity and currency illiquidity
risks are important in explaining ETF premiums they are only able to explain up to
20% of daily variation in ETF premiums suggesting that there are other dimensions
of friction risk that drive the deviations.
DeGennaro and Robotti (2007) define market frictions as “anything that
interferes with trade”. They classify frictions into several categories: transaction
7
costs (including cost of trade and the opportunity cost of time), taxes and regulations,
asset indivisibility, non-traded assets, agency and information problems. I argue
that the arbitrageur in the ETF market faces numerous of those frictions and being
risk averse demands the compensation for being exposed to them. For example, in
order to redeem the ETF shares (to close the arbitrage opportunity in case when
ETF is traded at discount) the authorised participant (AP) has to deliver to the
ETF sponsor at least 1 unit of the fund (typically 100,000 shares). Therefore, such
arbitrage may be too expensive/risky to execute, which is the example of asset
indivisibility friction.1
I use the absolute value of ETF premium/discount as a measure of aggregate
country-specific financial friction risk. In order to deal with a stale pricing problem
found in the ETFs where ETF shares and the underlying basket of securities are not
traded at the same time I adjust NAV using methods of Goetzmann et al. (2001) and
Engle and Sarkar (2006). I investigate if other known proxies of different dimensions
of frictions are related to absolute ETF deviation. I show that while ETF premiums
are related to closed-end fund discount the correlation is not very high. In contrast
to mutual funds that suffer from the inability to arbitrage the deviations due to
closed-end fund structure the unique ETF arbitrage mechanism ensures that ETF
premiums are small. As such, the use of ETFs allows for a more precise estimation
of frictions than mutual funds. I find that apart from equity illiquidity, the studied
proxy is related to funding conditions (e.g. Ted Spread), information uncertainty (e.g.
Aggregate Disagreement) and credit risk (e.g. Moody’s Spread). As such, I provide
the evidence that the absolute ETF premium is related to multiple dimensions of
friction risk.
After developing the financial friction proxy I compute the sensitivity of
stock returns to financial frictions for every security in my sample and study what
stock characteristics drive such sensitivity. I find that returns of stocks with high
1While some of the funds allow partial basket creation/redemption this is not a standard practice
and requires a special agreement with the fund
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market beta (cyclical stocks) and small market capitalisation co-move with frictions
risk. In addition, stocks with high information uncertainty (low analyst coverage
and high dispersion in forecasts) and securities with high financial leverage are also
positively related to frictions. Such relationship between friction sensitivity and
stock characteristics is consistent with different dimensions of frictions related to the
ETF-based proxy. I then study the cross-sectional pricing ability of the financial
friction risk. I find that stocks with high friction sensitivity tend to under-perform
stocks with low sensitivity. The high-minus-low portfolio generates approximately
-3.6% per annum on average. This suggests that investors are willing to hedge against
friction risk. The result is robust to using value and equity-weighted portfolios. In
addition, I investigate this risk premium internationally and find that 14 out 21
countries in my sample have negative and significant financial friction risk premiums.
Several previous studies attempt to measure different components of frictions.
My paper is related to Hou and Moskowitz (2005). They proxy for the financial
frictions using the stock delay measure. Such variable attempts to capture the
difficulty in the information diffusion, as market news are reflected in stock returns
with a delay. Alternatively, this proxy reflects the illiquidity of a stock. They find
that the delay measure is able to predict returns cross-sectionally. However, the
disadvantage of this approach to measure frictions is the need to pre-define the asset
pricing model and the number of lags included in the delay measure. In contrast,
the measure based on country ETFs does not require such assumptions. Malkhozov,
Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2018) also develop a proxy for a financial friction
that captures funding illiquidity. Similarly to this paper the proxy is at the country
level and is based on the deviation of the government bond yields from the fitted
yield curve. They show that this funding illiquidity is priced internationally and
affects the slope and intercept of the international security market line. While
such measure is relatively easy to identify the main drawback of this method is the
limited data availability cross-sectionally and the existence of substantial credit risk
premium embedded in the yield for some countries. As a results authors only cover
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6 countries in their paper. My financial friction proxy is also related to funding
liquidity, but, in contrast, ETF data allows to have a much broader sample with
22 countries covered in this study. My work is also related to Pasquariello (2014)
who combines the deviations of law of one price in different markets into a single
market dislocation index. The global measure includes arbitrage parity violations
from the FX market (Covered Interest Rate Parity and Triangular Arbitrage), as
well as from equity market in a form of ADR price discrepancies. Such measure is
highly dependent on specific events and is decreasing over time. In contrast, I do
not observe the reduction in friction premium over my sample period. In addition,
ETFs allow to clearly estimate the country-specific frictions. While ADR arbitrage
is fundamentally similar to ETFs there are significant differences. First of all, there
is large variability in ADRs (e.g. over-the-counter Level 1 vs exchange-listed Level 2
and 3, different bundling ratios etc.). In contrast, country-level ETFs are relatively
more standardised. Secondly, an ADR represents a claim on one specific foreign
company. As such, any price deviation is likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic
factors. Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) show that the daily premium can be as high
as 127.4%. The ETF deviations are much smaller, as being an index product, they
represent claims on the diversified basket of securities. I find the maximum deviation
of approximately 16.5% in my sample. Finally, to compute the deviations for a
specific country researchers are required to average such parity violations across
ADRs from this country. This is a significant data problem as often there is not
enough ADRs on stocks listed from a particular country. For example, Gagnon and
Karolyi (2010) have only one stock for Austrian market. This is not a concern for
ETFs for reasons mentioned above, which makes country-level ETFs a particularly
appealing product in measuring country-level frictions. My work is also related to
Bandi, Moise, and Russell (2006) who use intra-day prices of SPIDERS to measure
volatility of frictions. Since my study is international, I use the lower frequency
data (daily and monthly). In addition, I study the aggregate financial frictions
using the first moment, while they focus on the second moment. My proxy is also
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related to studies on stock market illiquidity. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) develop
liquidity-adjusted CAPM and show that aggregate liquidity risk is priced in the
cross-section of stock returns.
Most of the ETF research is focused on the U.S. index funds. Only few
studies, such as Levy and Lieberman (2013), consider the international funds and
non-synchronised trading periods of ETF shares and underlying baskets. They
show that while ETF prices are driven by NAV returns, during the periods when
underlying stock market is closed, ETF price overreacts to S&P 500 index return.
This mispricing is possible due to failure of arbitrage mechanism in those periods of
a day. In this paper, I show that even after controlling for non-synchronised periods
the significant mispricing exists and is related to financial friction risks. Petajisto
(2017) shows that the creation and redemption occurs on a much larger scale for U.S.
ETFs, rather than international ETFs, as the underlying assets of those funds are
more difficult to trade. In addition, he documents that while on average the premium
is close to zero it exhibits a significant time-series variation. Some of the factors cited
by Petajisto that can explain the variation include the movement of investors into
and out of funds (creates a price pressure) and the availability of arbitrage capital.
Petajisto also expresses concern that when using the in-kind creation/redemption
arbitrageur bears the risk of non-simultaneous trading and unpredictable transaction
costs. The noise in stock prices is also an important issue to arbitrageur, who is
restricted to trade while one of the markets is closed. AP bears the risk that if the
price of underlying stocks is noisy it can move to unpredictable direction when the
second market gets opened (the so-called price slippage of Malamud, 2016). One
of the contributions of my paper is that it quantifies the risk factors affecting the
ETF arbitrage and show the direct impact on the ETF premiums/discounts. A
large part of ETF literature demonstrates how ETF trading transmits noise to the
underlying stock prices making this risk significant. Israeli et al. (2017) examine
long-term implications of ETF ownership on information efficiency of underlying
stocks. They show that as ETF acquires more shares of a company, those shares
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become less price informative. The effect comes from two sources. The first one is
that when a large portion of shares gets locked-up in the ETF basket, they become
unavailable for informed agents willing to transact based on firm-specific information.
Secondly, presence of ETFs shifts uninformed investors from the direct trading of
the underlying stocks to ETF trading, as these index instruments minimise their
losses to informed traders. Subsequently, this leads to an increase in the transaction
costs for the underlying securities and, since the information acquisition is costly,
reduces the incentive of informed traders to acquire such information. In particular,
authors show that an increase in ETF ownership leads to widening of bid-ask spread,
increase in Amihuds illiquidity measure and increase in firms return synchronicity
with overall market. Similarly to studies cited above, I argue that noise in underlying
stock prices (a serious concern during the non-synchronised trading periods) and
transaction costs are parts of friction risk.
There is a growing body of literature that attempts to determine the driving
factors of the deviation between ETF prices and NAVs. Chacko, Das, and Fan (2016)
use premiums of bond ETFs to develop a new fixed-income illiquidity measure that,
as they suggest, can potentially be further extended to other asset classes. The main
problem of typical proxies for illiquidity risk is that the standard approach of going
long on assets with low liquidity characteristics (such as bid-ask spread) and short
on assets with high liquidity characteristics may not offset other possible systematic
risk factors. Despite the ability to overcome this problem and the computational
simplicity of their approach the authors ignore many other possible factors that
may explain the price premium. In particular, I demonstrate how other factors
beyond liquidity, such as credit spread and funding constraints, are also important in
determining the price difference between ETF and the underlying portfolio. Delcoure
and Zhong (2007) show that variables such as the degree of institutional ownership,
bid-ask spread, trading volume, exchange rate volatility, dummies for economical
and political events, as well as correlation between local market and the U.S. have
the ability to explain the variation in premiums of country ETFs. Nevertheless,
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with so many variables included, there is still a large portion of variation that is left
unexplained with R2 of their model not exceeding 14%. In contrast, I demonstrate
how the clearly identifiable risk factor proxies are more effective in explaining the
deviations. Bertone, Paeglis, and Ravi (2015) consider the ETF premium/discount in
the context of law of one price deviation. They show that the tracking error between
Dow Jones Industrial Average index and ETF is related to liquidity, volatility and
transactions costs. Similarly, to this stream of literature I also use liquidity to explain
ETF premium/discount. However, I do not use liquidity proxies in my regression,
but rather consider liquidity risk in a form of long-short portfolios for both currencies
and equity markets.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 describes the ETF arbitrage
mechanism, main players in this market and provides a risk-based explanation of
price deviations; section 1.3 provides the details on the ETF, equity sample and risk
factor construction; section 1.4 shows the empirical results; section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 ETF mechanics
Exchange-traded fund is a modern hybrid of closed-end and open-end mutual funds.
Similarly to closed-end funds its shares are traded on exchange and its price is subject
to supply and demand of market participants. At the same time, it overcomes one of
the main drawbacks of closed-end fund structure, difficulty in raising additional funds,
by incorporating the special feature of open-end funds – the ability to issue new
shares at their net asset value. ETF sponsor makes a special creation/redemption
agreement with several broker dealers (usually large financial institutions), called
authorised participants, to ensure that funds are traded at a price close to its net
asset value. APs also often act as market makers in the ETF market (although
this is not always the case). The authorised participant can (but not obliged to)
accumulate the basket of underlying shares that ETF tracks in the right proportion2
2Typically the size, weights and constituents of the basket are disseminated daily in the fund’s
portfolio composition file
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and pack it in the appropriate amount to reach a necessary size of a unit creation. He
then has a right to exchange this basket for newly created ETF shares. Usually, this
exchange happens in-kind (i.e. there is a physical delivery of the basket), however
in-cash transaction may also be possible, but at additional fee.3
This unit creation/redemption process creates a unique arbitrage mechanism
in the ETF market, which allows to keep the price of ETF close to the net asset
value of the basket that the fund tracks. When the temporary ETF price Pt is above
its NAVt (ETF is traded at a premium) the authorised participant has the incentive
to short-sell the ETF shares and simultaneously purchase the basket of underlying
stocks. Then authorised participant can deliver this basket to the ETF sponsor,
exchange it for new ETF shares and close the short position at a profit of Pt−NAVt
(ignoring the effect of sale on price), arbitraging away the initial difference. Similarly,
when the price of ETF is below its NAV (ETF is traded at discount) the authorised
participant buys the ETF shares (enough to reach a unit creation size) redeems them
for the underlying stocks and sells them in the stock market generating a profit of
NAVt − Pt. The initial purchase of ETF shares pushes the price upwards until it
reaches the NAV. Therefore, theoretically, to preclude the existence of arbitrage,
the ETF price must be equal to the NAV of the basket of shares that it tracks.
Engle and Sarkar (2006) show that ETF prices and NAVs are co-integrated and any
deviation is corrected within minutes for domestic funds. In contrast, international
funds can be traded at premium or discount for several days. Similarly, Madhavan
and Sobczyk (2016) show that the half-life of the deviation for domestic funds is
0.43 days, while it is 6.56 days for international funds. Arbitrage opportunities may
also arise between futures and ETFs (Richie, Daigler, and Gleason, 2008) and when
different funds tracking the same or similar basket (e.g SPDR Trust and iShares IVV)
have different prices (Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti, 2013). In the latter
3In-kind creation/redemption is often preferred by ETF sponsors. Firstly, it reduces the op-
erational complexity of buying the underlying securities (e.g. round lots, trading costs, liquidity
etc.). Secondly, for U.S. funds the in-kind creation allows the fund manager to pass shares with
high accumulated capital gains to APs. Since no money is exchanged, such transfer minimises tax
liability of ETF shareholders
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case, authors argue that although the risk of correcting such mispricing exists it is
minimised, as both funds are highly liquid and convergence risk is low. In contrast,
I consider arbitrage opportunities between international funds and their underlying
basket and show that both liquidity and convergence risks are important. While the
ETF shares and the underlying basket represent claims on the same future cashflows,
any deviations in international funds, which are the focus of this study, are harder
and riskier to arbitrage due to non-synchronised trading periods and other market
frictions.
It is possible for non-AP investors to get engaged in the ETF arbitrage
activity. For example, they can sell ETF shares, buy underlying basket of securities
(in case of ETF premium) and wait for price convergence. However, this is not a pure
riskless arbitrage opportunity in a traditional sense (Ben-David et al., 2018) and APs
remain key players in eliminating arbitrage opportunities. Often, previous research
assumes that the authorised participant has an unlimited risk bearing capacity. This
assumption leads to a doubtful conclusion that any deviation of ETF price from NAV
will be corrected by an arbitrageur, as it represents a profit opportunity. However,
in real life the arbitrage mechanism can be risky in particular, as argued before, for
international funds. As APs have limited capital, may not be able to specialise in
both ETF and stock markets at the same time (Bhattacharya and O’Hara, 2018)
and require appropriate compensation for any kind of risk they undertake it may
not be optimal for them to correct a small deviation. Figure 1.1 illustrates this idea
by showing a hypothetical variation in prices of an ETF. I argue that there exist an
upper and lower bound around the NAV. This bound is a minimum reward required
by the AP to compensate for the risk of ETF “arbitrage”. Starting with price P1
that is above upper bound, the AP will close the deviation by pushing the price
closer to the net asset value and earn P1 − P2. Assume that over time there is a
liquidity shock in the secondary market pushing the price up to P3. At this point it
is not optimal for the AP to intervene as the potential profit P3 −NAV is less than
UpperBound−NAV . The AP will intervene only when the premium/discount is
15
sufficiently high (price reaches P4) and close the gap between NAV and price.
[insert figure 1.1 here]
ETF market makers face numerous direct and indirect costs when conducting the
arbitrage trades. While the underlying bid-ask spread, creation/redemption fees,
trading fees and stamp taxes are important, the arbitrageur is also exposed to hedging
costs that create a natural “fair value band” around the NAV (Vanguard, 2016;
WisdomTree, 2019). Such costs vary depending on the fund (it is more expensive
for emerging market funds due to lack of hedging instruments) or during times of
uncertainty (which affects the difficulty in estimating the cost of a hedge). Petajisto
(2017) shows that the volatility of premiums/discounts is economically significant
and can be as high as 130 bps for some of the international funds. He also argues
that in certain cases market makers may need days to accumulate the positions to
conduct the arbitrage trade which exposes them to the timing risk. Consequently
arbitrageurs may choose to wait until premium/discount widens enough to correct the
deviations (SEC, 2019). Mackintosh (2014) argues that 90% of US equity arbitrage
opportunities is unprofitable. The AP may even choose to stop accepting redemption
orders as did Citigroup in 2013 when hitting the internal risk limits.4 I argue that
significant deviations between ETF price and NAV observed for the international
country funds are driven by the existence of arbitrage-efficient bounds and represent
a risk premium that arbitrageurs demand for being exposed to risk of correcting the
mispricing.
1.3 Data and Methodology
In this section I describe the procedures used in this study for the construction
of the ETF sample, as well as different methodologies for dealing with a stale
pricing problem present in the international funds. I also provide the details of the
4https://www.ipe.com/reports/special-reports/etfs-guide/global-regulators-take-another-look-
at-etfs/10021549.article
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construction of order imbalance, equity and foreign exchange liquidity risk factors.
Finally, I describe the construction of stock sensitivity to country-level frictions and
of the global equity sample that is used for the asset pricing tests.
1.3.1 ETF Sample
In this study I cover all currently available developed market single country ETFs
sponsored by iShares (Blackrock Inc.) that are not hedged (ticker starts with H) or
target only small or large market capitalization firms. The sample consists of 22
ETFs traded on NYSE Arca, BATS exchange or NASDAQ: 21 developed market
MSCI-based ETFs and IVV that tracks the S&P 500 index to represent the U.S.
market. Table 1.1 provides the description of each fund. All of the funds in the
sample use “physical replication” and attempt to minimize the fund deviations from
their benchmarks (country-level MSCI indices). I collect daily closing prices for each
of the fund from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg. When the closing
price is not available I replace it with the average of bid-ask spread. Net asset values
are obtained from individual fund sections on the iShares website. As in Ackert
and Tian (2008) I begin the sample on June 1, 2002, as this is the first date when
free-float adjustment was incorporated into MSCI index. Before this date, MSCI
methodology was based on the number of shares outstanding, which could prevent
ETF sponsor from closely tracking the index due to non-availability of privately held
shares for investment. The sample is at the daily frequency from June 2002-June
2018.
1.3.2 Stale pricing problem
The correct computation of ETF premiums is complicated by difficulty in estimating
the true net asset value of the fund. Every 15 seconds market data vendor provides the
indicative net asset value (INAV) of the fund. However, those indicative values may
not represent the true intrinsic value. First of all, instead of the current mid-quote
the last trading price is used in the NAV computation. Therefore, the direction of the
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last trade determines whether the bid or ask price is used in valuation. In addition,
according to Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016), when market is very illiquid the last
trading price may represent the significantly delayed valuation of securities, as the
trade could happen minutes ago. Ben-David et al. (2018) describe the mechanism of
propagation of fundamental shock when price discovery occurs in the ETF market.
In their example, due to ETF being more liquid than the underlying basket its price
immediately reflects new fundamental information, but the prices of securities are
temporally stale and only reach new equilibrium with a delay.
The stale pricing problem is especially relevant for country ETFs due to
non-synchronized periods of trading. The challenge in accurately computing NAV
arises as ETF shares are traded in the U.S. market, while the price of underlying
basket of securities is determined in the foreign market. Asian markets do not have
the overlapping trading hours with the U.S. market. NAV provided by the vendor
when Asian market is closed reflects the closing price of the underlying securities
adjusted for foreign exchange return. This elevates the stale pricing problem and,
according to Levy and Lieberman (2013), also limits the ETF arbitrage mechanism.
Several solutions are proposed to correct the reported NAV. Valuation based
on stale prices does not reflect all available information immediately. Following
Goetzmann et al. (2001) I adjust today’s NAV with the predictable component of
tomorrow’s NAV. This incorporates available value-relevant information into the
valuation of the underlying basket and makes its return unpredictable. First, I
regress NAV return on the instrument Z that helps to forecast NAV at time t+ 1:
RNAVi,t+1 = αi + βiZt + εt (1.1)
I use S&P 500 index return as an instrument. Then I update NAV at time t with
its predictable return by assuming that α is equal to zero. NAV shows the true
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(adjusted) net asset value.
NAVi,t = NAVi,t(1 + βiZt) (1.2)
Engle and Sarkar (2006) propose the alternative adjustment to NAV in order
to solve the stale pricing problem. They suggest that even in the presence of
measurement errors in the long-run the ETF prices and NAV must be the same due
to built-in self correcting arbitrage mechanism. Based on this cointegrating property
they derive the following relationship:
pi,t −NAVi,t = αi∆NAVi,t + βixi,t + ut (1.3)
where xi,t is a set of variables that explain the difference between measured and true
NAV and ut is the true premium. Similarly to Delcoure and Zhong (2007) I use S&P
500 return and spot exchange rate returns as proxies for xt.
In contrast to previous methodologies, Petajisto (2017) develops another
method for NAV correction that does not require any assumptions about the price
processes. He sorts funds that track the same or highly correlated basket of securities
into groups and then computes the true NAV as the average of group prices. Similar
funds must move together and any deviation from the group captures the idiosyncratic
mispricing. While this method is computationally easier to use in comparison to the
ones described above, it suffers from several problems and therefore is hard to apply
in this study. First of all, it assumes that there is no systematic mispricing among
all the ETFs in the group. In contrast, Broman (2016) demonstrates the significant
systematic mispricing in international iShares ETFs. Secondly, MSCI index provider
compiles the list of all ETFs tracking each of its country indices. According to this
list, many countries have very few tracking ETFs. In addition, to have a sizeable
group for each country, ETFs traded outside of the U.S. must be included. This
would lead to the same time zone problem as with NAV computation. On top of
that, different currency exposures must be taken into account. Considering above, I
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deem this method less appropriate for international country ETFs and, as such, I do
not use it for this study.
1.3.3 Currency and Equity Market Illiquidity Risks
Liquidity risk is an important factor when considering the deviation of ETF prices
from NAVs. As mentioned earlier, it is often considered a part of the financial friction
risk. Pan and Zeng (2019) and other market reports argue that liquidity risk is
significant for ETF APs, especially when the liquidity mismatch between ETF and
underlying market is high (e.g. bonds, international funds etc.).
Although ETF and its basket of underlying securities represent a claim on the
same assets there are two main differences between them. First, while ETF shares
are traded in U.S. dollars (within the sample considered), the underlying basket is
priced in the local currency. These currencies are more illiquid than U.S. dollars
and, therefore, holding underlying basket exposes international investor to additional
risk, which must be priced and reflected in the NAV. I obtain closing bid and ask
exchange rates for each underlying currency in the ETF sample from Thomson
Reuters Datastream. In order to construct currency illiquidity risk factor I follow
Mancini et al. (2013) in their procedure of computing IML (illiquid-minus-liquid)
factor. Each day I rank currencies based on their liquidity (using relative quoted
bid-ask spread). I then construct a portfolio that is long in the tercile of the most
illiquid currencies and short the tercile of the most liquid ones. The portfolio is
rebalanced daily. The constructed IML factor represents the risk premium that
investors demand for being exposed to currency illiquidity risk. The only fund that
is not affected by currency risk in my sample is IVV that tracks the U.S. index.
Similarly, I construct equity market illiquidity risk factor. In the international
sample, underlying basket of securities may be illiquid. Since the arbitrageur has
to go long or short in the underlying market (depending if the fund is traded at
a premium or discount) such risk is important to consider. I follow Amihud et al.
(2015) in constructing the global illiquidity risk premium. For every stock j at time
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t I compute the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as follows:
Illiqj,t = log
(
1 +
|Rj,t|
DV OLj,t
)
where Rj,t is the daily stock return, DV OLj,t is the daily dollar traded volume in
local currency obtained by multiplying the closing stock price by the number of
shares traded. Similarly, to many empirical papers (e.g Malkhozov et al., 2018) I
reduce the impact of outliers by adding a constant and taking a logarithm. Daily
equity market illiquidity risk premium (MILLIQGt ) at time t is calculated as a
return on portfolio that goes long in the tercile of the most illiquid stocks and short
the tercile of the most liquid ones.
1.3.4 Financial Frictions Risk Exposure
Using the risk-based limits to arbitrage explanation I consider the absolute deviation
between ETF price and its NAV as a risk premium that arbitrageurs demand to get
engaged in the arbitrage activities. Therefore, I use the absolute value of the ETF
premium as a financial friction proxy (FFP , FFPG, FFPE for simple, Goetzmann
et al. (2001) adjusted and Engle and Sarkar (2006) adjusted premiums). Since I use
country-level ETFs, this proxy is country specific. As discussed before, I hypothesise
that such financial friction measure for fund i has the ability to explain variations in
excess returns for stocks of country i. Assuming that the average coefficient of risk
aversion of authorised participants stays constant, a higher FFP represents a larger
financial friction risk. I first find the sensitivity of each stock in country i to this
proxy. Following Pasquariello (2014) every month t, for every available stock j in
country i I estimate beta from the following regression:
Rj,T = α+ β1FFP
i
T + Factors
i
T + εj,t T ∈ {t− 59, t} (1.4)
where Rj,T is a monthly excess return over the previous 60-month for stock j traded
in country i. For each country, I first standardise FFP i by its rolling historic mean
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and standard deviation (as in Pasquariello, 2014) to avoid forward looking bias. I
then average standardised variables within each month to generate monthly series
of friction proxies used in regression. Factorsi are monthly country-specific MRP,
HML, SMB and UMD factors from Carhart (1997) model obtained from the AQR
website. I then sort stocks based on estimated betas into quintiles and compute
the returns of portfolios over the next month. I construct a long-short portfolio by
buying the most sensitive group (high β1) and selling the least sensitive one (low β1).
1.3.5 International Stock Data
I follow Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2019) in the dataset construction. The
universe of stocks that I consider in this study covers all constituents of Compustat
Global, Compustat North America and CRSP databases for the period of June 2002-
June 2018, whose primary listings are located in one of the 22 countries from the
ETF sample. I only consider common stocks by filtering databases by the issue
code (TPCI=0) or share code (SHRCD=10 or 11) and I exclude all preferred stocks,
depository receipts, REITs, warrants etc. Each stock is allocated to a particular
country based on the location of its primary exchange, rather than based on the
country of domicile. Only primary listings are considered (identified using primary
issue tag). As common in the literature, I include all dead stocks to limit the
potential survivorship bias effect. I account for delisting returns of U.S. stocks by
following Shumway and Warther (1999). After careful consideration of data structure
and following cleaning procedures introduced in asset pricing literature I apply the
following filters to the dataset:
1. Volume filter: I exclude all observations with non-positive trading volume
2. Liquidity filter: I exclude all penny stocks defined as stocks with mean price
lower than 1 unit of exchange-local currency within the sample period
3. Trading day filter (e.g. Malkhozov et al., 2018): I remove those days on which
more than 90% of return observations are zero
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4. Staleness filter (e.g. Malkhozov et al., 2018): I remove a month of observations
if at least 80% of returns within this month are zeros. Similarly, I remove
a month of observations if 50% of observations within this month are not
available
5. Survival bias (e.g Fama and French, 1993): I require stocks to have at least 2
years of return observations within a sample period
I then compute individual dollar returns in USD for each stock in excess of U.S.
T-bill rate.
1.4 Empirical Results
In this section I provide the empirical evidence of the relationship of absolute
value of ETF price deviations from NAV to aggregate financial frictions. I start
by investigating the spikes in the time-series of ETF deviations and comparing the
ETF premiums to closed-end fund discounts highlighting that they are different. I
proceed by analysing the importance of currency and equity market illiquidity risks
as driving factors of ETF mispricing. I then compare my proxy to other known
dimensions of frictions risk, investigate what stock specific characteristics drive the
return sensitivity to the aggregate level of frictions and study the pricing ability of
frictions in the cross-section of stock returns.
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1.2 shows the cross-sectional average of the absolute premiums for 22 ETFs
in the sample. While the average daily deviation is below 1% there are numerous
time periods when it is high. For example, at its peak during the financial crisis such
deviation was more than 6%. The financial crisis is associated with a time of large
uncertainty with many frictions such as the degree of asymmetric information spiking
over this period. Petajisto (2017) documents a rise of the cross-sectional dispersion in
ETF premiums at that time. In addition, noticeable jumps in the deviation occurred
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during historically important volatile events (i.e. “market dislocations” as they are
called in Pasquariello, 2014). Deviations were high during the Flash Crash event on
May 6th, 2010. According to BlackRock (2011) report on that day within minutes
25% of Russell 3000 stocks dropped by more than 10%. Due to the extreme fall
in the values of U.S. shares it was difficult for ETF market makers to value funds
and they had to discount their bid quotes. In addition, arbitrage became extremely
risky as to hedge the long exposure in ETFs APs had to short falling stocks. The
possibility of short-selling cancellation by exchange was high making the arbitrage
mechanism non-functional. In addition, the situation was worsen by the inability
of traders to route orders to NYSE Arca where many ETFs are traded. Overall,
this situation resulted in many APs having to step away. This example highlights
numerous technological, regulatory and other hard to quantify frictions that are
present in the financial markets. Another example of such event occurred on February
5th, 2018 that resulted in the significant deviations of ETF prices from NAVs. On
this day a jump of 115% in VIX resulted in market turbulence and extreme trading
volumes in the ETF market (BlackRock, 2018). High volatility environment makes
it hard to price the underlying assets and, on average, deviations from NAV spiked.
Interestingly, the events described above affected most of the country-level ETFs in
my sample, with the deviation being significant even after removing U.S. ETF from
the sample. This suggests that there might be some friction factors at the global
level that drive the common component of deviations. I test the impact of global
illiquidity later in this paper. Different methods of premium adjustment produce a
similar pattern of absolute deviations, with the main difference being the range of
observations.
[insert figure 1.2 here]
Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics for premiums and the absolute premiums
of ETFs in my sample. As can be seen from the table most of the international
country-level ETFs trade at a small premium. This is in contrast to closed-end funds
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that are traded at discount (e.g. Lee and Ready, 1991). On average, daily mean
deviation is 0.42% globally and it is less than 1% for every developed country in
my sample. The mean absolute deviations exhibit a clear geographical pattern with
ETFs tracking countries that have the highest time difference with the U.S. having
the highest deviations (Australia, Japan, Hong Kong). Unsurprisingly, the smallest
average deviations are for the U.S. and Canada, where the time difference is zero.
On the regional level, North American funds have the lowest absolute deviations,
followed by Europe and Asia Pacific. Such geographical pattern emphasizes the stale
pricing problem discussed previously and the importance in adjusting the premiums.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the summary statistics for the adjusted premiums. The
geographical pattern is much weaker with Ireland having the largest mean deviation
of 0.78% and Australia showing a much lower mean deviation ranking despite having
the highest time difference (average deviation is 0.48%). Asia Pacific has still the
highest deviation on average, but the difference with Europe is much lower after the
adjustment. While mean deviation remains below 1% the premiums vary significantly
with minimum for Israel being −16.50% and the maximum for Canada (where one
would not expect high deviations due to proximity to the U.S.) of 10.48%. Table A.1
in the appendix shows the correlation of absolute premiums across different methods
of NAV adjustment. Tables A.2–A.4 show the correlation for different versions
of absolute premiums across countries. Different methods of NAV adjustment
produce positively correlated results. The adjustments tend to affect countries
with the highest level of non-synchronicity. For example, the correlation between
non-adjusted absolute premiums and the ones adjusted based on Engle and Sarkar
(2006) is the lowest for Australia, Hong Kong and Japan. In contrast, it is 0.92
for Canada. Across countries all pairwise correlations are positive no matter what
adjustment is used. This suggests that premiums and discounts tend to co-move
across different funds. Interestingly, the magnitude of correlations is being diminished
by adjustments with “no adjustment” being the highest on average and Engle and
Sarkar (2006) adjustment being the lowest.
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[insert tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 here]
1.4.2 ETF Premium and Illiquidity Risks
Numerous market reports cite illiquidity as the main driver of ETF premiums. I
test this by performing a panel regression with time and country fixed effects of
the absolute value of ETF premiums on my proxies for currency and global market
illiquidity risks:
|pi,t −NAVi,t| = α+ β1IMLt + β2MILLIQGt + FEi + FEt + εi,t (1.5)
In contrast to Delcoure and Zhong (2007) who uses 8 different variables to explain the
deviations I attempt to explain these arbitrage opportunities from a risky arbitrage
perspective using only tradable risk factors constructed as long-short portfolios.
I run this regression conditionally on whether the fund is traded at a premium
or discount. The reason for this separation is that the risk exposure is different
depending on the direction of arbitrageur’s trades. When the fund is traded at a
premium the AP has to buy the underlying stocks and sell ETF. As a result he is
long the foreign equities expressed in a foreign currency that are more likely to be
illiquid (in comparison to the U.S. equity market and USD). In contrast, when the
fund is traded at discount the opposite is true. Therefore, since the risk factors are
constructed as illiquid-minus-liquid portfolios I expect different signs of the beta
coefficients of the risk exposures for premiums and discounts.
Table 1.5 reports the results at a daily frequency. Results are provided for
two methods of net asset value adjustment discussed previously. I find that both
currency and equity market illiquidity risk increase the absolute premiums, which is
in line with a risk-based limits to arbitrage explanation. As expected, coefficients
are negative but still significant for the discount version of the regression.5 The R2
ranges from 17.8% to 23.6% which is larger than the ones reported in Delcoure and
5Table A.5 in the appendix presents the alternative specification without absolute values and
conditional sorting. The conclusion remains the same
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Zhong (2007) (13%-14%) despite only 2 regressors being used. Such R2 suggests
that while liquidity risk is an important driver of the deviations there is still a
substantial portion of variation in absolute premiums that remains unexplained. I
argue that other non-liquidity dimensions of frictions are also important determinants
of premiums.
[insert table 1.5 here]
1.4.3 FFP and Individual Components of Frictions
I proceed by determining whether the obtained FFP indeed captures the financial
frictions and if it is related to different types of frictions other than stock and
currency illiquidity. I obtain numerous proxies for different dimensions of frictions
and compute the correlation of those measures with FFP . Due to data availability
the analysis is done at a monthly frequency for the U.S. version of frictions. I obtain
U.S. average closed-end fund discount (CEFD) and investor sentiments proxy6 from
Baker and Wurgler (2006). Since FFP is constructed as the absolute value of the
deviation I use the absolute value of CEFD. The results are almost numerically
identical when a general version of CEFD is used. I use TED Spread (obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database), measured as the difference between
3-month Libor rate and U.S. Treasury bill rate, as a proxy for funding liquidity.
Similarly, I use Moody’s Spread, measured as a difference between BAA and AAA
corporate bond rates, to proxy for the counter-party credit risk. I obtain VIX from
CBOE and Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) from OECD to proxy for the general
economic uncertainty. I use Leverage Constraint Tightness (LCT) of Boguth and
Simutin (2018) to proxy for the difficulty in accessing leverage7. I test the importance
of liquidity in determining ETF premium by using Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)
aggregate liquidity measure. Finally, I follow Hong and Sraer (2016) to construct the
6Although Sentiments variable is constructed using closed-end fund discount, the variable is
based on the first principle component of numerous other proxies for sentiments
7Following Boguth and Simutin (2018) I measure correlation between changes in LCT and AR(1)
residuals of other variables
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Aggregate Disagreement measure, as a beta weighted average of dispersion in analyst
forecasts of the EPS long-term growth rate (obtained from IBES database) for every
stock in the country. This measure proxies the degree of information uncertainty in
the economy.
Table 1.6 shows the pairwise correlation of individual proxies for financial
frictions with FFP . Although the correlation with CEFD is positive it is one of the
lowest among other variables (0.18). This suggests that these measures are different.
The correlation with Investor Sentiments is negative but higher (in absolute values)
than with CEFD. The negative coefficient is unsurprising since negative CEFD is one
of the components of this measure. Higher value of correlation implies that FFP is
more correlated with other components of Sentiments. Most importantly, FFP is
highly correlated with TED and Moody’s spreads (coefficients are 0.66 and 0.81),
which means that funding illiquidity and credit risk are very important determinants
of frictions. The arbitrageur needs funds to buy stocks/ETFs, as well as for posting
margin as the collateral and for rebate fees for the short side of the trade. Interestingly,
the TED spread is uncorrelated with CEFD. VIX and CCI are also strongly related to
FFP . As mentioned previously, days with VIX jumps correspond to turbulent events
and non-functional arbitrage mechanism. FFP is also correlated with Aggregate
Disagreements measure since informational uncertainty affects stock prices. Finally,
there is a strong negative correlation with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate
liquidity, as illiquidity complicates the arbitrage mechanism. Overall, my proxy for
the financial frictions risk performs well at capturing different dimensions of frictions
such as funding constraints, illiquidity and information uncertainty.
[insert table 1.6 here]
I also investigate the relative importance of each factor by regressing the FFPUS
on individual proxies unconditionally (at a monthly level) and conditionally on
whether the fund is traded at a premium or discount (at a daily level8). Similarly
8Not all proxies are available at a daily frequency. When daily data is not available I assume
that the variable is constant throughout a month
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to correlation results, I find that funding illiquidity, credit risk and information
uncertainty are the main drivers of premiums/discounts. When considered jointly
with other proxies, I do not find the significance for aggregate disagreement and
liquidity. At a daily level I find that TED spread, Moody’s spread and VIX are
“symmetric” and similar in magnitude in their effect on premiums and discounts.
Interestingly, I find that high investor sentiments negatively affect the premium and
do not affect the discount.
[insert table 1.7 here]
1.4.4 Individual Stock Determinants of Exposure to Frictions
After showing that my proxy captures the financial friction risk at the aggregate
level I proceed by measuring the exposure of individual stock returns to FFP . I
analyse the stock-specific determinants of such exposure to see if they are consistent
with different dimensions of frictions discussed above. As described in section 1.3.4 I
compute the monthly exposure of stocks using rolling 60-month regression of stock
returns on FFP and other factors. The obtained βFFP captures the sensitivity of
excess returns to frictions controlling for other risk factors. In order to understand
what drives the risk exposure to frictions I then regress the time-series of obtained
beta exposures for each stock on the individual stock characteristics. Due to data
availability I focus on the FFPUS . Table 1.8 shows the results of such regressions.
The panel regression includes time and industry fixed effects (based on 49 Fama-
French industry classification). I follow Green, Hand, and Zhang (2017) to construct
the explanatory variables. The data is obtained from CRSP, Compustat and I/B/E/S.
I first test the relationship between friction sensitivity and risk sensitivity measures
from Fama-French 3 factor model: market beta, log of market value of equity
and book to market ratio. I then include variables that capture the information
uncertainty in stock prices: accruals, number of analysts following a stock, dispersion
in analyst forecasts and idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, I add financial leverage and
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to proxy for stock liquidity.
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[insert table 1.8 here]
I find that cyclical stocks are more sensitive to frictions as there is a positive
coefficient for market beta. Unsurprisingly, smaller stocks tend to have a higher
βFFP , as such firms are more likely to be financially constraint and it is relatively
more costly for them to obtain new financing. I do not find significant relationship
between friction exposure and growth/value stocks in the full regression specification,
which is in contrast to Boguth and Simutin (2018) who relate their leverage constraint
tightness proxy to leverage embedded in growth options in some stocks (in the short
version of the regression the negative coefficient for book to market ratio is consistent
with their findings). I find that stocks with higher price uncertainty (low number of
analysts and high dispersion of forecasts) tend to have a higher exposure to frictions.
Stocks with high leverage are more sensitive to frictions since, as shown before,
FFP is related to cost of borrowing. Surprisingly, I do not find the relationship
with Amihud (2002) illiquidity which could be due to noise in the estimation of this
variable at the stock level and at the monthly frequency. Overall, the results are
consistent with previous evidence that FFP is related to different dimensions of
frictions.
1.4.5 Cross-Sectional Stock Returns and Financial Frictions Risk
I proceed by investigating if the financial frictions risk is priced in the cross-section
of U.S. and international stocks. Every month I sort stocks into quintiles based on
their ex-ante sensitivity to the financial frictions proxy and then compute a return
in excess of the risk-free rate over the next month of the value-weighted portfolios in
each quintile. Table 1.9 shows the results of such sorting for the U.S. stocks. I report
excess returns and intercepts based on CAPM, Fama-French 3 factor and Carhart
(1997) 4-factor models. The estimated excess returns decline almost monotonically
from Low to High. The High minus Low strategy generates the significant excess
return of −0.299%. Similar pattern is observed for alphas. The negative premium is
consistent with findings of Boguth and Simutin (2018), Malkhozov et al. (2018) and
30
Pasquariello (2014). The most sensitive to frictions group has a higher return when
the level of frictions risk is high (i.e in the bad state of the world: when funding
conditions, market illiquidity and other dimension of frictions are tight). In contrast,
Low group returns negatively covary with frictions (i.e. it pays low in the bad state
of the world). As a result investors demand the compensation to hold such riskier
securities. In other words, the negative premium represents a demand by investors
to hedge against friction risk. I find that the risk premium estimated based on FFP
is relatively smaller than the one reported in Pasquariello (2014).9 Panel B of table
1.9 shows that the results are similar for equally-weighted portfolios.
[insert table 1.9 here]
I also perform the same sorting exercise for every country in my sample. Table
1.10 reports the results based on FFP constructed using Goetzmann et al. (2001)
adjustment. The results remain quantitatively similar for Engle and Sarkar (2006)
adjustment due to high correlation between two types of premiums. The table
reports the excess returns of portfolio 5 over portfolio 1, as well as 4-factor alpha
based on Carhart (1997) model. More than half of the countries have the significant
and negative average excess returns. Only 3 countries have insignificant positive
returns. The highest premium that investors require for being exposed to frictions is
in Denmark (12.32% per annum). The UK has one of the lowest estimates of 1.22%
per annum. I do not find the significant results for some of the countries with low
number of stocks in the cross-section (e.g. Finland, Ireland, Israel). Surprisingly,
Japan, despite containing a relatively large number of stocks, is not significant over
the sample considered in this study. This is consistent with Malkhozov et al. (2018)
who also find that funding illiquidity is not priced in Japan. As shown previously,
funding illiquidity is one of the main components of financial frictions that explains
the ETF premium and therefore, it could be the reason for the absence of significant
friction premium. When considering intercepts from the 4-factor model I find that
9 It is 3.6% per annum in my sample vs 8.76% in Pasquariello (2014) for 1994-2009 sample. Of
course, some dimensions of frictions, such as trading costs, are expected to diminish over time
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14 out of 21 countries have the significantly negative coefficients. Overall, such result
confirms that the findings based on the U.S. sort holds internationally and investors
demand a risk premium for holding stocks sensitive to financial frictions.
[insert table 1.10 here]
1.5 Conclusion
I study the deviations of ETF prices from NAVs for 22 international country-level
ETFs and provide a risk based explanation for premiums/discounts. I find that
on average country ETFs are traded at a premium of less than 1%, but significant
deviations in the range of -16% to +10% are also possible. Such high deviations
represent a violation of law of one price. I provide a risk-based limits to arbitrage
explanation of why they can persist in ETF market. While ETF arbitrage mechanism
is efficient in quickly eliminating such profit opportunities, I argue that APs would
only engage in creation/redemption when the reward (i.e. deviation of prices from
NAV) is high enough to compensate for numerous risks associate with such trades.
This creates upper and lower trading bounds around the NAV that vary with the
magnitude of risk.
I argue that the absolute deviation of ETF prices from NAVs is a good
proxy for country-specific aggregate financial friction risk. I demonstrate that since
ETF shares and underlying basket of securities are traded in different countries and
denominated in different currencies, market and currency illiquidity are important
factors in explaining international ETF premiums. However, they are only able to
explain up to 20% of premium variation at a daily level. Consequently, I relate
my proxy to numerous other known dimensions of frictions. I find that apart from
liquidity FFP is related to funding conditions, information uncertainty and credit
risk.
I investigate the stock sensitivity to aggregate frictions and find that securities
with high market beta and small capitalisation tend to co-move with frictions.
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Similarly, stocks with high price uncertainty proxied by low analyst coverage and
high dispersion of EPS forecasts are also more sensitive to friction risk. Finally,
stocks with high leverage are more dependent on aggregate frictions.
Finally, I study the cross-sectional ability of financial friction risk to explain
stock returns. I find that investors are willing to hedge against such risk. Stocks
with high sensitivity to frictions are under-performing securities with low sensitivity
generating a negative risk premium. Overall, this paper offers a risk based explanation
of observed ETF premiums and provides a novel method for computing aggregate
financial friction proxy at a country level using the absolute ETF premiums/discounts
that can be useful in the future international studies.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: ETF Trading Bounds
This diagram shows a hypothetical path of ETF price (from P1 to P5) relative to NAV in the
presence of upper and lower trading bounds.
NAV
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
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Figure 1.2: Average Absolute Premium
This figure shows the cross-sectional daily average of absolute premiums of 22 ETFs in the sample
from June 2002- June 2018. The absolute premium is measured as the absolute value of the difference
between log price (p) and log of net asset value (NAV ). Top figure shows the simple version, the
middle figure shows the version based on Goetzmann et al. (2001) adjustment, and the bottom
figure shows the version based on Engle and Sarkar (2006) adjustment.
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Table 1.1: Sample of iShares ETFs considered in the study
This table shows the list of international country-level iShares ETFs used in this study.
Country ETF Name: iShares Ticker Basket Currency Tracking Index
Australia MSCI Australia ETF EWA AUD MSCI Australia Index
Austria MSCI Austria Capped ETF EWO EUR MSCI Austria IMI 25/50
Belgium MSCI Belgium Capped ETF EWK EUR MSCI Belgium IMI 25/50
Canada MSCI Canada ETF EWC CAD MSCI Canada Index
Denmark MSCI Denmark Capped ETF EDEN DKK MSCI Denmark IMI 25/50 Index
Finland MSCI Finland Capped ETF EFNL EUR MSCI Finland IMI 25/50 Index
France MSCI France ETF EWQ EUR MSCI France Index
Germany MSCI Germany ETF EWG EUR MSCI Germany Index
Hong Kong MSCI Hong Kong ETF EWH HKD MSCI Hong Kong Index
Ireland MSCI Ireland Capped ETF EIRL EUR MSCI All Ireland Capped Index
Israel MSCI Israel Capped ETF EIS ILS MSCI Israel Capped IMI
Italy MSCI Italy Capped ETF EWI EUR MSCI Italy 25/50
Japan MSCI Japan ETF EWJ JPY MSCI Japan Index
Netherlands MSCI Netherlands ETF EWN EUR MSCI Netherlands IMI
New Zealand MSCI New Zealand Capped ENZL NZD MSCI New Zealand IMI 25/50
Norway MSCI Norway Capped ETF ENOR NOK MSCI Norway IMI 25-50 Index
Singapore MSCI Singapore ETF EWS SGD MSCI Singapore Index
Spain MSCI Spain Capped ETF EWP EUR MSCI Spain 25/50
Sweden MSCI Sweden ETF EWD SEK MSCI Sweden Index
Switzerland MSCI Switzerland Capped ETF EWL CHF MSCI Switzerland 25/50
United Kingdom MSCI United Kingdom ETF EWU GBP MSCI United Kingdom Index
USA Core S&P 500 ETF IVV USD S&P 500
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: ETF Premium- no adjustment
This table shows the summary statistics for the daily ETF premium and for absolute value of the
premium (Mean Deviation). The absolute deviation is measured as
∑T
t=1 |pi,t −NAVi,t|, where pi,t
and NAVi,t are the log of price and log of net asset value of fund i at time t. The standard deviation,
minimum, maximum as well as skewness and kurtosis are shown for premium. The bottom of the
table shows the cross-sectional average of the summary statistics aggregated by the geographical
areas: Global, North America, Europe, Asia Pacific. The data period is from June 2002 until June
2018.
Countries Mean Mean Standard Min (%) Max (%) Skewness Kurtosis
Premium (%) Deviation (%) Deviation (%)
Australia 0.114 0.745 1.102 -8.902 10.920 -0.355 14.208
Austria -0.002 0.571 0.862 -8.889 8.419 -0.790 17.277
Belgium 0.057 0.517 0.785 -7.601 7.668 -0.215 17.100
Canada 0.063 0.317 0.519 -5.348 12.453 3.943 91.089
Denmark 0.119 0.368 0.474 -2.270 2.892 -0.011 5.350
Finland 0.128 0.393 0.557 -7.734 4.030 -1.682 32.975
France 0.056 0.480 0.726 -5.028 8.836 0.627 19.633
Germany 0.042 0.470 0.702 -5.827 7.354 0.247 14.478
Hong Kong 0.025 0.734 1.104 -9.347 7.917 -0.538 11.493
Ireland 0.539 0.787 0.863 -3.230 5.201 0.182 3.532
Israel -0.048 0.567 0.899 -16.645 4.575 -3.362 55.170
Italy 0.049 0.517 0.760 -6.413 7.690 -0.057 14.221
Japan 0.071 0.780 1.127 -12.666 12.155 -0.383 14.489
Netherlands 0.045 0.486 0.729 -6.055 6.833 -0.147 14.961
New Zealand 0.055 0.464 0.636 -3.390 4.387 -0.102 6.405
Norway 0.079 0.460 0.635 -3.410 6.414 0.213 11.391
Singapore 0.031 0.732 1.085 -8.646 7.520 -0.794 9.328
Spain 0.044 0.518 0.774 -6.248 8.380 0.279 15.552
Sweden 0.096 0.615 0.935 -7.759 9.437 0.122 15.822
Switzerland 0.136 0.485 0.700 -4.525 5.844 0.060 10.205
UK 0.307 0.594 0.785 -6.313 9.876 0.258 16.320
U.S. 0.005 0.063 0.108 -1.046 1.514 1.046 30.405
Global 0.083 0.420 0.623 -6.196 6.451 -0.428 18.382
North America 0.034 0.163 0.267 -2.715 6.410 3.999 92.346
Europe 0.099 0.445 0.663 -5.951 7.105 -0.180 18.767
Asia & Pacific 0.062 0.651 0.971 -9.890 8.903 -0.679 14.057
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics: ETF Premium- Goetzmann et al. (2001)
adjustment
This table shows the summary statistics for the daily ETF premium and for absolute value of the
premium (Mean Deviation). The absolute deviation is measured as
∑T
t=1 |pi,t −NAVi,t|, where pi,t
and NAVi,t are the log of price and log of net asset value of fund i at time t. NAV is adjusted based
on Goetzmann et al. (2001) as in equation 1.2. The standard deviation, minimum, maximum as well
as skewness and kurtosis are shown for premium. The bottom of the table shows the cross-sectional
average of the summary statistics aggregated by the geographical areas: Global, North America,
Europe, Asia Pacific. The data period is from June 2002 until June 2018.
Countries Mean Mean Standard Min (%) Max (%) Skewness Kurtosis
Premium (%) Deviation (%) Deviation (%)
Australia 0.100 0.481 0.681 -5.708 6.060 0.065 10.378
Austria -0.010 0.507 0.737 -8.280 5.824 -0.716 12.727
Belgium 0.049 0.463 0.683 -6.403 5.487 -0.404 13.068
Canada 0.058 0.323 0.521 -5.537 10.628 2.854 54.941
Denmark 0.105 0.331 0.430 -1.345 2.624 0.491 5.686
Finland 0.114 0.372 0.510 -6.419 4.070 -0.927 24.269
France 0.049 0.410 0.592 -3.591 5.907 0.459 11.336
Germany 0.036 0.406 0.589 -3.087 5.517 0.370 10.314
Hong Kong 0.016 0.531 0.789 -5.450 8.422 -0.050 11.642
Ireland 0.530 0.777 0.852 -2.662 4.972 0.253 3.285
Israel -0.054 0.489 0.774 -16.551 4.178 -4.403 87.953
Italy 0.042 0.446 0.633 -5.447 4.870 0.100 9.710
Japan 0.061 0.538 0.769 -7.490 7.145 0.115 13.630
Netherlands 0.038 0.414 0.593 -3.513 4.590 0.055 8.807
New Zealand 0.039 0.372 0.500 -2.229 2.723 0.118 5.291
Norway 0.061 0.413 0.572 -2.642 6.537 0.819 14.671
Singapore 0.024 0.580 0.870 -5.406 5.436 -0.893 8.973
Spain 0.037 0.437 0.631 -5.106 5.105 0.320 10.730
Sweden 0.087 0.520 0.757 -6.323 7.147 0.233 11.520
Switzerland 0.129 0.421 0.593 -3.679 3.710 0.267 7.090
UK 0.300 0.524 0.648 -3.470 6.274 0.339 8.195
U.S. 0.005 0.063 0.108 -1.046 1.514 1.046 30.405
Global 0.076 0.291 0.408 -3.272 3.907 -0.085 12.038
North America 0.032 0.166 0.269 -2.810 5.498 2.890 55.608
Europe 0.092 0.359 0.508 -3.683 4.625 0.048 11.421
Asia & Pacific 0.052 0.406 0.585 -4.974 6.107 -0.224 11.355
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: ETF Premium- Engle and Sarkar (2006)
adjustment
This table shows the summary statistics for the daily ETF premium and for absolute value of the
premium (Mean Deviation). The absolute deviation is measured as
∑T
t=1 |pi,t −NAVi,t|, where pi,t
and NAVi,t are the log of price and log of net asset value of fund i at time t. NAV is adjusted based
on Engle and Sarkar (2006) as in equation 1.3. The standard deviation, minimum, maximum as well
as skewness and kurtosis are shown for premium. The bottom of the table shows the cross-sectional
average of the summary statistics aggregated by the geographical areas: Global, North America,
Europe, Asia Pacific. The data period is from June 2002 until June 2018.
Countries Mean Mean Standard Min (%) Max (%) Skewness Kurtosis
Premium (%) Deviation (%) Deviation (%)
Australia 0.097 0.472 0.663 -5.320 4.908 -0.127 8.674
Austria -0.011 0.491 0.715 -7.371 4.995 -0.885 12.177
Belgium 0.048 0.439 0.652 -6.549 4.234 -0.726 14.498
Canada 0.061 0.306 0.488 -4.267 10.477 3.276 61.915
Denmark 0.111 0.322 0.413 -1.340 2.618 0.400 5.468
Finland 0.117 0.347 0.479 -6.227 4.144 -0.995 27.523
France 0.045 0.363 0.510 -3.189 5.131 0.279 9.623
Germany 0.032 0.355 0.499 -2.446 4.285 0.299 8.170
Hong Kong 0.009 0.491 0.707 -4.484 8.064 0.048 11.188
Ireland 0.534 0.762 0.830 -2.237 4.823 0.250 3.086
Israel -0.061 0.462 0.726 -16.501 4.503 -4.840 107.938
Italy 0.034 0.408 0.566 -4.826 4.008 -0.068 8.019
Japan 0.057 0.483 0.689 -5.599 6.522 0.230 12.741
Netherlands 0.035 0.378 0.533 -3.420 3.840 -0.231 7.529
New Zealand 0.037 0.362 0.480 -2.034 2.205 0.070 4.814
Norway 0.063 0.392 0.540 -2.398 6.275 0.864 15.299
Singapore 0.017 0.542 0.818 -5.926 4.948 -1.080 9.903
Spain 0.032 0.409 0.578 -4.565 4.155 0.137 8.466
Sweden 0.085 0.480 0.685 -5.511 5.141 0.110 9.491
Switzerland 0.128 0.401 0.564 -3.566 4.029 0.310 7.157
UK 0.296 0.492 0.589 -3.415 4.930 0.226 6.604
U.S. 0.005 0.063 0.108 -1.046 1.514 1.046 30.405
Global 0.074 0.274 0.371 -2.507 2.878 -0.225 8.090
North America 0.033 0.157 0.250 -2.175 5.422 3.308 63.434
Europe 0.089 0.324 0.445 -2.866 3.593 -0.154 8.873
Asia & Pacific 0.048 0.375 0.532 -3.156 5.538 -0.272 9.408
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Table 1.5: Absolute Premium and Illiquidity Risks
This table shows the results of a panel regression of the absolute value of ETF premiums on the
currency illiquidity (IML) and global market illiquidity (MILLIQG), as well as monthly fixed
effects and country fixed effects run conditionally on whether the fund is traded at the premium or
discount.
|pi,t −NAVi,t| = α+ β1IMLt + β2MILLIQGt + FEi + FEt + εi,t
The results are presented for 2 versions of ETF premiums: the one based on Goetzmann et al.
(2001) adjustment (FFPG) and the one based on Engle and Sarkar (2006) adjustment (FFPE).
The IML (MILLIQG) is measured as a long-short portfolio of currency pairs (stocks) sorted by
bid-ask spread (Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio) and rebalanced daily. The regression is performed
at a daily level. The sample is from June 2002- June 2018. ***,**,* show the significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
Panel A: Premium Panel B: Discount
Variables FFPG FFPE FFPG FFPE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IML 0.050*** 0.038*** -0.049*** -0.015*
(5.13) (6.19) (-3.22) (-2.06)
MILLIQG 0.026** 0.014** -0.049*** -0.031***
(2.13) (2.21) (-3.61) (-7.15)
Constant 0.008 0.009 0.007*** 0.007***
(7.84) (9.47) (14.72) (18.05)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42,561 42,563 33,354 33,352
Countries 22 22 22 22
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.175 0.236 0.222
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Table 1.7: U.S. FFP and Proxies for Individual Components of Frictions
This table shows the result of a time-series regression of the financial friction proxy FFP for the
U.S. on various proxies for individual components of frictions such as: investor sentiments (Sent)
of Baker and Wurgler (2006), TED spread (TED), Moody’s spread (Moodys), ∆V IX, change in
Consumer Confidence Index (∆CCI) , Aggregate disagreement (AD) of Hong and Sraer (2016) and
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity proxy (PS).
FFPUS = α+ β1Sent+ β2TED+ β3Moodys+ β4∆V IX + β5∆CCI + β6AD+ β7PS + εt (1.6)
The standard errors are based on Newey and West (1987). The data is at the monthly and daily
frequency and is from June 2002-June 2018. Sent, AD and PS are assumed to be constant during
a month for daily regression. ***,**,* shows the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Variables Monthly Daily
Total Total Premium Discount
Sent -0.002* -0.001 -0.002** -0.001
(-1.76) (-1.06) (-2.12) (-0.69)
TED 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(3.10) (5.38) (5.07) (3.90)
Moodys 0.006*** 0.261*** 0.214*** 0.326***
(5.18) (7.09) (6.41) (7.03)
∆V IX 0.002** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.051***
(2.33) (5.68) (9.85) (9.64)
∆CCI -0.171 - - -
(-1.42) - - -
AD -0.007 -0.015 -0.019 -0.020
(-1.23) ( -0.16) (-0.78) (-0.28)
PS -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(-1.42) (-0.66) (-0.37) (-0.78)
Constant 0.001 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.49) (7.98) (7.33) (4.40)
Observations 189 3,806 2,338 1,468
Adjusted R2 0.731 0.252 0.315 0.455
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Table 1.8: Stock Determinants of FFP Exposure
This table shows the results of a panel regression of FFP betas βFFPUSi,t
of stock i (from the
U.S.) at time t on the market beta, log of market value of equity, book to market ratio, number
of analysts covering the stock, dispersion of analyst forecasts of EPS, idiosyncratic volatility of
residuals from market model, stock leverage measured as a ratio of the value of total liabilities to
market capitalization and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (coefficient is shown in 102). βFFPi,t is
computed from equation 1.4 . The regression includes time and industry fixed effects based on 49
Fama-French industry classification. The sample is from May 2007 until June 2018. ***,**,* show
the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Market beta 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.035***
(5.10) (5.91) (5.83)
Market Equity -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(-4.72) (-4.27) (-4.26)
Book to Market ratio -0.007** 0.002 -0.002
(-2.38) (0.45) (-0.54)
Number of Analysts -0.002*** -0.002***
(-4.83) (-4.86)
Dispersion in Analyst Forecasts 0.003* 0.003*
(1.81) (1.71)
Idiosyncratic volatility -0.223 -0.295
(-1.63) (-1.12)
Financial leverage 0.001***
(3.39)
Amihud Illiquidity -1.00
(-1.61)
Constant 0.143 0.087 0.089
(1.42) (0.82) (0.85)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 416,723 293,278 292,450
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.18 0.19
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Table 1.9: Stock Portfolios and Financial Frictions: the U.S.
This table shows the average excess returns over the risk-free rate of portfolios sorted by the exposure
to financial friction proxy (FFPUS). The sample covers stocks with primary listing in the U.S.
At the beginning of every month stocks are sorted into quintiles based on ex ante sensitivity to
FFPUS (measured using 60-month rolling window). Excess returns, intercept from CAPM model,
Fama-French 3-factor model and Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (includes MRP, HML, SMB and
UMD factors) are reported. Panel A shows the results based on value-weighted portfolios. Panel
B shows the results based on equally-weighted portfolios. Returns and alphas are in percent per
month. T-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The sample is from May
2007 until June 2018. ***,**,* show the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolios
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Excess Returns 0.871*** 0.723* 0.589** 0.653** 0.572* -0.299**
(2.81) (1.70) (2.19) (2.04) (1.91) (-2.24)
CAPM α 0.322** 0.421* 0.264* 0.085* 0.009 -0.313**
(2.54) (1.82) (1.95) (1.73) (1.35) (-2.41)
FF 3-factor α 0.301** 0.409 0.257** -0.034* -0.084 -0.385**
(2.25) (1.62) (1.98) (-1.78) (1.14) (-2.33)
4-factor α 0.289** 0.402* 0.211** -0.088* -0.181 -0.470**
(2.12) (1.65) (2.13) (-1.75) (-1.62) (-2.21)
Panel B: Equally-weighted portfolios
Excess Returns 0.748*** 0.616* 0.519* 0.569** 0.477** -0.271**
(2.41) (1.69) (1.79) (2.13) (2.02) (-2.07)
4-factor α 0.333** 0.454* 0.143** 0.091 -0.119* -0.452**
(2.32) (1.73) (2.01) (0.32) (-1.71) (-1.97)
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Table 1.10: Stock Portfolios and Financial Frictions: International
This table shows the average excess returns (H-L) of portfolios with high exposure to financial friction
proxy (FFP ) over the portfolios with low exposure to FFP for 21 country in the development
market sample. At the beginning of every month stocks are sorted into quintiles based on ex ante
sensitivity to FFP (measured based on Goetzmann et al. (2001) adjustment using 60-month rolling
window). The reported excess return is the average difference between value-weighted portfolio 5
and portfolio 1 (where 5 is the highest). 4-factor alpha is the intercept from the regression of the
long-short portfolio on Carhart (1997) 4 factor model that includes MRP, HML, SMB and UMD
factors. Returns and alphas are in percent per month. T-statistics is based on Newey and West
(1987) standard errors. The sample is from May 2007 until June 2018. ***,**,* show the significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Based on Goetzmann et al. (2001) adjustment
Country H-L t-stat 4-factor α t-stat
Australia -0.562*** (-2.79) -0.811** (-2.10)
Austria -0.657** (-2.01) -0.546*** (-2.99)
Belgium -0.292 (-0.75) -0.301 (-0.71)
Canada -0.621** (-2.27) -0.484** (-2.52)
Denmark -1.027** (-2.33) -0.873*** (-2.60)
Finland 0.344 (0.80) 0.124 (0.22)
France -0.502** (-2.37) -0.326* (-1.79)
Germany -0.281** (-2.41) -0.304*** (-2.66)
Hong Kong -0.487* (-1.93) -0.724** (-2.28)
Ireland 0.186 (0.20) 0.062 (0.02)
Israel -0.040 (-0.09) -0.058 (-0.10)
Italy -0.162** (-2.52) -0.237*** (-2.83)
Japan -0.042 (-0.16) -0.012 (-0.40)
Netherlands 0.865 (1.50) 0.689 (1.22)
New Zealand -0.259* (-1.78) -0.342** (-2.26)
Norway -0.205** (-2.32) -0.218** (-2.17)
Singapore 0.217 (0.66) 0.197 (0.45)
Spain -0.544* (-1.73) -0.631* (-1.94)
Sweden -0.221*** (-2.64) -0.334*** (-2.89)
Switzerland -0.248** (-2.30) -0.214** (-2.16)
UK -0.102** (-2.11) -0.121** (-2.35)
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Chapter 2
ETF Arbitrage and
International Diversification
2.1 Introduction
Significant innovations in financial products made international investments in-
creasingly possible. Over the recent years, exchange-traded funds experienced a
double-digit growth in assets under management. Low management fees allow ETFs
to compete for market share with more expensive mutual funds and future contracts
(e.g., Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2017).1 Yet, trading across major country
ETFs, and its association with local and global uncertainty remains understudied.
Country ETFs are a low-cost vehicle for foreign investments in benchmark country
indices across the world, and hence provide access to foreign markets, in particular
for retail investors. Many exchange-traded fund providers refer to international
diversification as one of the key advantages of investing in this type of products.2
While the majority of earlier studies focus on the effects of ETFs on the underlying
securities in the basket that it tracks, I propose a transmission mechanism of U.S.
market shocks to foreign country equity markets via ETF trading.
I provide a view that as the U.S. accommodates the largest share of ETF
global trading volume, its market conditions directly impact the decisions of country
1Roll costs are important when trading futures.
2Blackrock: https://www.ishares.com/us/strategies/invest-internationally.
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ETF investors.3 I show that international ETF market participants trade based on
shocks related to U.S. fundamentals rather than local ones, and propagate those
shocks to local markets. The shock transmission is performed via ETF arbitrage.
I argue that such arbitrage activity is one of the few mechanisms responsible for
increasing correlation between the U.S. market and the rest of the world. This high
cross-country correlation limits the ability of investors to cheaply diversify U.S. risk
via international ETF investments. Country ETFs often provide an easier access to
less integrated emerging markets or to countries where direct investments are costly
(e.g., Brazil). Such ETFs become increasingly popular with iShares Emerging Markets
ETF being the second largest ETF by trading volume in the world.4 However, the
transmission of U.S. shocks to those markets limits the diversification benefits of
emerging market strategies.
I first test the hypothesis whether country ETF investors react to changes in
the U.S. rather than local economic uncertainty, as measured by CBOE Volatility
Index (VIX). To this end, I compute order imbalances of different market participants,
based on identification of Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (e.g., 2017) and trade size (e.g.,
Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009; Peress and Schmidt, 2017), with a particular focus
on retail activity. Using a large cross-section of 41 countries, I find strong association
between ETF order imbalances and U.S. VIX, indicating that international investment
decisions are mainly driven by the latter measure, rather than its local counterparts.
For example, an increase in the U.S. VIX results in a selling pressure in the country
ETF market. Such result is robust to different volatility regimes and is consistent
across different types of investors. Asymmetric response analysis confirms that
country ETF investors only react to positive changes in local VIX, which correspond
to negative news in the local markets. Moreover, I observe that, when reacting to an
increase in U.S. uncertainty, investors switch to safer assets such as cash equivalent
ETFs. I also decompose the VIX into the economic uncertainty and risk aversion
3According to Deutsche Bank’s ETF Annual Review & Outlook just for equity ETFs turnover in
U.S. was $16.38 trillion out of $18.26 trillion globally in 2016.
4http://etfdb.com/compare/volume/.
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components and find that traders react more strongly to changes in U.S. economic
uncertainty rather than the risk aversion component of the VIX.
I also find that investors respond to changes in U.S. political uncertainty
differently than to economic uncertainty- they leave the U.S. stock market and
buy international country-level ETFs. However, they do not react to local political
uncertainty and the economic effect of political risk is much smaller than of changes
in U.S. VIX. My result is related to Levy and Lieberman (2013) who show the
overreaction to U.S. returns during non-synchronised trading hours. They observe
that since ETF and local market (especially Asian) are open during different market-
hours, intra-day price formation is often driven by S&P 500 returns, rather than
changes in net asset value of the fund. In contrast to their study, I focus on order
imbalance rather than returns, as it allows me to assess the trading decisions of
different types of investors. My analysis is both on the daily and monthly level,
and as such I alleviate non-synchronicity effects. Furthermore, I utilize a much
broader cross-sectional sample. In addition, my result is in line with a recent study
of Converse, Levy-Yeyati, and Williams (2018) who show that ETF fund flows are
much more (less) sensitive to global (local) risk factors than mutual funds. Authors
relate this effect to ETFs attracting uninformed investors. In contrast, my analysis
shows the reaction to U.S. risk is common to all investor types.
A large set of literature focuses on the effect of one central economy, the U.S.,
on the rest of the world. Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2013) highlight the leading
role of the U.S. market, and show the predictability of country-level returns by U.S.
returns. Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) examine the effect of U.S. economy
on global financial variables (e.g., cross-border credit flows, leverage etc.). They
highlight the role of a global factor that can explain a large portion of the variation
in global asset returns, and is related to global risk aversion and aggregate volatility.
Atanasov (2014) shows that a single “global consumption factor” can explain more
than 70% of cross-sectional variation in stock returns. Rey (2015) documents the
existence of a global financial cycle. A “central country” has an impact on leverage
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of banks, growth and availability of credit across the world. CBOE Volatility index
(VIX), that is, implied volatility of options written on S&P 500, is often used as
a measure of uncertainty and is generally perceived as an indicator of market fear.
VIX is significantly correlated with a global risk factor affecting international stock
returns. Rey (2015) shows that when VIX is low for a long time, there is a boom in
the global financial cycle and inflation of stock prices. In contrast, high values of
VIX are negatively associated with capital inflow, credit growth and leverage in all
of the main financial centres across the world. Forbes and Warnock (2012) highlights
the relationship between VIX, as a proxy for global risk, and international capital
flows. Therefore, I use VIX as a key variable in my empirical analysis in the context
of passive international investment via ETFs.
The central role in earlier models is often allocated to large international
banks (via leverage and risk appetite) that use U.S. dollars as a funding currency and
provide credit across borders and foreign direct investments. Another set of literature
studies the role of mutual funds that are being affected by investor redemptions during
crisis periods on international transmission of shocks (e.g., Jotikasthira, Lundblad,
and Ramadorai, 2012; Raddatz and Schmukler, 2012). However, the role of indirect
investment via ETFs is often overlooked. In contrast, I look at the ETF arbitrage
that propagates both fundamental and non-fundamental shocks to the underlying
economies. I argue that due to ETF arbitrage mechanism, U.S. fundamentals get
incorporated into local market returns, which in turn results in a high positive
correlation of local market returns with the U.S. market.
Another strand of the literature studies the role of increased correlation during
periods of high volatility (e.g., Solnik, Boucrelle, and Le Fur, 1996). In particularly,
an important concern is the comovement of countries during crisis periods, but there
is a disagreement on what can be classified as contagion. Forbes (2012) treats it
more generally, as a strong negative shock that is transmitted to other countries. He
suggests that there are four important and often interlinked channels for contagion:
trade, banks, portfolio investors, and wake-up calls. In contrast, Bekaert, Ehrmann,
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Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014) define contagion as an increase in correlation across
stocks beyond what can be explained by fundamentals. They explore different types
of contagion during recent financial crisis and find the support for wake-up call
hypothesis. According to wake-up call hypothesis (first proposed by Goldstein, 1998),
the crisis originated in one market provides a new information about true value
of fundamentals to other markets. I complement this literature by showing that
ETF arbitrage mechanism is an important channel that transmits U.S. shocks to
individual countries and hence increases cross-country equity market correlations
beyond crises.
In order to access the impact of ETF arbitrage on correlation of country
returns with the U.S. market, I regress monthly innovations in such correlation
both on a dummy variable capturing staggered introduction of ETF markets across
countries, and on a proxy for ETF arbitrage during different volatility regimes.
I provide time-series evidence that during periods of high volatility in the U.S.,
the introduction of the ETF market, and more importantly, an increase in the
arbitrage activity by the authorized participant (AP) (as measured by net share
creation/redemption) in the ETF market results in an increase in innovation in such
monthly correlation of the underlying country stock market indices. The latter result
is consistent with the literature on global contagion and, in particular, wake-up call
hypothesis. I argue that during periods of high volatility in the U.S. market, it is
harder for investors to distinguish between noise and fundamental component of the
order flow. Consequently, based on wake-up call hypothesis investor may treat U.S.
shocks as relevant to their own country and consume such shocks via ETF arbitrage.
I also explain cross-country variation in return correlation with the U.S.
market. According to Ben-David et al. (2018), non-fundamental shocks must be
reversed over time. This suggests that if all shocks transmitted from ETF market to
local economies were non-fundamental, ETF arbitrage would not contribute towards
increased correlation. In contrast, if the price deviation from the NAV is due to
faster incorporation of fundamental information in ETF market, then arbitrage
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should affect returns of underlying index, and such effect should not be reverted. If
such fundamental information is common both to U.S. and local market, one should
observe a higher correlation between them. Section 2.2 provides the details of this
mechanism which leads to increased correlation. Consistent with the literature, I
argue that ETF transmits both fundamental and noise shocks to the underlying
economies. I show that countries that have a higher degree of price discovery in
their ETFs have on average a higher correlation (integration) with the U.S. market.
In these markets fundamental information gets incorporated into ETF prices faster
than in the Net Asset Value (NAV), and therefore, market makers closely follow
and learn from changes in ETF prices. This is the case when derivative securities
price the underlying assets, rather than the other way around. In addition, in order
for fundamental shocks to get transmitted to underlying markets, the authorised
participants (AP) must engage in arbitrage activity. I find that the lower the limits
to ETF arbitrage, the higher is the correlation (integration) between a country and
the U.S. market. Neither the international trade channel nor the business cycles
alter this result. This is in line with Rozental (2019) who argues that the AP may
not engage in the arbitrage activity if the reward for facing ETF arbitrage risks is
not high enough.
Most of ETF research focuses on evaluation of negative and positive con-
sequences of ETF trading on underlying markets (see Ben-David et al. (2017) for
a survey of recent ETF literature). Malamud (2016) theoretically shows that de-
mand shocks can be propagated to the underlying markets. A strong debate is
about whether such shocks reflect fundamental information that is incorporated into
ETF faster than to NAV or reflect non-fundamental liquidity shocks that diminish
information efficiency of underlying stock prices. There is mixed evidence of both
effects. Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016) show that ETF trading can partially
transmit information about systematic fundamentals to the underlying stocks leading
to information efficiency improvement. Lettau and Madhavan (2018) and Wermers
and Xue (2015) argue for the existence of price discovery in ETF market. Madhavan
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and Sobczyk (2016) make a similar argument and develop a theoretical model that
incorporates both noise and price discovery in ETF prices. Marshall et al. (2013) find
that when underlying liquidity of stock market is low, ETF prices adjust faster than
NAV. In contrast, Ben-David et al. (2018) show that ETFs increase the volatility of
underlying assets due to propagation of noise via arbitrage mechanism. They show
that such additional layer of volatility is non-fundamental. Israeli et al. (2017) show
that increase in ETF ownership leads to a rise in trading costs of the underlying
markets and a potential shift of retail traders to ETF market leading to a decline
in information efficiency over a longer term (due to less analyst coverage). Brown,
Davies, and Ringgenberg (2019) demonstrate that arbitrage activity in ETF market
negatively predicts future stock returns suggesting non-fundamental based view. Da
and Shive (2018) show that arbitrage in U.S. domestic ETFs can cause an excessive
comovement amount stocks in the underlying basket of securities. They show that
shocks propagated from ETF markets also include non-fundamental ones due to price
pressure, and are reflected in negative autocorrelation in stocks and ETF returns.
My study complements this literature and studies the consequences of price discovery
process in ETF market on the cross-country correlation.
Section 2.2 describes the link between ETF arbitrage and cross-country
correlation. Section 2.3 introduces the data sources and the construction of key
variables. Section 2.4 provides the empirical results. Section 2.5 shows the results of
my robustness tests. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 ETF Arbitrage and Correlation: Mechanism
ETF arbitrage mechanism is a unique feature of the market that theoretically allows
prices to continuously track underlying stocks. A fund is traded at a premium
(discount) when ETF price is higher (lower) than the NAV. The AP (designated
dealer in the ETF market) has an incentive to correct the emergence of arbitrage
by placing opposing trades in local and ETF markets. For example, to correct the
52
ETF premium AP can sell ETF shares and buy underlying basket of securities.
The constituents of this basket are published daily by ETF sponsor in the portfolio
composition file (PCF). Then, at the end of the day AP is able to deliver and
exchange such basket of securities to ETF sponsor for newly created ETF shares
(“in-kind” creation). As a result of such arbitrage activity the gap between ETF
price and NAV should be closed.
Despite the existence of such mechanism deviations of prices from the NAV
of the fund are common. Pan and Zeng (2019) show that when there is a liquidity
mismatch between ETF and underlying market, APs may not be willing to correct
the existing deviations. Petajisto (2017) highlights the existence of limits to arbitrage
in ETF market especially for international funds. He shows that such deviations
can last for days. I am interested in the consequences of such arbitrage incidents
on the return of the underlying index. As argued by Ben-David et al. (2018) when
arbitrage mechanism transmits non-fundamental shocks to underlying stocks, over
time, stock and ETF prices move back to fundamental levels. In contrast to such
view, Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016) argue that although the indicative NAV is
published throughout the day (every 15 seconds) the “true” NAV is often hard to
estimate. U.S. market often trades when underlying markets are closed, in which
case NAV is a closing value of a previous day corrected by foreign exchange return.
International equity ETFs specifically suffer from such a problem. In addition, for a
basket with a large composition the correct estimation of the total value of assets is
often complicated. As such, any deviation between price and NAV can be either due
to transitory liquidity shocks or due to price discovery in ETF market.5
Similarly to this view, I argue that any deviation between ETF price and NAV
reflects a mix of noise and fundamental information. The mechanism is illustrated
in Figure 2.1. When U.S. investors experience an increase in VIX (e.g., bad news
about future U.S. fundamentals arrives in the market) the following happens:
1. Both retail and institutional U.S. investors negatively react to increase in
5Appendix B.1 provides a description of the model of Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016).
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market uncertainty and sell ETF of country A. I show such response in section
2.4.2. Investors also sell S&P constituents (negative return of U.S. market).
2. A sell-off of ETF leads to a decrease in its market price below the NAV of the
fund. When the decrease is significant enough and limits to arbitrage are low,
AP intervenes exploiting the ETF arbitrage mechanism outlined above.
3. AP buys ETF shares and short-sells (or reduces his inventory) the underlying
stocks of country A (in a correct proportion in line with portfolio composition
file). As a result, the prices of underlying stocks are reduced. ETF shares are
delivered to ETF sponsor and get redeemed for the underlying stocks. AP
closes his short position.
4. If local dealer uses ETF market to price the underlying market (i.e., price
discovery happens in the ETF market), the decrease in prices of underlying
stocks is permanent (negative return of county’s A market). This results in
positive correlation between the U.S. market and country A. If decrease in
ETF price is considered as noise, that is, if VIX changes are not fundamental
news for country A, both ETF and underlying stock prices will be moved back
to fundamental level (as in Ben-David et al., 2018) and therefore, there should
not be any positive effect on correlation. This mechanism will be impaired, if
the price discovery in the ETF market is distorted due to noise trading.
[insert figure 2.1 here]
2.3 Data and Methodology
In this section I discuss my sample construction, different measures of order im-
balances used in this paper, as well as the methodology for obtaining proxies for
economic and political risk sentiments. I begin by describing the type of funds that
are considered in this paper and proceed with a discussion of methods for capturing
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trading activities of different types of investors, as well as proxies for economic and
political uncertainty.
2.3.1 MSCI Country Indices and iShare ETFs
My focus is on exchange-traded funds provided by iShares (Blackrock, Inc.) that
track a general MSCI index of a single country6, do not hedge their currency exposure
and are traded on one of the U.S. exchanges. The final sample consists of 41 funds
traded on NYSE Arca, NASDAQ or CBOE BZX (Bats) (see table B.1 in the appendix
for details of ETFs). U.S. ETF market is one of the most developed and represents
a significant portion of the world ETF trading volume. My sample covers developed
and emerging economies and has a wide geographical reach: 22 ETFs are from
Europe, Middle East or African; 13 ETFs are from Asia and Pacific regions; 6 ETFs
are from Latin and North America. The majority of my analysis is on a daily level
and covers the period of January 2006 - June 2018. I obtain ETF prices, MSCI daily
index (in USD) and its turnover from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg.
Officially published end of day net asset values (NAV) of funds are available directly
from iShares website.
2.3.2 Total Order Imbalance
I obtain intra-day quote and trade data for 41 ETFs from TAQ database. Total
ETF order flow (TOI) is constructed by matching quote and trade data from TAQ
database using Holden and Jacobsen (2014) time interpolation method. I use Lee
and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign the trades (see the appendix B.2 for more details
on these two methods). The order imbalance is calculated as a difference between
buyer and seller dollar volume scaled by the total dollar-volume on a particular day.
TOIt =
buyerst − sellerst
buyerst + sellerst
(2.1)
6Many of single country ETFs in my sample are on the list of top 100 funds by traded volume
on etfdb.com. In my sample Brazil , Japan, China, Taiwan, India, Hong Kong, Mexico, Germany
and South Korea are the most popular.
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I also consider order imbalances of different trader types based on trade size
and retail investor identification (Boehmer et al., 2017). Such differentiation allows
me to conduct a deeper analysis of similarities and differences between these types
of investors in the ways they react to new information.
Order Imbalance: Small vs. Large Trades
ETFs are designed for retail investors. Lack of access to foreign markets and inability
to invest directly into underlying securities due to significant cost barriers (e.g.,
trading costs) are only a few reasons why individual investors use ETFs to invest
in general market indices. Due to several institutional factors (e.g., commission
based advisory practice) retail participation in European ETF markets is still low.
In contrast, participation of U.S. retail investors in this market is relatively higher.
As such, in contrast to other markets the analysis of this type of investors in the
context of U.S. ETF trading is important.
I first consider a measure of retail trading activity based on trade size (Peress
and Schmidt, 2017). Using equation 2.1, I obtain order imbalance for small trades
(OIs). Retail trades are usually identified as the smallest trades of less than or equal
to $5, 000 (e.g., Barber et al., 2009). The limitation of this method is that with the
rise of high-frequency algorithmic trading orders are often sliced into small quantities
(e.g., Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011) and therefore, small trades are likely
to be a noisy measure of retail trading activity.
High-frequency traders often submit a large number of quotes that do not
result in trades in order to uncover the direction of the market. Some exchanges
introduced a fee to deter such activity.7 Hangströmer and Lars (2013) distinguish
between two types of high-frequency trading: market making strategies and oppor-
tunistic trading. They show that order-to-trade ratio (OTR) is much higher for the
former group. High-frequency market makers tend to have zero inventory on average.
7For example see Friederich and Payne (2015) on regulatory fees in Borsa Italiana, Malinova,
Park, and Riordan (2018) in Canada and Jørgensen, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2017) in Oslo Stock
Exchange.
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Therefore, their trades might only reflect temporary inventory adjustments and do
not contain any additional information about the direction of the market.
I follow Skjeltorp, Sojli, and Tham (2015) to construct the OTR. The variable
is based on the number of daily quote updates in TAQ database relative to the total
number of executed trades. My measure of quote updates includes any changes in
the best bid or ask prices across all exchanges, as well as changes in quantities at
such prices.
In order to clean the order imbalance measure from the effect of high frequency
market making activity, I regress the raw measure of small trades (OIs) on the OTR:
OIs,i,t = α+ β1,iOTRi,t + εi,t (2.2)
I take a residual from equation 2.2 to find an order imbalance that is uncorrelated with
a measure of high frequency market making activity. Thus, I denote as smallOIi,t
the innovation of equation 2.2, which serves as a cleaner proxy for small retail trades.
However, I acknowledge that small trades are also likely to capture the activity of
institutional investors who use high frequency algorithms to minimise the impact of
their trades (through smaller trade size and by routing orders to more liquid trading
venues). Therefore, I capture the retail trading activity with an alternative measure
following Boehmer et al. (2017).
I also compute order imbalance for trades over a threshold of $20, 000
(largeOI) in a similar fashion to Barber et al. (2009). This measure presumably
captures the trading activity of institutions that are less likely to use sophisticated
high-frequency algorithms to slice the orders (e.g., pension funds etc.).
Retail Order Imbalance
I use an alternative method suggested by Boehmer et al. (2017) to sign the retail
trades. The authors recognise that in contrast to institutional orders many retail
trades are happening off-exchange and are internalized or executed by a wholesaler.
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Such trades are reported to FINRA Trade Reporting Facility (TRF), marked with
exchange code D in the TAQ trade database and usually executed at prices slightly
above National Best Bid or Offer. The retail seller initiated transactions receive
a small price improvement and are identified by prices with a fraction of a penny
in a range of (0, 0.4). The retail buyer transactions receive a price improvement
as a discount and are identified by prices with a fraction of a penny in a range of
(0.6,1). The Boehmer et al. (2017) type of retail order imbalance (retailOI) is then
calculated in the same way as in equation 2.1.
One of the limitations of this measure is that it only incorporates market
orders, while retail traders often use limit orders. Nonetheless, Boehmer et al. (2017)
suggest that more than half of trades on NYSE are captured by this methodology.
Interestingly, Boehmer et al. (2017) find that this measure captures informed retail
order flow rather than noise trading.
2.3.3 Economic Uncertainty
In order to see how the order imbalance of different groups of investors react to
new information I measure changes in economic uncertainty in the U.S. and in
the underlying economies. I use CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) as a proxy for U.S.
economic uncertainty. The data is available from CBOE website. I also obtain local
alternative of VIX (LVIX) from Bloomberg. Not all countries in my sample have a
local version of VIX. For a few European countries I have to substitute LVIX with
a general European index (VSTOXX Volatility Index). Table B.2 in the appendix
provides the summary statistics of VIX and LVIX. Changes in VIX and LVIX are
positively correlated for all countries, but such correlation is not high. Nevertheless,
I orthogonalise changes in LVIX to changes in VIX and conduct the analysis using
uncorrelated variable ∆LV IXo.
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2.3.4 Political Uncertainty
In order to control for other sources of uncertainty, I follow Da, Engelberg, and Gao
(2011, 2015) and Filippou and Li (2018) to construct a daily political uncertainty
measure. The methodology is based on changes of frequency of word searches in
Google. I first obtain the list of words from Harvard dictionary that is classified as
“political”. I then download the search volume index (SVI) for each of the word on
the list, as well as for top searches that include these words. I take a view of U.S.
investor and, as such, I only obtain the data for U.S.-based searches.8 I compute
the difference in SVI across time. I first winsorize then remove seasonality and
standardise the data. Finally, similarly to Da et al. (2015), I select the most relevant
words by performing an expanding backwards rolling regression of ∆SV Ii for word i
on country j MSCI index return.
∆SV Ii,t = α+ βi∆MSCIj,t + ε (2.3)
The political uncertainty measure is then constructed as a cross-sectional average
of ∆SV I of the words with the most negative t-statistics for βi. Intuitively, an
increase of the political uncertainty measure is associated with increasing “fears” of
the households regarding the political conditions of the country.
2.4 Empirical Results
In this section I evaluate the effects of changes in local and U.S. economic and
political uncertainty on the trading decision of international ETF investors. I
highlight the similarities and differences in the reaction of different investor types (as
outlined above). I further show the implication of such decisions on the correlation
of countries with the U.S. market and emphasize the role of ETF trading as a
transmission mechanism of U.S. uncertainty to local markets.
8Data is available from https://trends.google.com/trends/.
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2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.2 shows the 36-month rolling correlation between returns on S&P 500 index
and the rest of the world (ROW, proxied by returns on MSCI EAFE index). Over
the last 14 years the value of correlation was volatile but high on average. I observe
the minimum correlation of around 0.7 right before the financial crisis in 2007 and
in the middle of 2015. During financial crisis the correlation significantly increases
and reaches its peak of more than 0.9 in 2009. Such high correlation is in line
with the evidence that cross-country correlation increases at times of high market
volatility. Figure 2.2 also shows the 36-month moving average of VIX level. The
rolling correlation between the U.S. market and the ROW closely follows the slow-
moving fluctuations in VIX. Overall, correlation with the U.S. market experiences
significant time variation, but remains high during my sample period.
[insert figure 2.2 here]
Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics of each of the four measures of order
imbalance. On average, order imbalance for all type of traders is small but positive,
suggesting that over my sample these investors are net buyers of ETFs. Among
all countries the largest average order imbalance is for Colombia (0.16) and Saudi
Arabia (0.12), while the most negative is for Peru (-0.03.). The reason why the first
two countries mentioned above are in the top of the ranking can be due to the fact
that the ETF markets for Colombia and Saudi Arabia are very undeveloped and
not very liquid. Over my sample, there has been a number of days with net order
imbalance of 1 for such countries (likely due to only a few buy trades per day).9
For most of the countries standard deviation of smallOI is the lowest. Table 2.2
shows the correlation across different types of order imbalance for each country. All
of these measures tend to be positively correlated, but the correlations are relatively
low, on average. This suggests that I capture the trading activity of different set of
investors with these measures.
9This illiquidity problem is not significant in my sample with most of the countries (even for
Colombia and Saudi Arabia) having a significant number of buys and sells per day.
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[insert tables 2.1 and 2.2 here]
2.4.2 The Role of VIX: Country-level and Panel Results
I first analyse how ETF traders make their investment decisions. My main interest
is to investigate the key risk factors affecting investors’ order imbalances. In order
to understand how an increase in U.S. uncertainty affects market for foreign country
ETFs I regress daily total ETF order imbalance at time t on the percentage change in
VIX at time t− 1. Table 2.3 shows individual country-level results of such regression.
I control for local market effect by including changes in local version of VIX (LV IXo)
and changes in local interest rates (IR).10 I also control for autocorrelation including
lagged order imbalance. I select the optimal number of lags of ∆V IX and ∆LV IXo
using the combination of Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (e.g., AIC and
BIC). My model takes the following form:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k+
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k+δ1∆IRi,t−1+δ2OIi,t−1+ε (2.4)
If the local market drives the order imbalance in the exchange-traded fund market
then I would expect the significance of the local VIX to be over and above the
significance of the U.S. VIX. In contrast, Table 2.3 shows that U.S. VIX coefficients
are significant for almost every country. More importantly, every significant coefficient
is negative implying that investors are more likely to increase their selling pressure
on country ETFs in anticipation of higher U.S. economic uncertainty. In contrast to
U.S. volatility index, its local alternative is almost never significant when included
in my model, suggesting that it is the U.S. uncertainty that has the first-order
effect on international country investments, rather than the uncertainty of target
countries. The significant results of my predictive regression suggest that there is
a delay in reacting to past information. Very few countries have significant local
VIX coefficients. Among those are Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK.
10I use 3-months deposit rate available at a daily frequency from Datastream. If LV IX or IR is
not available it is omitted from the regression.
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These are relatively big regional centres and, as such, investors in those countries
may also pay attention to the information generated in the local market. Overall, the
predictive results suggest that for most of the countries in my sample, an increase in
U.S. uncertainty leads, on average, to a sell-off of country ETFs in the secondary
market.
[insert table 2.3 here]
I also run a predictive panel regression with random effects for all countries in my
sample. In addition to variables used in previous regressions I add two extra controls:
dummy variable (L) that takes the value of 1 if a country has a common language with
the U.S. and 0 otherwise; and a constant that represents the geographical distance
of the country from the U.S. (G). Both of these variables capture the difficulty of
the information generated in the foreign country to flow to the U.S. market. I expect
that in the presence of information frictions, lack of common language and long
distance between countries make it harder to acquire news about local fundamentals.
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k +
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k+
+ δ1∆IRi,t−1 + δ2Li + δ3Gi + δ4OIi,t−1 + ε
(2.5)
Table 2.4 shows the panel results of such regression. I provide the results for all
versions of the dependent variable. In addition, I perform the difference in coefficients
test for every version of order imbalance. On its own, local VIX is significant in
every case while the inclusion of control variables does not reduce its significance. In
addition, the consideration of two lags exhibit strong predictive ability for every type
of order imbalance. However, when U.S. VIX is added in the model (always negative
and highly significant) the loading on ∆LV IX becomes smaller demonstrating the
economic significance of VIX relatively to the local measure. The loadings on local
VIX are still negative and significant for TOI and smallOI, but not for retail
and large order imbalance measures. In full specification, the loading on ∆V IX
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is always at least 3 times larger than for ∆LV IX. The results suggest that one
standard deviation increase in ∆V IX implies a reduction in TOI by $0.87 million
on average11. I also report the results of the contemporaneous regression in table B.4
of the appendix. The results are quantitatively similar with even stronger reaction
to ∆V IX.
[ insert table 2.4 here]
Overall, the results suggest that traders mainly react to changes in U.S. uncertainty.
The effect of local news that relates to future uncertainty has only a second-order
effect on order imbalance of country ETF investors.
2.4.3 VIX and Cash ETFs
My results suggest that when observing an increase in U.S. volatility index investors
tend to sell international country-level ETFs. In this section, I investigate whether
investors switch to other types of ETFs after reducing their positions in international
ETFs. U.S. VIX is a widely used proxy for investors’ fear. An increase in this
measure results in an increase in aggregate risk aversion of investors (e.g., Adrian,
Stackman, and Vogt, 2019; Rey, 2015). I hypothesize that investors would move
their funds to more safe-heaven assets when they expect high volatility in the U.S.
stock market.
ETF.com is a website that lists all ETFs and groups them under different
asset classes and segments. This is a useful tool to obtain a list of all ETFs that are
classified as “cash ETFs”. I select ETFs under “Fixed Income: U.S. Government
Treasury Cash Equivalents” category. These funds invest in U.S. treasuries with less
that 1 year maturity. I compute order imbalance for such funds and take a cross-
sectional average. Table 2.5 shows the individual country-level results of U.S. cash
order imbalance (cashOI) on ∆V IXt−1, ∆LV IX
o
t−1 and other control variables.
12
11 This is based on the average dollar trading volume of $60 million per day.
12Since my depended variable cashOI is the same for every country, I only show those countries
for which local VIX is available. I use Italy as an example of countries for which VSTOXX is used
as a substitute for local volatility. The full table B.14 is reported in the appendix.
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Unlike ∆LV IX, ∆V IX is significant for every country. In contrast to previous
results the loading is positive, which suggests that investors buy cash equivalent ETFs
when facing an increase in U.S. economic uncertainty. The increase in risk aversion
and future volatility makes the expected returns of investing in international ETFs
less attractive to U.S. investors forcing them to find safer investment opportunities.13
[insert table 2.5 here]
2.4.4 Asymmetric Reaction to Changes in VIX
Previous results do not consider the direction of changes in my proxy for economic
uncertainty. In this section I investigate if ETF traders react symmetrically to
positive and negative changes in future uncertainty (in the U.S. via ∆V IX and
locally via ∆LV IX). I split changes in VIX and LVIX into quintiles by size. I define
five variables ∆V IXQ1 . . .∆V IXQ5 as follows:
∆V IXQn =

∆V IX, if ∆V IX ∈ quintile n
0, otherwise
(2.6)
Group 1 represents the most negative changes (good news), while group 5 includes
only the most positive changes (bad news). Similarly I define five variables for local
volatility index ∆LV IXQ1 . . .∆LV IXQ2. Table 2.6 shows the result of considering
asymmetric response in predictive regression. I include total lagged changes in U.S.
and local versions of VIX, as well as variables for groups 2 to 5 (as defined above):
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=2
βk∆V IX
Qk
t−1 +
5∑
k=2
γk∆LV IX
o,Qk
t−1 +
+
5∑
I=1
ηI∆V IXt−I +
2∑
I=1
δI∆LV IX
o
t−I + µControls+ εi,t
(2.7)
13Interestingly, I find that local or U.S. VIX cannot explain the variation of gold ETF.
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where the set of Controls includes changes in interest rates (∆IR), order imbalances
(OI) at time t − 1 as well as a dummy variable for a common language (L) and
a distance measure to the U.S. (G). In such specification, the coefficients ηk (δk)
represent the general reaction of investors to changes in VIX (LVIX). I see the
reaction to U.S. VIX for every type of order imbalance, except for smallOI. On
average, investors tend to react more to significant bad U.S. news (β5 is significant
for TOI ), except for retailOI. Both small and retail investors exhibit a significant
reaction to good U.S. news (β2).
When splitting local VIX, I can see that the result is different to the previous
one. On average, investors react only to large negative news (i.e., positive β5). One of
the possible reasons why investors react to increases to local VIX could be difficult or
costly short-selling of the underlying foreign stocks during periods of high volatility.
Li and Zhu (2018) argue that ETFs are often used for “synthetic short-selling”. In
order to short-sell a stock speculators can go short on the ETF and simultaneously
take a long position in a group of other underlying stocks. Such approach allows
trading stocks at times when the direct short-selling may be difficult. Shorting via
ETF was particularly easy in the past, as before the introduction of alternative
up-tick rule in 2011, ETFs were exempt from such price test (Miffre, 2007). Another
potential explanation of such asymmetric reaction to negative news could be barriers
to information that may make it more difficult to acquire foreign data. As such, only
significant foreign negative news are likely to capture the attention of U.S. based
investors. This explanation is consistent with salience theory of Bordalo, Gennaioli,
and Shleifer (2012). Investors have a limited attention and are attracted only by
significant changes in VIX.
[insert table 2.6 here ]
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2.4.5 Political Uncertainty
While VIX represents the economic uncertainty and general risk aversion of market
participants, I also test the effect of political uncertainty on investment decisions
of U.S. investors. Filippou, Gozluklu, and Taylor (2018) show that political (that
is, changes in monthly ICRG policy risk index) and economic risks (measured by
VIX) are different. However, Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov (2012)
suggest that political risk is one of the drivers of stock volatility. As such, changes
in VIX may reflect both economic and political uncertainty. I include my proxy for
political uncertainty (see section 2.3.4) to measure them separately, and to investigate
if investors react differently to different sources of uncertainty. Table B.3 in the
appendix shows the summary statistics for political measure and its correlation with
changes in LVIX. I also observe low correlation between two proxies for political and
economic uncertainty in my sample.
Table 2.7 provides the results of regression of different versions of order
imbalance on my proxy for changes in U.S. and local political sentiments, economic
uncertainty and controls. I find that investors react to lagged U.S. political risk
differently than to ∆V IX. While all types of investors react to an increase in
U.S. economic uncertainty by exiting the international stock market (via selling
country-level ETFs), investors react to U.S. political risk in a different way. They
tend to exit the U.S. stock market and move their capital to international stock
markets (reflected in positive loadings on USPUt−1). Such different response seems
to suggest that investors treat the U.S. economic uncertainty as a proxy for a “global
risk” and political uncertainty as the U.S.- specific risk. While investors with small
trades (smallOI) respond faster to USPU , others react with a delay. I also observe
that retailOI is less sensitive to this type of risk. I do not find any strong evidence
that investors react to my proxy for local political uncertainty.
As expected, the loadings on ∆V IX still remain significant both in statistical
and economic terms above and beyond the political uncertainty measure, suggesting
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that my previous results are mainly driven by economic uncertainty which is the key
determinant shaping the investment decisions of country ETF investors.
2.4.6 Correlation with the U.S. Market and ETF Arbitrage
I show that U.S. investors only marginally consider foreign risks when making invest-
ment decisions. U.S. uncertainty affects all types of ETF investors and determines
the direction of their trades. If such risk is transmitted via ETF market the returns
of countries whose ETFs are actively traded in the U.S. are likely to be correlated
with U.S. market returns.
In order to avoid microstructural noise due to desynchronised trading hours
I conduct the analysis using monthly returns. I measure market connectedness to
the U.S. by computing 36-month rolling correlation ρ between returns of S&P 500
index that represent the U.S. market and local MSCI index that is tracked by a
corresponding country-level iShares ETF. Figure 2.3 shows the map of correlations
for 41 countries. My sample is geographically dispersed and covers developed and
emerging economies. The choice of monthly frequency for computation of correlation
eliminates the time-zone effect: Australia is highly correlated with the U.S. despite
having the largest time difference.
[insert figure 2.3 here]
Many papers such as Solnik et al. (1996) show that international correlation tends to
be higher during periods of high volatility. My focus is on innovations in correlation
(∆ρ), which are computed as residuals from first-order auto-regressive model for ρ. I
create a dummy variable (DUS|L,t) that takes the value of 1 when U.S. volatility, as
measured by VIX, is high (larger than its mean plus 1 standard deviation), but local
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volatility index is not high:
DUS|L,t =

1, if V IX ≥ µ(V IX) + σ(V IX) and LV IX < µ(LV IX) + σ(LV IX)
0, otherwise
(2.8)
Firstly, I exploit the fact that ETFs were introduced at different times
throughout the sample (see table B.1 in the appendix for fund inception dates). I
create the dummy variable IntroETF that takes the value of 1 at fund inception date
and throughout its life. In other words, such dummy reflects if the ETF is traded in
the market. Table 2.8 shows the result of regressing the innovation in correlation
on the introduction dummy, volatility dummy, as well as the interaction of the two
variables:
∆ρt = α+ β1Intro
ETF
t + β2Intro
ETF
t DUS|L,t + β3DUS|L,t + β4∆ρt−1 + εi,t
My sample for this regression is extended from January 1988 until June 2018 to
ensure that I have at least 8 years of data before the introduction of the first ETF.14
The results show that on its own the high volatility environment does not lead to an
increase in the correlation. However, the interaction term is positive and significant
suggesting that the there is an effect conditional on the existence of the ETF. Such
finding highlights the role of the country-level ETFs in the U.S. shock transmission
to foreign countries.
[insert table 2.8 here ]
I explore the role of ETF further by testing if such shock propagation is happening
via the arbitrage activity. Similarly to Davies (2019) I use an absolute value of
changes in shares outstanding as a proxy of arbitrage activity in the ETF market.
14As a consequences of extended sample for this test I use the realised volatility (RV ), measured
as a squared MSCI return, instead of VIX. Most of the subsequent analysis continues to use VIX.
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Creation/redemption results in a change of number of shares in the ETF and therefore,
this measure captures the frequency and significance of arbitrage trades.
Table 2.9 shows the result of regressing innovation in correlation on measures
of arbitrage and volatility dummy.15 In this regression I also control for the illiquidity
of underlying market ILLIQMSCI using Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.
∆ρt = α+ β1|∆SOt|+ β2|∆SOt|DUS|L,t + β3DUS|L,t+
+ β4∆ρt−1 + β5ILLIQMSCI,t + εt
(2.9)
In general, without controlling for volatility, I find only a weak evidence of the
relationship between level of arbitrage and innovation. However, once considering
full specification of regression and accounting for periods when VIX is high and LVIX
is not high (column 2) I show that ETF arbitrage activity affects the innovation
in correlation only during periods of high U.S. volatility (while LVIX is not high).
In these periods U.S. VIX is at its peak. Taking the argument that VIX is a
proxy for a global risk aversion I show that during periods of high uncertainty (e.g.,
crisis periods) there is a propagation of U.S. shocks to local underlying markets
via ETFs. Observing high volatility in the U.S., investors treat order flow in
ETF market as the one reflecting fundamentals about local economies. As argued
before, this causes a comovement of these markets with the U.S. market. Such
finding is in line with the idea that during periods of high volatility it is harder to
distinguish if movements in ETF prices reflect liquidity shocks or new information
about fundamentals. Consistent with wake-up call hypothesis a significant fall in
ETF prices (due to a large increase in VIX) can force investors to reassess the value
of local fundamentals.
[insert table 2.9 here ]
After showing the effect of arbitrage on country correlation with the U.S.
over time, I proceed to explore the cross-country differences in such correlation.
15I aggregate the daily data into monthly frequency by averaging variables within a month.
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Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018) show that when the underlying assets are hard
to trade (e.g., fixed income) price discovery happens in the ETF market. “Hard to
trade” situation also arises in a case of international funds with non overlapping
trading hours. As mentioned before, Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016) show that a price
discovery component of ETF premium is negatively related to variance of transitory
liquidity shocks and positively related to the efficiency of arbitrage. My hypothesis is
that countries with funds that have a high price discovery component (and therefore,
for which market makers are closely following ETFs to price the underlying assets)
have a higher correlation with the U.S.. Since all types of U.S. investors trade
based on U.S. risks (economic or political) they are affecting the ETF price with
U.S. fundamentals. Then the ETF arbitrage works as a transmission mechanism of
U.S. risk to foreign countries. However, if the noise in the ETF market (e.g., via
retail participation) clouds the price discovery process, I expect the transmission
mechanism to be weaker. Overall, I expect the magnitude of correlation to be related
to price discovery, noise in the ETF market, and the ease of arbitrage.
In order to test this I follow Broman (2016) to determine the degree of price
discovery in ETF. If a demand shock related to fundamentals increases price of ETF
above NAV (premium) such faster incorporation of prices reflects a price discovery.
Next period, such premium (discount) should translate into a positive (negative)
NAV return, as new information gets to the underlying market. In order to compare
the extend to which price discovery happens in ETF I regress NAV return on the
past ETF premium. Higher β loading represents a stronger adjustment to NAV and
higher price discovery in ETF.
RNAVi,t = α+ βi
(
Pi,t−1 −NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ ε (2.10)
Table 2.10 shows the average correlations of 3 portfolios formed based on
degree of price discovery (panel A) and on a measure of limits to arbitrage (panel
B). I also perform an independent double-sort, where I combine price discovery with
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proxy for limits to arbitrage (panel C). I pre-sort countries into portfolios 1 month
before computing correlations. The low group correlation (ρLt ) is defined as the
average correlation across all counties within this group:
ρLt =
1
NLt
NLt∑
i=1
Corr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500) (2.11)
where NLt is the number of countries in the group L in month t− 1. The correlation
of returns is computed using 36-month rolling window (I test the alternative measures
in section 2.5). The correlation for medium and high groups is defined in the same
manner.
As expected, the first sort based on β from equation 2.10 shows a significant
increase in correlation for funds with a high price discovery. The difference in average
correlation across low and high groups is 0.17. Panel B shows the sort based on
a proxy for limits to arbitrage. I use Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud, 2002) of
underlying markets. As can be seen from this sort, increase in illiquidity measure
leads to a relatively lower correlation with U.S. on average (by 0.11). Lower liquidity
of the underlying market limits the profitability of the arbitrage (due to higher price
impact) and, as such, U.S. shocks are less likely to get propagated to local economies.
The double sorting confirms my previous findings: the average difference between
a country with low price discovery and high limits to arbitrage in comparison to
the opposite one (low limits and high price discovery) is around 0.16. I find that
Australia, France, Germany, Spain and the UK are the countries that have the
highest chance of being in the low illiquidity - high price discovery group. In contrast,
Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India and Taiwan appear in low illiquidity - low price
discovery group more often than any other country.
Berger, Pukthuanthong, and Yang (2011); Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)
argue that the correlation is an imperfect measure of market integration and propose
a measure that is based on the first principal component of equity returns. To
this end, table 2.10 also offers average adjusted R-squares that are estimated based
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on 36-month rolling contemporaneous regressions of MSCI index returns on the
first principal component (PC1) of all available stock returns in my sample. The
principal components are estimated based on a 36-month rolling window. I find
that the average adjusted R-squares follow the same direction with the average
rolling correlations implying higher (lower) levels of market integration as the NAV
sensitivity to premium (stock illiquidity) increases.
Pan and Zeng (2019) show that for corporate bond ETF market due to
existence of liquidity mismatch between fund and the underlying index the inventory
management effect16 may be dominant making APs reluctant to close the price
deviations. I extend this argument to ETF market for international equities. While
there may not be a significant mismatch for highly liquid developed market ETFs, my
sample also includes small emerging market economies, where the underlying index
is much more illiquid than the corresponding ETF fund. In contrast to Pan and
Zeng (2019), as I have a broad range of different countries in my sample I consider
ETF liquidity to have enough variability to be included in my measure. I compute
the liquidity mismatch as a percentage difference in Amihud’s illiquidity measures
for ETF and local index.
Mismatch =
ILLIQETF − ILLIQindex
ILLIQindex
(2.12)
I use this mismatch measure for a limits to arbitrage proxy (in my definition lower
the value of mismatch - stronger the limits). In contrast to previous measures,
this variable combines both ETF and local market. Figure B.1 plots the mismatch
together with an average GNI per capita (as a proxy to identify developed markets)
obtained from World Bank database.17 Countries with higher GNI per capita tend
to have lower liquidity mismatches (more positive). Panel D of table 2.10 shows the
result of double-sorting the funds by price discovery and this version of limits to
arbitrage. As can be seen from the sort, countries where the difference in liquidity is
16In this market APs maintain inventory of illiquid corporate bonds.
17MSCI uses GNI per capita as one of many criteria for developed market classification.
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the largest (the most negative mismatch), have on average lower correlation with
U.S. market. The difference between extreme portfolios (high price discovery and
high mismatch vs. low price discovery and low mismatch) is around 0.16. This is
consistent with previous evidence of limits to arbitrage preventing the propagation
of U.S. market shocks to local economies.
[insert table 2.10 here ]
Finally, I test how the impediments to price discovery, say lack of price
efficiency and/or noise trading activity in the ETF markets affects the correlation
mechanism via ETF arbitrage. I form monthly portfolios based on one of the
three proxies that affect price discovery. My first proxy is the variance ratio (VR),
specifically |V R − 1|, where VR is the ratio of 15-sec returns over three times of
5-sec return variances. If the prices follow random walk, I expect this measure to
be equal to zero. Deviations from zero indicate lack of price efficiency in the ETF
market (Ben-David et al., 2018; O’Hara and Ye, 2011). My second proxy is based on
the ratio of dollar volume of smallOI and of TOI. Small trades arguably capture
either uninformed retail or high frequency trading (HFT) activity. While the former
is likely to introduce noise in the market, the role of the latter on price efficiency is
less clear with mixed evidence (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014; Zhang,
2010). My third proxy is the ratio of dollar volume of smallOI over the (informed)
retailOI. If the denominator is a measure of informed retail activity as argued in
Boehmer et al. (2017), this proxy can be used to obtain the relative noise (over
signal) due to retail participation. Admittedly, none of these proxies are perfect
measures of noise. In each panel of table 2.11, I report both the single sorts and
the double sort taking into account Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud, 2002) of the
underlying markets (ILLIQ).
The single-sort based on variance ratios in Panel A of table 2.11 shows that as
the price efficiency of the ETF market declines, the correlation with the U.S. market
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declines as well. This is in line with the mechanism I described above: since the
price discovery in the ETF market is more difficult, the correlation due to arbitrage
mechanism is lower. However, this effect disappears in the double-sorts. This is
not surprising, since the high-frequency variance ratios and illiquidity are inherently
linked. The sorting results in Panel B and Panel C confirm the single-sort result that
noisy ETF markets make it difficult for the arbitrage mechanism to induce higher
correlations between U.S. and foreign markets, however, this time regardless of the
illiquidity of the underlying markets. The evidence is particularly strong in Panel C.
Overall, the evidence from table 2.11 lends support to the idea that noise in the ETF
market is an impediment for the arbitrageurs, but at the same time brings good
news for uninformed retail participants in the context of international diversification
via ETFs.
[insert table 2.11 here ]
2.5 Robustness and other Specification Tests
In this section I perform numerous robustness tests to ensure that results demon-
strated in previous sections are not sensitive to my choice of methodologies. I start
with the analysis of my cross-sectional sample choice, then I control for alternative
types of risks that may affect the result, I follow by investigating how different volat-
ility conditions affect my results and conclude by computing alternative correlation
measures.
2.5.1 Sub-sample analysis
As shown in Figure 2.3, my choice of 41 counties has a wide geographical dispersion.
I test if my results are robust to my sample selection. It may be possible that the
dominant effect of VIX comes from countries that are more integrated with the U.S..
I split my sample by the level of economic development based on MSCI classification:
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into developed and emerging markets. My sample is not dominated by developed
countries, as almost half of the sample (20 countries) consists of emerging countries.
Tables B.5 and B.6 in the appendix show the results of such split.
Developed markets results show that ∆V IX is significant with large negative
coefficients for every type of investor. The reaction to changes in local VIX is much
smaller or insignificant. This is consistent with my previous evidence despite the
presence of major financial centres (e.g., UK, Germany, Switzerland etc.) in the
region.
Emerging markets results also suggest that every type of investor mainly
reacts to U.S. VIX. The loadings on ∆V IX are relatively smaller. I see the evidence
of reaction to local VIX on average, however, it is mainly due to small trades. Overall,
I show that my results are not driven by the choice of my sample, and that U.S. VIX
remains the key variable to which U.S. investors react when trading country ETFs.
2.5.2 Foreign Exchange risk
None of ETFs in my sample include derivatives (usually futures) to hedge the foreign
exchange risk. The NAV of the fund is the sum of its holdings expressed in USD.
Therefore, NAV and price of ETF is subject to FX fluctuations. I obtain daily
spot exchange rates for each country versus USD from Datastream. I test my
results by including spot return of local currency (∆exr) and absolute value of such
return (|∆exr|) to account for latent FX volatility (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and
Schrimpf, 2012).
Table 2.12 shows the results of such regression. Foreign exchange return
and volatility variables are significant and negative for almost every type of order
imbalance. When local currency depreciates relative to USD (positive ∆exr ) the
NAV of the fund becomes smaller (as the value of securities owned by the fund
expressed in USD becomes smaller). The negative loading on spot return reflects the
sale of ETFs by investors, as the price temporarily becomes higher than NAV. The
negative reaction to FX volatility is consistent with investors’ fear to hold ETFs,
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as during volatile FX environment it is harder to price the basket of underlying
securities. Despite significant reaction of investors to FX risk proxies, the response
to changes in VIX and LVIX remains the same, suggesting that my results are not
driven by fluctuations in exchange rates.
2.5.3 Volatility regimes and Recession Period
I also study the effect of volatility in the U.S. market on my results. As argued by
Drechsler, Moreira, and Savov (2018) liquidity providers are exposed to volatility
risk. When volatility is high one can expect the sensitivity of order imbalance to
changes in U.S. VIX to be high. It is possible that the dominance of U.S. VIX is
mainly due to a period of high volatility present in my sample (e.g., financial crisis).
I split my sample into 3 periods: low, medium and high VIX. The split is based
on terciles of historic VIX level from 1990-2018. Table 2.13 shows the results of
such split. As can be seen, U.S. VIX remains significant in every period for almost
every type of investor. The coefficient is insignificant only for smallOI in the low
period. Increase in U.S. uncertainty when the general level of volatility is low may
not be a strong signal for investors with small trades. Overall, I can see that the
high exposure to changes in U.S. VIX remains in any volatility regime.
The sell-off of international ETFs could be particularly strong during recession
periods in local economies. I obtain the recession indicators from OECD database
for countries in my sample. I create a dummy variable DR that takes the value of
1 if there is a recession period during a month in a local country and 0 otherwise.
Table B.7 shows the results of including the recession periods in my regression of
order imbalance on U.S. and local VIX. The result shows that all types of investors
tend to sell international country-level ETFs more when there is a recession in a
local country. For most of the investor types ∆LV IX becomes insignificant. This
is consistent with my previous evidence that investors only react to large negative
news (that are more likely to happen during recession). In contrast, the loadings on
changes in U.S. VIX remain significant, suggesting that my result are not driven by
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recession periods.
2.5.4 Correlation: Alternative Explanations and Different Meas-
ures
One of the possible explanations of a high correlation of a country with the U.S. can
be the importance of U.S. as a country’s trading partner (Chen and Zhang, 1997).
In order to control for this channel, I obtain monthly exports and imports between
U.S. and my sample countries from U.S. census website. I scale the result by total
amount of exports and imports of those countries obtained from OECD database.
When computing partial correlations I use 36-month rolling window and control for
export and import ratios:
ρLt =
1
NLt
NLt∑
i=1
partialCorr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500 |
mUS,t
mTotal,t
,
xUS,t
xTotal,t
) (2.13)
where mUS,t (xUS,t) is the amount of imports (exports) of a country from (to) U.S.
in month t and mTotal,t (xTotal,t) is the total amount of imports (exports) with all of
its trading partners. The correlation for medium and high groups is defined in the
same manner. Table B.9 in the appendix shows the sort using partial correlation
measures. The result is robust to imports and exports controls.
The alternative explanation of high correlation between countries is related
to business cycles. As discussed before, the correlation tends to be higher during
recession periods. I obtain monthly industrial production index (a proxy for business
cycles in monthly frequency) for most of the countries in my sample from the OECD
and Global Financial Data databases. I control for annual changes in industrial
production when computing partial correlation, which is defined as follows:
ρLt =
1
NLt
NLt∑
i=1
partialCorr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500 |∆IPi,t,∆IPUS,t) (2.14)
where ∆IPi,t (∆IPUS,t) is the change in the industrial production for country i
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(U.S.) from month t− 12 to t. Table B.10 shows that my results are unchanged, and
therefore robust to controlling for business cycles.
Most of the countries that appear in the low illiquidity- high price discovery
group are developed financial centres. Therefore it is important to check if the result
is driven by the level of country development. In table B.11 in the appendix I repeat
the sorting conditional on countries being in G10 or in the MSCI Developed Country
universe. I find that the price discovery channel remains significant even within the
developed countries. In addition, I perform the sorting using partial correlations
controlling for the level of country’s financial development (FD). FD is computed
as a ratio of total stock market capitalization (obtained from Global Financial Data)
and GDP (obtained from OECD database). The results are robust to such control.
I also study the effect of my choice of correlation measure. In the main results
I compute correlation using 36-month rolling window. The benefit of such method
is that it does not rely on an assumption about the data generating process and is
simple to compute. However, there is no clear way to choose the appropriate length
of the rolling window. I first test the validity of my cross-sectional results using a
longer 100-month period. Table B.12 in the appendix shows that the results of such
sort produce identical outcome as before.
In order to overcome the need to choose the length of the rolling window
(longer length may result in a smoother correlation estimates), I employ an alternative
measure of correlation - Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) of Engle (2002).
The assumption is that returns conditional on prior available information is normally
distributed with mean 0 and time-varying covariance matrix Ht: rt|Ft−1 ∼ (0, Ht).
Then covariance matrix can be represented as:
Ht = DtRtDt (2.15)
Dt is the square root of diagonal matrix of Ht and Rt is the time-varying correlation
matrix. I model the volatility of returns for each country using GARCH(1,1) process.
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Matrix Rt can be further decomposed into:
Rt = diag(Qt)
−1/2Qtdiag(Qt)
−1/2 (2.16)
Then auxiliary variable Qt can in turn be represented using GARCH(1,1) process as:
Qij,t = ρ̄ij + α(εi,t−1εj,t−1 − ρ̄ij) + β(Qij,t−1 − ρ̄ij) (2.17)
In this equation, εi,t−1 = D
−1
t−1rt−1 and ρ̄ = E[εi,tεj,t].
Table B.13 in the appendix shows the results using DCC correlation. Both
single and double sorts produce very similar results to the ones using 36 and 100-
month correlations. The outcomes of these robustness tests suggest that my results
are not sensitive to the modelling choice of correlation.
2.5.5 VIX Decomposition
Here, I examine which part of the variation of the VIX drives its predictive ability
for ETF order imbalances. To this end, I extract the economic uncertainty and
risk aversion components of VIX following Bekaert and Hoerova (2014); Bekaert,
Hoerova, and Duca (2013).18 Specifically, the VIX component that serves as a
proxy of economic uncertainty is the forecast of the following month stock market
variance (e.g., 22 trading days) that is estimated based on a model that includes as
independent variables a squared value of VIX that is annualized and expressed in
percentage terms as well as the continuous component of the daily quadratic variation
of stock returns (e.g., Ct = RVt − Jt, where RV is the daily realized variance of the
stock market return that is computed as the sums of squared five-minute returns
as well as the squared close-to-open return and Jt represents the jump component)
over the previous day, week and month. Thus, I denote the conditional (physical)
variance by V IXCV . The risk aversion (e.g., V IXRA) component of VIX reflects the
variance risk premium which is measured as the difference between the implied and
18I would like to thank the authors for making the data available on their webpage.
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conditional variance (e.g., V IX2t −Et[RV
(22)
t+1 ], where RV
(22)
t+1 is the realized variance
of the S&P 500 over the next month).
I run a predictive panel regression with random effects for all countries in
my sample. My model also includes lagged percentage changes of the components
of VIX, the local VIX and a number of controls: a dummy variable (L) that takes
the value of 1 if a country has a common language with the U.S. and 0 otherwise;
and a constant that represents the geographical distance of the country from the
U.S. (G). I also consider lagged order imbalance, lagged interest rates and lagged
specifications of components of VIX. My model includes both components of VIX as
well as nested specifications of the model below:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βCVk ∆V IX
CV
t−k +
5∑
k=1
βRAk ∆V IX
RA
t−k +
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k+
+ δ1∆IRi,t−1 + δ2Li + δ3Gi + δ4OIi,t−1 + ε
(2.18)
Table B.15 of the appendix shows the panel results of such regression. I
consider different order imbalance measures as independent variables (e.g., TOI,
smallOI, retailOI and largeOI). I find that the economic uncertainty component
of VIX is a strong predictor of total ETF order flow over and above the risk
aversion component. However, I find that both components of VIX render a similar
contribution to small and retail order imbalances while economic uncertainty drives
the variation of order imbalances of institutional investors. Overall, the results
suggest that traders mainly react to changes in U.S. economic uncertainty rather
than the risk aversion part of the VIX.
2.5.6 Central Bank ETF Purchases: The Case of Japan
There is a policy discussion whether the central banks should extend their quantitative
easing (QE) programmes to stock markets. While previous Fed Chair Yellen hinted at
the possibility in a testimony before the House Financial Services Committee (Reuters,
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2016)19, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has been purchasing stocks through its ETF
Purchase programme since 2010, and has gradually increased the intensity of ETF
purchases in 2014 (3 trillion yen per year) and 2016 (6 trillion yen per year)(Barbon
and Gianinazzi, 2019; Charoenwong, Morck, and Wiwattanakantang, 2019). These
interventions in the (TOPIX and Nikkei 225) ETF market aim at reducing the equity
risk premia and improving underlying equity valuations, however, they happen to
be distortionary (Barbon and Gianinazzi, 2019) and relatively predictable, that is,
BOJ purchases are triggered when indices go down due to market uncertainty (FT,
2018)20.
In figure B.2 I show the actual BOJ ETF purchases (in billion yen) and
the intraday variance ratios for both EWJ and SPY ETFs since the beginning of
the BOJ ETF purchase programme, over the period 2010-2018. These ETFs that
track MSCI Japan and S&P 500, respectively, and both are traded on NYSE Arca
platform. My proxy for intraday price distortions for the ETF market suggests that
the average level of distortions increases as BOJ moves to a new regime of ETF
purchases with larger amounts, while I do not observe any effect on SPY trading. In
fact, as figure B.3 indicates, the price distortions are significantly larger on the days
of BOJ purchases which coincide with an increase in uncertainty measured by U.S.
VIX.
The impact of BOJ’s actions on Japanese equity market is asymmetric, as the
central bank acts only in one direction, i.e., buys ETFs. As a result, BOJ is likely
to create an upward bias on the valuation of the underlying stocks (Charoenwong
et al., 2019), which translates into noisy overvalued NAV of EWJ. Realising the
probability of BOJ’s intervention, market participants in the U.S. are then likely
to sell EWJ pushing the price downwards until the fundamental level is reached.
Figure B.4 shows that on average returns on the EWJ ETF are much more negative
on BOJ ETF purchase days than on non-intervention days. The selling pressure
19https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-yellen-purchases-idUSKCN11Z2WI.
20https://www.ft.com/content/8f472648-a783-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b.
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results in a positive intra-day autocorrelation captured by the variance ratio. At
the same time, figure B.4 shows that SPY returns tend to be negative on the BOJ
purchase days, presumably through the increase in VIX. Finally, I demonstrate that
negative returns of SPY and EWJ on the interventions days results in a higher (the
difference is statistically significant at 1% level) intraday correlation of these two
ETF products traded on the U.S. market. As a result, the impact of BOJ’s purchase
program is likely to have adverse effect on the ability of U.S. investors to diversify
globally by purchasing Japanese country-level ETFs.
2.6 Conclusion
Overall, I investigate how different groups of country ETF traders make investment
decisions. I show that order imbalance of country ETF trades mainly reflects changes
in U.S. implied volatility index rather than local VIX. Such result is robust to
different volatility regimes and a sub-sample analysis. Asymmetric response analysis
shows that investors react only to negative foreign news, as measured by positive
changes in LVIX. I find that when reducing positions in international ETFs, investors
switch to a safe asset such as cash ETFs, reflecting a risk based explanation of ETFs
sell-off.
I use these results to investigate the mechanism of transmission of U.S. shocks
to foreign countries that results in high cross-country correlation. I argue that such
shocks are propagated to different countries via ETF arbitrage mechanism. Consistent
with this argument my time-series analysis shows that both the introduction of the
ETF market, and significant arbitrage activity in the ETF market at times of high
U.S. volatility results in a positive innovation in country’s stock market correlation
with U.S. market. My finding is in line with a wake-up call hypothesis of contagion.
Finally, I investigate the cross-sectional differences in countries’ correlations
with the U.S. market. APs engage in arbitrage activity to correct the deviations
between ETF price and the NAV. If such deviation is caused due to transitory
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liquidity shock, the adjustment to ETF price and NAV should be reverted. In
contrast, I argue, that if such deviation is a result of a faster incorporation of
fundamentals in ETF price, arbitrage should lead to higher correlation of a country
with the U.S. equity market. In support of this hypothesis, I find that countries
with higher price discovery and lower limits to arbitrage have a higher correlation
with the U.S. market. By the same token, countries with lower price discovery and
higher limits to arbitrage due to noise in the ETF market have a lower correlation
with the U.S. market. The latter finding implies that an increase in (uninformed)
retail participation is likely to have a positive effect on international diversification
via country ETFs.
I also consider the response to local and global political uncertainty and its
association with economic uncertainty (e.g., the VIX). I find that investors tend to
respond to past movements of U.S. political uncertainty in a different fashion than to
economic uncertainty. Specifically, investors react to such signals by exiting the U.S.
stock market and moving their capital to international stock markets. I do not find
any evidence that investors react to my local political uncertainty proxy. Overall, I
find that the effect of U.S. VIX on ETF order flow is stronger compared to local and
global political uncertainty.
My work is important for international investors seeking to diversify their
U.S. exposure by investing in international ETFs. My analysis suggests that even
emerging countries with low integration are still significantly affected by the U.S.
stock market. While previous research focuses on the role of global banks and the
U.S. as the central economy on cross-country correlation, the novelty of my study is
that I discover a new channel of country connectedness that is via ETF arbitrage.
83
Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Correlation Mechanism
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Figure 2.2: Correlation between U.S. Market and the Rest of the World
Solid line shows the rolling 36-month correlation between S&P 500 and MSCI EAFE total returns
(ρ = Corr(∆S&P500,∆MSCIEAFE)). MSCI EAFE represents the portfolio of more than 900 stocks
from Europe, Australia, Asia, and the Far East. Index returns are measured at a monthly frequency.
Data sample is 2001-2018. Dashed line shows the 36-month moving average of CBOE VIX level at a
monthly frequency. Shaded area is official NBER recession period of December 2007-June 2009.
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Figure 2.3: Correlation between the U.S. and Other Countries
This map shows the 36-month correlation between return of S&P 500 and returns of MSCI indices
(ρi = Corr(∆S&P500,∆MSCIi)) of 41 countries used in the sample (see table B.8 for the full list
of ETFs and corresponding indices). The correlation varies from light blue (the lowest) to dark blue
(the largest) .
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Order Imbalances
Summary statistics of daily total, small, retail and large order imbalances. retailOI is based on
Boehmer et al. (2017) and largeOI is based on Barber et al. (2009). smallOI is the residual from
equation 2.2 and expressed in 10−16. All order imbalances are calculated as defined in equation 2.1.
Mean and standard deviation is based on the sample period from 2006 or the first trading day of
ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
Country Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
AUS 0.02 17.33% 0.06 14.05% −0.01 32.98% 0.02 27.22%
AUT −0.02 42.38% −0.57 35.78% −0.04 46.84% −0.02 60.27%
BEL 0.01 43.58% 0.68 38.61% −0.05 51.68% 0.02 61.97%
BRA 0.00 10.08% 0.02 24.61% 0.01 24.98% 0.00 16.75%
CAN 0.02 20.51% 0.06 14.67% 0.04 30.76% 0.02 30.12%
CHL 0.02 30.61% −0.41 39.84% 0.01 41.24% 0.02 41.12%
CHN 0.06 35.80% −0.01 30.21% 0.10 50.33% 0.06 45.20%
COL 0.16 66.25% 0.01 64.58% 0.16 81.51% 0.22 91.22%
DNK 0.07 52.70% 0.00 50.83% 0.07 61.32% 0.04 70.49%
FIN 0.08 57.64% 0.86 57.87% 0.16 73.26% 0.06 82.82%
FRA 0.01 32.06% 0.08 26.07% 0.01 44.91% 0.01 39.97%
DEU 0.02 24.30% 0.20 15.57% 0.02 36.47% 0.02 33.36%
HKG 0.01 18.02% −0.11 13.85% −0.04 35.93% 0.01 26.26%
IND 0.08 38.36% 0.22 34.98% 0.08 47.70% 0.07 46.33%
IDN 0.04 27.53% 0.14 25.95% 0.01 41.87% 0.03 40.05%
IRL 0.03 51.89% −0.72 50.05% 0.06 59.85% −0.02 73.03%
ISR −0.01 45.21% −0.10 43.94% −0.02 53.32% −0.02 63.44%
ITA 0.02 32.12% −0.19 28.19% 0.03 46.89% 0.02 41.22%
JPN 0.01 13.92% 0.03 14.46% −0.03 33.01% 0.01 16.64%
MYS 0.00 20.11% 0.08 17.54% −0.03 40.22% −0.01 32.02%
MEX 0.01 12.85% 0.10 26.64% 0.01 33.15% 0.00 22.75%
NLD 0.00 39.58% −0.16 34.33% −0.02 46.76% 0.00 51.98%
NZL 0.02 40.06% 0.74 37.10% 0.00 46.62% 0.03 59.52%
NOR 0.09 54.95% 0.06 55.27% 0.08 75.97% 0.10 84.22%
PER −0.03 38.45% 0.03 33.69% −0.01 45.32% −0.05 54.98%
PHL 0.02 30.44% 0.34 27.24% 0.02 45.43% 0.01 46.30%
POL 0.03 33.46% −0.11 27.33% 0.02 46.89% 0.03 51.55%
QAT 0.07 71.15% 0.90 69.15% 0.00 80.32% 0.10 90.79%
RUS 0.01 34.43% 0.01 26.59% 0.03 47.64% 0.00 50.82%
SAU 0.12 59.70% 0.64 59.54% 0.14 73.77% 0.13 77.67%
SGP 0.01 19.53% 0.15 17.31% −0.04 32.82% 0.01 30.09%
ZAF 0.00 23.14% 0.09 36.20% −0.03 39.31% 0.00 30.91%
KOR 0.00 12.93% −0.01 25.34% −0.01 34.40% −0.01 21.26%
ESP 0.01 29.84% −0.07 23.52% 0.01 37.94% 0.02 37.77%
SWE 0.01 32.01% 0.06 27.35% 0.02 35.05% 0.01 41.47%
CHE 0.03 28.30% 0.05 23.76% 0.05 32.61% 0.02 37.58%
TWN 0.00 13.13% −0.01 12.88% −0.03 37.43% 0.00 19.16%
THA 0.02 29.96% 0.30 37.35% 0.01 43.57% 0.02 40.99%
TUR 0.00 26.88% 0.29 34.03% −0.01 35.07% 0.00 38.68%
ARE 0.01 63.45% 0.13 63.12% 0.02 80.17% 0.04 89.04%
GBR 0.03 25.40% −0.18 20.86% 0.07 34.60% 0.04 34.59%
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Table 2.2: Correlation of Order Imbalances
Per country correlations of daily retail, small and large order imbalances based on Barber et al.
(2009) and retail order imbalances based on Boehmer et al. (2017). Construction of variables is
defined in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.2. Sample period begins from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF
(whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
Country ρ(smallOI, retailOI) p-val ρ(smallOI, largeOI) p-val ρ(retailOI, largeOI) p-val
AUS 0.199 < 0.01 0.280 < 0.01 0.243 < 0.01
AUT 0.277 < 0.01 0.361 < 0.01 0.296 < 0.01
BEL 0.306 < 0.01 0.342 < 0.01 0.241 < 0.01
BRA 0.053 0.03 0.005 0.84 0.027 0.13
CAN 0.241 < 0.01 0.321 < 0.01 0.332 < 0.01
CHL 0.088 < 0.01 0.245 < 0.01 0.216 < 0.01
CHN 0.166 < 0.01 0.199 < 0.01 0.168 < 0.01
COL 0.196 < 0.01 0.330 < 0.01 0.099 0.10
DNK 0.232 < 0.01 0.237 < 0.01 0.174 < 0.01
FIN 0.198 < 0.01 0.280 < 0.01 0.117 < 0.01
FRA 0.202 < 0.01 0.282 < 0.01 0.176 < 0.01
DEU 0.192 < 0.01 0.325 < 0.01 0.250 < 0.01
HKG 0.119 < 0.01 0.232 < 0.01 0.205 < 0.01
IND 0.154 < 0.01 0.324 < 0.01 0.171 < 0.01
IDN 0.175 < 0.01 0.314 < 0.01 0.238 < 0.01
IRL 0.278 < 0.01 0.274 < 0.01 0.205 < 0.01
ISR 0.193 < 0.01 0.279 < 0.01 0.234 < 0.01
ITA 0.195 < 0.01 0.329 < 0.01 0.203 < 0.01
JPN 0.214 < 0.01 0.278 < 0.01 0.224 < 0.01
MYS 0.224 < 0.01 0.262 < 0.01 0.269 < 0.01
MEX 0.007 0.77 0.031 0.17 0.157 < 0.01
NLD 0.218 < 0.01 0.336 < 0.01 0.237 < 0.01
NZL 0.188 < 0.01 0.307 < 0.01 0.196 < 0.01
NOR 0.213 < 0.01 0.274 < 0.01 0.180 < 0.01
PER 0.284 < 0.01 0.392 < 0.01 0.258 < 0.01
PHL 0.222 < 0.01 0.329 < 0.01 0.239 < 0.01
POL 0.195 < 0.01 0.298 < 0.01 0.196 < 0.01
QAT 0.255 < 0.01 0.394 < 0.01 0.126 0.02
RUS 0.178 < 0.01 0.250 < 0.01 0.219 < 0.01
SAU 0.293 < 0.01 0.199 < 0.01 0.103 0.08
SGP 0.303 < 0.01 0.350 < 0.01 0.302 < 0.01
ZAF 0.040 0.15 0.108 < 0.01 0.205 < 0.01
KOR 0.032 0.15 0.086 < 0.01 0.179 < 0.01
ESP 0.193 < 0.01 0.320 < 0.01 0.274 < 0.01
SWE 0.233 < 0.01 0.365 < 0.01 0.275 < 0.01
CHE 0.206 < 0.01 0.284 < 0.01 0.224 < 0.01
TWN 0.124 < 0.01 0.278 < 0.01 0.189 < 0.01
THA 0.124 < 0.01 0.233 < 0.01 0.207 < 0.01
TUR 0.139 < 0.01 0.166 < 0.01 0.220 < 0.01
ARE 0.169 < 0.01 0.323 < 0.01 0.018 0.73
GBR 0.168 < 0.01 0.318 < 0.01 0.191 < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Individual Country Regressions
Predictive regression of order imbalances for 41 country-level MSCI based iShares ETFs on percentage
change in volatility index (∆V IX), orthogonalised percentage change in local volatility index
(∆LV IXo), change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), as well as lags of
∆V IX and ∆LV IXo. Specifically, I estimate the model below:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k +
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k + δ1∆IRi,t−1 + δ2OIi,t−1 + ε (2.19)
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and t-statistics (based on Newey and West (1987) standard
errors) are presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and
covers the period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of
June 2018. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Country OI Constant ∆V IXt−1 ∆LV IX
o
t−1 ∆IRt−1 OIt−1 ∆V IXt−2 ∆LV IX
o
t−2 ∆V IXt−3 ∆V IXt−4 ∆V IXt−5 Obs. R
2
AUS 0.001 −0.114∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.092 0.075∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.071 −0.012 −0.056 0.032 2, 640 0.009
(0.25) (−3.46) (−0.30) (−0.90) (2.71) (−0.65) (−1.56) (−0.32) (−1.62) (0.95)
AUT −0.015 −0.302∗∗∗ 0.054 −0.039 0.183∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗ 0.032 −0.072 −0.104 −0.135 3, 140 0.038
(−1.49) (−3.29) (0.40) (−0.63) (8.64) (−2.01) (0.23) (−0.78) (−1.16) (−1.57)
BEL 0.030∗ −0.417∗∗ 0.267 −0.146 0.353∗∗∗ −0.107 −0.258 0.039 −0.072 −0.138 1, 220 0.129
(1.78) (−2.48) (1.14) (−0.60) (10.30) (−0.58) (−1.19) (0.22) (−0.42) (−0.80)
BRA 0.002 0.022 − −0.074 0.067∗∗∗ 0.015 − 0.004 0.013 0.004 3, 140 0.003
(1.08) (1.14) − (−0.84) (2.76) (0.72) − (0.17) (0.62) (0.21)
CAN 0.004 −0.090∗∗ −0.087∗∗ 0.029 0.177∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.046 −0.079∗ −0.088∗∗ −0.028 2, 199 0.036
(0.71) (−2.18) (−2.23) (0.71) (7.02) (−0.32) (−1.12) (−1.85) (−2.36) (−0.72)
CHL 0.016∗∗ −0.066 − −0.054 0.229∗∗∗ 0.034 − −0.057 0.065 −0.086 2, 672 0.052
(2.13) (−0.82) − (−1.54) (9.63) (0.44) − (−0.85) (0.91) (−1.17)
CHN 0.051∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗ −0.085 −0.003 0.208∗∗∗ 0.130 −0.165 −0.065 −0.028 −0.143 1, 649 0.044
(4.74) (−2.07) (−0.46) (−0.03) (5.41) (1.02) (−0.87) (−0.65) (−0.26) (−1.42)
COL 0.155∗∗∗ −0.111 − 0.229 0.067∗ −0.015 − −0.101 0.201 −0.288 1, 122 0.002
(6.46) (−0.56) − (0.83) (1.95) (−0.08) − (−0.46) (0.95) (−1.42)
DNK 0.065∗∗∗ −0.342∗∗ − 0.017 0.148∗∗∗ 0.003 − −0.260∗ −0.106 −0.030 1, 567 0.024
(3.96) (−2.43) − (1.22) (5.11) (0.018) − (−1.83) (−0.74) (−0.17)
FIN 0.074∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗ −0.520∗∗ −0.018 0.143∗∗∗ 0.130 −0.217 −0.392∗∗ −0.038 −0.019 1, 609 0.027
(4.41) (−3.14) (−2.16) (−0.80) (4.80) (0.67) (−0.97) (−2.37) (−0.23) (−0.11)
FRA 0.014∗ −0.100 0.010 0.004 0.105∗∗∗ −0.053 0.013 −0.096 −0.156∗∗ −0.041 3, 132 0.011
(1.91) (−1.49) (0.43) (0.61) (4.28) (−0.88) (0.74) (−1.57) (−2.47) (−0.72)
DEU 0.020∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.144∗ −0.002 0.151∗∗∗ −0.035 −0.094 0.002 0.017 −0.088∗ 3, 132 0.024
(3.57) (−2.03) (−1.69) (−0.23) (6.69) (−0.73) (−1.03) (0.03) (0.32) (−1.66)
HKG 0.010∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.043 0.056 0.060∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.036 −0.060 −0.056 0.030 3, 140 0.010
(2.79) (−3.91) (−0.78) (0.89) (2.92) (−0.34) (−0.64) (−1.44) (−1.51) (0.85)
IND 0.065∗∗∗ −0.091 −0.126 0.419 0.179∗∗∗ 0.025 0.319 −0.146 −0.069 0.030 1, 611 0.031
(5.14) (−1.10) (−0.70) (0.91) (4.24) (0.28) (1.61) (−1.45) (−0.77) (0.32)
IDN 0.026∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗ − 0.275 0.360∗∗∗ 0.072 − −0.056 0.000 0.091 2, 051 0.133
(3.56) (−2.35) − (1.27) (9.36) (1.18) − (−0.91) (0.00) (1.63)
IRL 0.026∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.129 −0.100 0.113∗∗∗ −0.167 −0.010 −0.155 −0.145 −0.106 1, 982 0.015
(1.76) (−3.03) (−0.67) (−1.26) (4.13) (−1.15) (−0.05) (−1.10) (−1.12) (−0.83)
Continue on the next page
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Table continued from previous page
Country OI Constant ∆V IXt−1 ∆LV IX
o
t−1 ∆IRt−1 OIt−1 ∆V IXt−2 ∆LV IX
o
t−2 ∆V IXt−3 ∆V IXt−4 ∆V IXt−5 Obs. R
2
ISR −0.007 −0.202 − −0.072 0.097∗∗∗ −0.167 − −0.131 −0.030 −0.127 2, 583 0.010
(−0.70) (−1.59) − (−0.27) (4.56) (−1.25) − (−1.27) (−0.28) (−0.88)
ITA 0.017∗∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.003 −0.012∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ −0.050 0.005 −0.019 −0.029 −0.014 3, 132 0.026
(2.34) (−2.28) (−0.03) (−2.20) (6.09) (−0.78) (0.06) (−0.28) (−0.45) (−0.21)
JPN 0.006∗ −0.016 −0.017 −0.003 0.152∗∗∗ −0.006 0.015 0.033 −0.005 0.048∗ 3, 083 0.022
(1.67) (−0.53) (−0.41) (−1.05) (6.29) (−0.18) (0.44) (1.02) (−0.18) (1.65)
MYS 0.004 −0.172∗∗∗ − −0.276 0.117∗∗∗ −0.005 − −0.149∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.047 3, 140 0.022
(1.01) (−4.09) − (−1.17) (5.03) (−0.12) − (−3.64) (0.93) (−1.25)
MEX 0.005∗ −0.036 −0.001 0.513 0.067∗∗ −0.009 −0.017 0.027 0.012 −0.055∗∗ 2, 870 0.004
(1.90) (−1.31) (−0.01) (1.41) (2.55) (−0.34) (−0.34) (0.98) (0.40) (−1.99)
NLD 0.003 −0.333∗∗∗ −0.061 −0.019 0.155∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.142 0.038 −0.177∗∗ −0.035 3, 132 0.029
(0.33) (−3.72) (−0.69) (−1.38) (5.99) (0.06) (−1.35) (0.48) (−2.27) (−0.40)
NZL 0.020∗ −0.037 − −0.229 0.167∗∗∗ −0.031 − −0.184∗ −0.056 −0.074 1, 969 0.027
(1.68) (−0.32) − (−0.92) (6.65) (−0.30) − (−1.73) (−0.62) (−0.78)
NOR 0.087∗∗∗ −0.359∗∗ − −0.742 0.065∗∗ −0.297 − −0.137 −0.208 −0.258 1, 619 0.008
(5.34) (−2.50) − (−0.79) (2.39) (−1.99) − (−1.00) (−1.58) (−1.67)
PER −0.018∗ −0.314∗∗∗ − 0.003∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ −0.039 − −0.095 −0.271∗∗∗ 0.143 2, 272 0.098
(−1.73) (−3.61) − (18.36) (10.94) (−0.44) − (−1.05) (−3.07) (1.30)
PHL 0.069∗∗∗ −0.088 − −0.024∗ 0.178∗∗∗ −0.146 − −0.322∗ −0.364∗ −0.040 638 0.034
(3.77) (−0.47) − (−1.73) (4.01) (−0.68) − (−1.71) (−1.76) (−0.22)
POL 0.027∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ − −0.543 0.150∗∗∗ −0.116 − −0.233∗∗∗ −0.038 0.081 2, 038 0.033
(2.97) (−4.07) − (−0.25) (5.72) (−1.29) − (−2.72) (−0.45) (0.91)
QAT 0.066∗∗∗ −0.568∗∗ − 0.318 0.079∗∗ 0.193 − −0.048 −0.083 0.344 790 0.006
(2.76) (−2.28) − (0.20) (2.42) (0.69) − (−0.24) (−0.31) (1.22)
RUS 0.012 −0.265∗∗∗ −0.042 0.549 0.157∗∗∗ −0.116 −0.124 −0.037 0.054 0.106 1, 535 0.026
(1.08) (−2.82) (−0.39) (1.01) (5.29) (−1.05) (−1.10) (−0.32) (0.44) (0.85)
SAU 0.087∗∗∗ −0.370∗ − 16.635∗∗∗ 0.057 −0.025 − −0.106 −0.075 0.288 638 0.020
(3.44) (−1.65) − (3.27) (1.38) (−0.13) − (−0.52) (−0.28) (1.37)
SGP 0.011∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ − −0.146 0.117∗∗∗ −0.070∗ − −0.036 −0.061 0.007 3, 140 0.022
(2.31) (−4.42) − (−1.32) (3.57) (−1.84) − (−0.99) (−1.34) (0.20)
ZAF 0.002 −0.161∗∗∗ −0.120 −0.005 0.081∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.334∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.018 −0.045 2, 871 0.011
(0.57) (−3.25) (−0.76) (−0.03) (4.11) (0.24) (−2.73) (−0.42) (−0.35) (−0.91)
KOR 0.000 −0.097∗∗∗ −0.044 −0.477 0.077∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.046 −0.033 −0.033 0.019 3, 140 0.010
(0.01) (−3.85) (−0.99) (−1.64) (2.99) (0.09) (−1.19) (−1.22) (−1.26) (0.76)
ESP 0.011 −0.138∗∗ −0.019 −0.007 0.268∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.067 −0.018 −0.164∗∗∗ −0.094 3, 132 0.075
(1.55) (−2.32) (−0.23) (−1.08) (9.59) (0.43) (−0.76) (−0.33) (−2.64) (−1.47)
SWE 0.011 −0.334∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗ 0.007 0.216∗∗∗ −0.041 −0.240∗∗∗ −0.105 −0.201∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ 3, 139 0.065
(1.43) (−5.27) (−2.08) (0.97) (8.96) (−0.56) (−2.60) (−1.48) (−2.67) (−2.83)
CHE 0.024∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ 0.146 −0.001 0.138∗∗∗ −0.098 −0.070 −0.119∗ −0.048 0.001 3, 055 0.022
(3.68) (−3.33) (1.42) (−0.47) (5.68) (−1.54) (−0.64) (−1.83) (−0.87) (0.01)
TWN 0.005∗ −0.074∗∗∗ − −0.267∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ −0.023 − −0.029 −0.044∗ 0.001 3, 140 0.006
(1.83) (−2.66) − (−2.12) (2.80) (−0.94) − (−1.04) (−1.80) (0.04)
THA 0.021∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ − −0.020∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ −0.107 − −0.167∗∗ −0.064 −0.105∗ 2, 583 0.057
(2.73) (−5.60) − (−3.53) (6.03) (−1.50) − (−2.25) (−1.01) (−1.78)
TUR 0.004 −0.417∗∗∗ − 0.065 0.150∗∗∗ −0.046 − −0.124∗∗ −0.046 0.023 2, 581 0.041
(0.58) (−6.39) − (0.13) (6.17) (−0.77) − (−2.15) (−0.94) (0.38)
ARE 0.019 0.106 − −0.048 0.119∗∗∗ −0.244 − −0.251 −0.133 −0.131 1, 029 0.012
(0.94) (0.61) − (−1.13) (3.93) (−1.35) − (−1.43) (−0.67) (−0.68)
GBR 0.027∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.117∗ −0.037 0.161∗∗∗ −0.052 −0.190∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.081 −0.081 3, 140 0.032
(5.00) (−2.86) (−1.88) (−0.85) (5.87) (−0.97) (−2.65) (−0.01) (−1.65) (−1.46)
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Table 2.5: Cash ETFs and VIX
Predictive regression of average order imbalance for U.S. cash ETFs (cashOI) on percentage change
in volatility index (∆V IX), orthogonalised percentage change in local volatility index (∆LV IXo),
change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), as well as lags of ∆V IX and
∆LV IXo. Specifically, I estimate the model below:
CashOIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k +
3∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k + γ5∆LV IX
o
i,t−5+
+ δ1∆IRi,t−1 + δ2CashOIi,t−1 + εi,t
Cash ETFs are defined as funds that invest in U.S. treasuries with less than 1 year of maturity.
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and t-statistics (based on Newey and West (1987) robust
standard errors) are presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily
frequency and covers the period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until
the end of June 2018. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Country Const ∆V IXt−1 ∆LV IX
o
t−1 ∆IRt−1 cashOIt−1 ∆V IXt−2 ∆LV IX
o
t−2 ∆V IXt−3 ∆LV IX
o
t−3 ∆V IXt−4 ∆V IXt−5 ∆LV IX
o
t−5 Obs. R
2
AUS 0.020** 0.289*** 0.039 -0.065 0.301*** 0.383*** 0.002 0.233*** 0.007 0.21*** 0.257*** 0.022 2,637 0.113
(2.22) (3.83) (0.37) (-0.27) (13.28) (3.84) (0.02) (2.74) (0.07) (2.58) (3.37) (0.22)
BEL 0.096*** 0.217 0.193 0.12 0.392*** 0.451*** 0.058 0.264 0.131 0.419** 0.045 0.184 966 0.176
(5.58) (1.38) (0.77) (0.72) (8.83) (2.85) (0.28) (1.62) (0.68) (2.47) (0.22) (1.06)
CAN 0.007 0.290*** -0.037 0.034 0.276*** 0.391*** -0.005 0.208*** 0.114 0.179** 0.259*** 0.016 2,196 0.097
(0.74) (3.59) (-0.63) (0.39) (11.5) (3.89) (-0.06) (2.76) (1.56) (2.20) (3.24) (0.25)
CHN 0.035*** 0.314*** -0.097 0.003 0.35*** 0.478*** 0.073 0.254*** -0.174 0.306*** 0.197** 0.023 2,723 0.146
(3.68) (3.58) (-0.61) (0.08) (13.05) (5.65) (0.46) (3.12) (-1.12) (3.05) (1.99) (0.15)
FRA 0.039*** 0.307*** 0.039 0.02* 0.341*** 0.369*** 0.063** 0.208*** 0.051* 0.24*** 0.169* 0.019 2,878 0.140
(4.18) (4.02) (1.20) (1.66) (12.92) (4.16) (2.01) (2.99) (1.66) (2.95) (1.93) (0.77)
DEU 0.039*** 0.304*** 0.125 0.02* 0.343*** 0.349*** 0.143 0.189** 0.016 0.247*** 0.168* 0.085 2,878 0.139
(4.18) (3.99) (0.93) (1.67) (12.98) (3.8) (1.00) (2.39) (0.14) (2.93) (1.91) (0.70)
HKG 0.038*** 0.303*** -0.016 0.202 0.342*** 0.396*** -0.013 0.235*** -0.078 0.279*** 0.181** 0.176* 2,886 0.140
(4.11) (4.00) (-0.13) (1.18) (12.98) (4.06) (-0.11) (3.13) (-0.68) (3.13) (2.08) (1.65)
IND 0.022** 0.275*** -0.079 0.255*** 0.304*** 0.404*** 0.132 0.217*** -0.06 0.222*** 0.257*** 0.021 2,678 0.116
(2.45) (3.67) (-0.67) (2.61) (13.59) (4.44) (1.12) (2.91) (-0.54) (2.91) (3.43) (0.2)
ITA 0.039*** 0.305*** 0.041 0.019* 0.343*** 0.366*** 0.146 0.187*** 0.075 0.235*** 0.168* 0.072 2,878 0.139
(4.17) (4.01) (0.34) (1.64) (12.97) (4.10) (1.10) (3.32) (0.68) (2.80) (1.91) (0.66)
JPN 0.04*** 0.326*** 0.022 0.010 0.348*** 0.369*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.114 0.209** 0.158* -0.011 2,829 0.142
(4.29) (4.2) (0.21) (1.17) (13.06) (3.63) (0.15) (2.76) (1.06) (2.32) (1.78) (-0.11)
MEX 0.033*** 0.286*** 0.272** 1.416 0.355*** 0.459*** 0.112 0.247*** 0.119 0.300*** 0.166 0.061 2,616 0.152
(3.44) (3.22) (2.01) (1.19) (12.93) (5.68) (0.66) (3.09) (0.73) (3.06) (1.61) (0.48)
NLD 0.039*** 0.306*** -0.008 0.019 0.343*** 0.376*** 0.120 0.191** 0.064 0.236*** 0.168* -0.054 2,878 0.139
(4.16) (4.00) (-0.08) (1.64) (13.01) (4.18) (0.84) (2.35) (0.55) (2.74) (1.88) (-0.42)
RUS 0.027*** 0.291*** -0.148 -0.003 0.349*** 0.534*** 0.075 0.266*** -0.118 0.333*** 0.182* 0.049 2,500 0.149
(2.74) (3.25) (-1.01) (-0.01) (12.22) (6.36) (0.62) (3.08) (-1.18) (3.31) (1.72) (0.55)
ZAF 0.038*** 0.305*** 0.908*** -0.638** 0.322*** 0.315*** 0.648*** 0.159** 0.394 0.211** 0.152* 0.423** 2,868 0.139
(4.05) (3.98) (3.86) (-2.02) (12.73) (3.7) (3.13) (2.27) (1.59) (2.52) (1.69) (2.14)
KOR 0.039*** 0.309*** -0.168 2.298*** 0.342*** 0.442*** 0.024 0.235*** 0.018 0.253*** 0.176** 0.165 2,886 0.141
(4.17) (4.11) (-1.31) (2.97) (13.08) (4.34) (0.19) (3.11) (0.15) (2.94) (1.99) (1.53)
SWE 0.039*** 0.300*** 0.064 -0.009 0.344*** 0.366*** 0.229** 0.167** 0.104 0.225*** 0.173** 0.019 2,885 0.140
(4.17) (3.93) (0.61) (-0.62) (13.01) (4.12) (2.16) (2.17) (1.09) (2.7) (1.98) (0.20)
CHE 0.039*** 0.289*** 0.090 -0.006** 0.344*** 0.35*** 0.128 0.185** 0.088 0.204** 0.189** -0.013 2,801 0.139
(4.03) (3.74) (0.66) (-2.12) (12.73) (3.63) (0.94) (2.26) (0.66) (2.26) (2.09) (-0.10)
GBR 0.039*** 0.296*** 0.134 0.018 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.125 0.184** 0.092 0.223*** 0.169* 0.032 2,886 0.139
(4.15) (3.92) (1.42) (0.28) (13.01) (3.78) (1.09) (2.41) (0.99) (2.65) (1.91) (0.34)
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Table 2.6: Asymmetric Reaction to Changes in VIX and LVIX
Panel regressions with random effects for predictive regression of order imbalance for 41 country-level
MSCI based iShares ETFs on percentage change in volatility index (∆V IX), percentage change in
orthogonalised local volatility index (∆LV IXo), ∆V IXQk and ∆LV IXo,Qk (where k ∈ [2, 5]) to
capture asymmetric response to magnitude and direction of news, change in local interest rates (IR),
lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), dummy variable for a common language (L) and a distance to the
U.S. (G), as well as lags of ∆V IX and ∆LV IXo. ∆V IX is split into quintiles by size. ∆V IXQ1
(∆V IXQ5) equals ∆V IX if the change is the smallest (the largest) and 0 otherwise. The same
applies for ∆LV IXQ1 (∆LV IXQ5). Specifically, I estimate the model below:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=2
βk∆V IX
Qk
t−1+
5∑
k=2
γk∆LV IX
o,Qk
t−1 +
5∑
I=1
ηI∆V IXt−I+
2∑
I=1
δI∆LV IX
o
t−I+µControls+εi,t
where the set of Controls includes changes in the interests (∆IR), order imbalances (OI) at time
t − 1, as well as as dummy variable for a common language (L) and a distance measure to the
U.S. (G). The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and
Bayesian information criterion jointly. Coefficients and z-statistics (based on robust standard errors)
are presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and covers the
period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
∆V IXt−1 -0.055* 0.011 -0.230*** -0.095**
(-1.93) (0.41) (-3.55) (-2.18)
∆V IXQ2t−1 -0.101 -0.336*** -0.325** 0.012
(-1.40) (-6.31) (-2.43) (0.13)
∆V IXQ3t−1 0.002 0.114 -0.455 -0.098
(0.01) (0.50) (-1.17) (-0.30)
∆V IXQ4t−1 -0.388*** -0.227** -0.048 -0.453**
(-2.58) (-2.01) (-0.25) (-2.10)
∆V IXQ5t−1 -0.174*** -0.163*** -0.018 -0.207***
(-4.18) (-3.62) (-0.23) (-3.47)
∆LV IXot−1 0.025 0.045 0.080 0.043
(0.60) (1.26) (1.12) (0.78)
∆LV IXo,Q2t−1 0.006 -0.024 0.012 -0.034
(0.04) (-0.26) (0.06) (-0.18)
∆LV IXo,Q3t−1 0.429 0.088 0.854 0.536
(0.91) (0.25) (1.09) (0.95)
∆LV IXo,Q4t−1 0.075 0.035 0.230 0.029
(0.40) (0.28) (0.75) (0.12)
∆LV IXo,Q5t−1 -0.114** -0.126*** -0.141* -0.137*
(-2.06) (-2.88) (-1.67) (-1.83)
∆IRt−1 -0.004** -0.002 -0.006* -0.002
(-2.22) (-1.54) (-1.96) (-0.79)
Continue on the next page
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Table continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
G -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(-0.22) (-0.69) (-2.56) (0.13)
L 0.003 -0.005** 0.013 0.001
(0.38) (-2.23) (0.87) (0.14)
OIt−1 0.169*** 0.193*** 0.129*** 0.113***
(12.31) (8.23) (8.87) (10.57)
∆V IXt−2 -0.020 -0.015 -0.100*** -0.031
(-1.48) (-1.16) (-4.06) (-1.29)
∆LV IXot−2 -0.055** -0.026 -0.050* -0.071***
(-2.32) (-1.20) (-1.86) (-2.71)
∆V IXt−3 -0.042** -0.014 -0.057** -0.046**
(-2.53) (-1.35) (-2.43) (-2.13)
∆V IXt−4 -0.062*** -0.048*** -0.079*** -0.074***
(-4.15) (-3.23) (-4.44) (-3.66)
∆V IXt−5 -0.036** -0.021 -0.022 -0.046*
(-2.45) (-1.58) (-1.16) (-1.95)
Constant 0.022*** 0.008** 0.040*** 0.018***
(2.85) (2.09) (3.31) (2.74)
Observations 57,683 52,578 54,455 55,346
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.041 0.020 0.016
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Table 2.7: Panel Results- Political Uncertainty
Panel regressions with random effects for predictive regression of order imbalance for 41 country-level
MSCI based iShares ETFs region on percentage change in volatility index (∆V IX), percentage
change in orthogonalised local volatility index (∆LV IXo), U.S. political uncertainty (USPU),
orthogonalised local political uncertainty (LPUo), change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order
imbalance (OIt−1), dummy variable for a common language (L) and a distance to the US (G),
as well as lags of ∆V IX, ∆LV IXo, USPR and LPRo. Specifically, I run the model below:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k+
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k+
2∑
k=1
δkUSPUt−1+
1,5∑
k=1
φkLPU
o
t−1+µControls+εi,t
where the set of Controls includes changes in the interests (∆IR), order imbalances (OI) at time
t − 1, as well as as dummy variable for a common language (L) and a distance measure to the
U.S. (G). Political uncertainty is based on SVI from Google trends (as described in section 2.3.4).
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and z-statistics (based on robust standard errors) are
presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and covers the
period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
∆V IXt−1 -0.172*** -0.107*** -0.257*** -0.233***
(-7.10) (-4.49) (-9.42) (-7.94)
∆LV IXot−1 -0.046** -0.035*** -0.013 -0.050*
(-2.39) (-2.72) (-0.50) (-1.79)
USPUt−1 0.010 0.017** -0.014 0.014
(1.07) (2.08) (-0.92) (1.19)
LPUot−1 -0.010 -0.004 0.005 -0.012
(-0.98) (-0.43) (0.37) (-0.86)
∆IRt−1 -0.004** -0.002* -0.006* -0.002
(-2.37) (-1.68) (-1.85) (-0.86)
OIt−1 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.131*** 0.109***
(14.03) (9.98) (9.09) (10.20)
L 0.005 -0.003 0.013 0.004
(0.66) (-1.50) (0.89) (0.45)
G -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(-0.00) (0.15) (-2.54) (0.41)
USPUt−2 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.027 0.040***
(4.33) (5.79) (1.62) (3.87)
LPUot−5 -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 -0.002
(-0.99) (-0.63) (-1.20) (-0.14)
∆V IXt−2 -0.037** -0.024* -0.109*** -0.049*
(-2.42) (-1.67) (-4.83) (-1.91)
∆LV IXot−2 -0.048** -0.024 -0.049* -0.067**
(-1.97) (-1.08) (-1.74) (-2.36)
∆V IXt−3 -0.061*** -0.030*** -0.064*** -0.066***
(-3.20) (-2.93) (-2.96) (-2.80)
∆V IXt−4 -0.072*** -0.053*** -0.076*** -0.082***
(-4.42) (-3.34) (-4.62) (-3.91)
∆V IXt−5 -0.036** -0.022 -0.026 -0.047**
(-2.54) (-1.55) (-1.52) (-2.04)
Constant 0.010 -0.003 0.038*** 0.004
(1.45) (-1.24) (3.09) (0.63)
Observations 55,567 50,543 53,863 53,493
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.036 0.019 0.015
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Table 2.8: Correlation with the U.S. Market: Staggered Introduction
Panel regression with random effects of innovations in rolling 36-day correlation (measured as a
residual of AR(1) process) between S&P 500 returns and local MSCI market returns (∆ρ) on the
dummy variable (for the introduction of ETFs) IntroETF , on the dummy variable (for periods of
high U.S. volatility conditional on low volatility in local markets) DUS|L, the interaction of two
dummy variables and the lagged innovation in correlation. Specifically, I estimate the model below:
∆ρt = α+ β1Intro
ETF
t + β2Intro
ETF
t DUS|L,t + β3DUS|L,t + β4∆ρt−1 + εi,t
Dummy variable DUS|L takes the value of 1 when volatility in U.S. market is high (greater than
mean plus one standard deviation) and volatility in the local market is not high (less than mean
plus one standard deviation). Dummy variable IntroETF takes the value of 1 throughout the life of
an ETF (from the inception date until the fund end date) and is 0 otherwise. Data is at a monthly
frequency and covers the period from January 1988 or the first trading day on which MSCI return
is available (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level.
(1)
VARIABLES ∆ρt
IntroETF 0.001
(1.10)
IntroETF ×DUS|L,t 0.008**
(2.59)
DUS|L,t 0.002
(0.78)
∆ρt−1 0.015
(1.28)
Constant -0.001
(-1.60)
Observations 12,268
Adjusted R2 0.004
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Table 2.9: Correlation with the U.S. Market: Arbitrage and High Volat-
ility
Panel regression with random effects of innovations in rolling 36-month correlation (measured
as a residual of AR(1) process) between S&P 500 returns and local MSCI market returns (∆ρ)
on the dummy variable (for periods of high U.S. volatilities conditional on low volatility in local
markets) DUS|L, measure of arbitrage activity (|∆SOt|), interaction of the dummy variable with
the arbitrage proxy, lagged innovation in correlation and Amihud (2002) illiquity measure of MSCI
index (ILLIQMSCI). Specifically, I estimate the model below:
∆ρt = α+ β1|∆SOt|+ β2|∆SOt|DUS|L,t + β3DUS|L,t + β4∆ρt−1 + β5ILLIQMSCI,t + εi,t
Dummy variable takes the value of 1 when volatility in U.S. market is high (greater than mean
plus one standard deviation) and volatility in the local market is not high (less than mean plus one
standard deviation). Arbitrage activity |∆SOt| is proxied by an absolute value of percentage change
of shares outstanding of ETF fund from time t− 1 to t. Data is at a monthly frequency and covers
the period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
Illiquidity measure is in 10−4 ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ∆ρt ∆ρt
|∆SOt| 0.23* -0.048
(1.80) (-0.33)
|∆SOt| ×DUS|L,t 0.649**
(2.05)
DUS|L,t -0.003
(-1.36)
∆ρt−1 0.075*** 0.136***
(3.99) (10.34)
ILLIQMSCI,t 0.56* 1.35***
(1.67) (2.62)
Constant -0.001** -0.000
(-2.46) (-0.68)
Observations 3,243 1,939
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.019
98
Table 2.10: Price Discovery, Market Illiquidity and Correlation
This table presents average 36-month rolling correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns
and average adjusted R-squares of MSCI index returns on the first principal component (PC1) of
all available countries. I form 3 (or 4) monthly portfolios based on price discovery and limits to
arbitrage proxies. Each portfolio is presorted based on information available during previous month.
Panel A shows the sort into terciles by βi from equation R
NAV
i,t = α + βi
(
Pi,t−1−NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ ε.
I use a 36-month period to estimate βi. Sort in panel B is based on Amihud’s illiquidity ratio
(Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets (ILLIQ). Panel C shows the result of a double sort by
median based on proxies from Panel A and Panel B. Panel D shows the result of a double sort by
median based on price discovery as in panel A and illiquidity mismatch as defined in equation 2.12.
t-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors.
Panel A: Price Discovery
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Rolling Correlations
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.59 0.69 0.76 0.17 (32.02)
Adjusted R-squared based on PC1
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.50 0.61 0.67 0.17 (10.67)
Panel B: Limits to Arbitrage
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Rolling Correlations
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 0.75 0.69 0.65 -0.11 (-10.11)
Adjusted R-squared based on PC1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 0.66 0.61 0.54 -0.12 (-10.26)
Panel C: Double Sort 1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
Rolling Correlations
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.67 0.60 -0.07 (-5.81)
high 0.76 0.72 -0.04 (-3.31)
HML 0.09 0.12
t-stat (8.71) (14.08)
Panel D: Double Sort 2
Liquidity Mismatch
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
Rolling Correlations
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.61 0.65 0.06 (3.25)
high 0.71 0.77 0.06 (5.04)
HML 0.10 0.11
t-stat (9.48) (6.54)
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Table 2.11: Price Discovery, Noise and Correlation
This table presents average 36-month rolling correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns
for all available countries. I form 3 (or 4) monthly portfolios based on one of the three proxies that
affect price discovery due to noise. Each portfolio is presorted based on information available during
previous month. Panel A shows the sort into terciles by the |V R− 1|, where VR (variance ratio) is
the ratio of 15-sec returns over three times of 5-sec return variances. Sort in panel B is based on
the ratio of dollar volume of smallOI and of TOI. Panel C shows the result of a sort by ratio of
dollar volume of smallOI and retailOI. For each panel, the double sort by median based on one of
3 sorting criteria and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets (ILLIQ)
is also provided. t-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors.
Panel A: Variance Ratio
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Variance Ratio 0.72 0.67 0.68 -0.03 (-2.64)
Variance Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
low 0.73 0.73 -0.01 (-0.42)
high 0.65 0.65 -0.01 (-0.45)
HML -0.08 -0.08
t-stat (-6.55) (-4.27)
Panel B: Small Dollar Volume to Total Dollar Volume
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Small/Totl Dollar Volume 0.71 0.73 0.66 -0.05 (-2.93)
Small/Total Dollar Volume
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
low 0.75 0.72 -0.02 (-2.79)
high 0.66 0.64 -0.02 (-1.56)
HML -0.08 -0.08
t-stat (-7.91) (-11.41)
Panel C: Small Dollar Volume to Retail Dollar Volume
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Small/Retail Dollar Volume 0.71 0.71 0.67 -0.04 (-4.15)
Small/Retail Dollar Volume
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
low 0.76 0.72 -0.04 (-7.56)
high 0.67 0.63 -0.04 (-4.36)
HML 0.09 0.09
t-stat (-11.10) (-10.52)
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Table 2.12: Panel Results- Foreign Exchange Risk
Panel regressions with random effects for predictive regression of order imbalance for 41 country-level
MSCI based iShares ETFs region on percentage change in volatility index (∆V IX), percentage
change in orthogonalised local volatility index (∆LV IXo), exchange rate return (∆ert−1), absolute
value of exchange rate return (|∆ert−1|), change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance
(OIt−1), dummy variable for a common language (L) and a distance to the US (G), as well as lags
of ∆V IX and ∆LV IXo. Specifically, I estimate the model below:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k +
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k + δ1∆ert−1 + δ2|∆ert−1|+
+ δ3∆IRi,t−1 + δ4OIi,t−1 + δ5Li + δ6Gi + εi,t
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and z-statistics (based on robust standard errors) are
presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and covers the
period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
∆V IXt−1 -0.176*** -0.113*** -0.249*** -0.235***
(-7.08) (-4.73) (-9.71) (-8.05)
∆LV IXot−1 -0.039* -0.032** 0.002 -0.037
(-1.95) (-2.01) (0.09) (-1.39)
∆ert−1 -0.680*** -0.387** -1.296*** -0.856**
(-4.23) (-2.27) (-3.59) (-2.50)
|∆ert−1| -1.020*** -1.559*** -2.017*** -0.663
(-2.78) (-4.76) (-3.14) (-1.63)
∆IRt−1 -0.004** -0.002 -0.006** -0.002
(-2.28) (-1.63) (-2.02) (-0.86)
OIt−1 0.169*** 0.193*** 0.128*** 0.113***
(12.39) (8.30) (8.83) (10.50)
L 0.002 -0.006*** 0.012 0.001
(0.33) (-2.64) (0.81) (0.11)
G -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(-0.23) (-0.93) (-2.55) (0.14)
∆V IXt−2 -0.027* -0.023* -0.095*** -0.040
(-1.92) (-1.80) (-4.19) (-1.55)
∆LV IXot−2 -0.055** -0.027 -0.054** -0.072***
(-2.32) (-1.25) (-2.03) (-2.68)
∆V IXt−3 -0.053*** -0.024** -0.057*** -0.060***
(-3.13) (-2.42) (-2.70) (-2.64)
∆V IXt−4 -0.071*** -0.056*** -0.081*** -0.085***
(-4.65) (-3.58) (-4.89) (-4.17)
∆V IXt−5 -0.042*** -0.028** -0.023 -0.055**
(-2.78) (-2.07) (-1.25) (-2.22)
Constant 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.049*** 0.013*
(2.99) (3.02) (4.02) (1.85)
Observations 57,683 52,578 54,455 55,346
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.041 0.020 0.016
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Chapter 3
ETF Short Interest and
Distressed Stocks
3.1 Introduction
With the rise of assets under management of exchange traded funds (ETFs) significant
attention is devoted to studying the effect of ETFs on the underlying stocks. Yet,
the majority of previous research focuses on the common effects of ETFs on every
stock in the holding basket, regardless of the individual characteristics of such stocks.
In particular, many studies investigate whether ETFs bring noise to underlying
securities (e.g. Ben-David et al., 2018). At the same time, the growth of coverage of
ETF market led to inclusion of securities of heterogeneous types in the portfolios.
Therefore, it is important to consider differences in stocks in ETF basket when
assessing potential impact of such investment vehicles on equity markets. In this
paper, I consider the credit quality as a characteristic that varies among ETF holdings
and measures the impact of ETF trading on stocks.
I investigate the effect of industry ETF membership on stocks that are in
financial distress in contrast to non-distressed stocks. Industry ETFs (also known
as sector ETFs) is a growing product with $385 billion dollars of assets under
management in the U.S. alone as of June 20191. For this study I consider industry
1According to ICI Global: https://www.ici.org/research/stats/etf/etfs 06 19
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ETF as a fund that tracks the performance of one sector of U.S. economy (e.g.
iShares U.S. Real Estate ETF) via physical (non-synthetic) replication. Such type of
ETFs has a large market coverage and is widely available. It is also an ETF product
with one of the highest levels of short-selling (Huang, O’Hara, and Zhong, 2018). I
investigate the role of industry ETF short-selling on the underlying stocks and, in
contrast to previous studies, show that distressed securities are positively affected by
industry ETF membership in a form of improved price efficiency.
I also study stocks that are part of industry ETF baskets and find that they
do not show signs of financial distress anomaly in contrast to non-ETF-member
stocks. The financial distress anomaly is one of the widely investigated puzzles
in the asset-pricing literature. Stocks that experience financial distress are more
risky. Apart from bankruptcy risk (and numerous costs associated with it) such
stocks tend to have larger market betas, have smaller market capitalization, have
larger volatility, leverage and lower liquidity. Despite having a higher risk than
other less distressed firms they under-perform relative to the common benchmarks
(e.g Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008; Dichev, 1998). Such high risk and low
return relationship is not consistent with rational investment behaviour of market
participants. Although there is no clear consensus within the current research
on the potential explanations of distress anomaly, strong evidence suggest that
distressed stocks tend to be overpriced due to the existence of higher barriers for
short-selling (e.g. higher fees, low institutional ownership and therefore availability
etc.). Campbell et al. (2008) find that distressed stocks have higher loadings on
market, SMB and HML factors. They show that stocks with higher limits to
arbitrage tend to exhibit a stronger anomaly. The profit and loss of the long-
short strategy on the non-distressed and distressed stocks is correlated with VIX,
suggesting that investors sell stocks with high probability of failure when facing
an increase in market uncertainty. Gao, Parsons, and Shen (2017) support the
behavioural explanation based on limits to arbitrage suggesting that when it is
hard for institutional investors to correct the mispricing negative news might not be
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reflected in the price immediately. The slow incorporation of information results in
negative returns consistent with under-performance of distressed stocks. Specifically,
they show that high overconfidence among investors results in significantly negative
returns of distressed stocks. Following the period of high market gains the returns of
portfolio of distressed stocks is low. Finally, they show that within the distressed
group returns are particularly low for firms that have experienced recent bad news.
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2013) show that profitability of many
anomalies such as, for example, earnings and price momentum is concentrated in
distressed stocks. Once stocks with low credit ratings are removed from the sample
the anomalies disappear. Moreover, it is the short side of the strategy that generates
the positive return. Such finding supports the distressed stock mispricing explanation.
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) link investor sentiments to profitability of the
short-leg of the long-short distressed strategy. They show that distressed anomaly
is stronger following the period of high sentiments and the short-leg experiences
a significantly lower return. Interestingly, the effect of sentiments on the long-leg
is much weaker. Such asymmetric effect of sentiments is consistent with anomaly
reflecting the mispricing.
Motivated by the mispricing explanation of the anomaly and the existence of
high barriers for the direct short-selling of distressed stocks I investigate whether
investors can reduce the overpricing of such stocks by obtaining a short position
indirectly via ETFs. Karmaziene and Sokolovski (2015) as well as Li and Zhu (2018)
describe the create-to-lend mechanism that allows the authorised participants (APs)2
to easily expand the supply of ETF shares available to borrow. The transmission
mechanism of ETF shocks to the underlying stocks is widely described in the ETF
literature (e.g Ben-David et al., 2018; Da and Shive, 2018, etc.). The sufficient short-
selling of industry ETFs in the secondary market leads to the ETF price declining
2Authorised Participant is a dealer in the ETF market who has an agreement with ETF sponsor
for creation/redemption of ETF shares. To create new shares he can deliver the basket of underlying
securities to ETF sponsor and exchange them for newly created shares. For redemption he can
deliver the ETF shares and exchange them for underlying stocks.
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below the net asset value of the fund. Observing the discount (or experiencing a
positive inventory shock if the AP is also a market maker), the AP has the incentive
to close the arbitrage opportunity by purchasing the ETF shares (or using ETF
stocks from his inventory) and delivering them to the ETF sponsor in exchange for
the underlying basket of securities. Simultaneously, underlying stocks are sold-short
by the AP creating a negative price pressure. The short-selling is much easier for
the AP as he has a certainty of receiving the underlying securities locked in the
ETF basket. In addition, the short-sale of the ETF should be a strong signal to
the market participants about the value of the underlying stocks. Over time such
signal is reflected in negative returns in the underlying market (Li and Zhu, 2018).
I find that 9.11% of the companies in the baskets of industry ETFs are in distress.
Such percentage is high because many passive funds are forced to keep distressed
stocks as they are a part of broad sector benchmarks that industry funds replicate. I
first test the effect of U.S. industry ETF short-selling on returns of distressed and
non-distressed stocks next month. I find that while ETF short-selling has a very
limited effect on non-distressed stocks (consistent with absence of overpricing in these
stocks) the selling pressure results in negative returns of distressed stocks during the
following month. Such response is consistent with the existence of risk-averse APs
that propagate ETF shocks to the underlying markets. I also investigate the effect
of differences in the short-selling motives of industry ETFs on underlying securities.
Huang et al. (2018) argue that industry ETFs provide a new hedging tool to active
investors (e.g. hedge funds) to hedge their industry risk when making risky bets on
underlying stocks. An informed investor would utilise his positive private information
about a stock by taking a long position in it and simultaneously hedging his industry
exposure by going short on a corresponding industry ETF. Such motive is dominant
during non-crisis period. The alternative reason to short-sell industry ETF is to make
a negative bet on the future returns of the industry (speculative motive). Huang et al.
(2018) show that such reason for short-selling is the main one during the crisis period.
Since short-selling for hedging purposes does not contain fundamental information
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about the industry such activity should result in return reversal of underlying stocks
next month. I test whether such explanation is consistent in the case of distressed
stocks by splitting my sample into crisis and non-crisis periods. I find that during
the crisis period fundamental short-selling creates an equal downwards pressure on
both types of stocks. During the period of hedging-motivated short-selling I observe
a reversal for non-distressed stocks. In contrast, even when the initial motive for
short-selling is non-fundamental the distressed stocks react negatively in line with an
overvaluation hypothesis proposed by a number of studies. Overall, such results show
that irrespective of short-selling motives industry ETFs partially reduce overpricing
of distressed securities.
In contrast to Huang et al. (2018) I demonstrate that high short-selling
of industry ETFs is not uniform across all sectors of the economy. The negative
returns of the underlying stocks after indirect short-selling is concentrated in the
cyclical industries. Such evidence is consistent with high proportion of distressed
stocks concentrating in high beta (more volatile) sectors. Following the findings
of Stambaugh et al. (2012) I also test whether ETF short-selling is driven by the
existence of overpricing in the market. I show that on average the largest amount
of short-selling is concentrated in the month following the period of high investor
sentiments proxied by Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure and by the Michigan
sentiment index. Finally, I test whether the alleviation of the short-selling constraint
embedded in the distressed stocks translates into a higher price efficiency of distressed
stocks. Consistent with previous studies I find that ETF short-selling increases the
price delay for non-distressed stocks (negative effect on efficiency). However, the
effect is completely opposite for distressed stocks, which highlights the positive effect
of industry ETFs on the price efficiency of their distressed member stocks. I also
investigate whether the ETF effect on efficiency remains in the presence of alternative
short-selling mechanisms - stock options. I find that although the net effect is lower
the result is robust when controlling for availability of call and put options.
I investigate the financial distress anomaly among stocks with low credit
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ratings conditional on ETF membership. I first sort stocks based on S&P long-term
credit rating and then based on ETF membership. I find that since ETFs reduce
the overpricing of distressed stocks, securities that are members of industry ETFs
do not under-perform common benchmarks in contrast to non-member stocks. This
effect is robust to different proxies of financial distress. Such finding provides a
novel evidence of ETFs improving general market efficiency in contrast to numerous
previous studies that show the opposite. Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and Garlappi
and Yan (2011) suggest that one of the potential explanations of distress anomaly is
that when default is almost certain the distress risk decreases as equity investors
can expropriate value from debt holders. Gao et al. (2017) do not find the support
for such hypothesis internationally. I show that my findings are not driven by such
explanation either.
This paper is related to the literature that links pricing efficiency to the
short-selling constraints at the individual stock level. Drechsler and Drechsler (2016)
demonstrate the connection between high short-selling fees and profitability of
anomaly returns. They show that many anomalies (including the distress anomaly)
only exist in the high short-selling fee group. Previous research shows that short-
selling constraints (Nagel, 2005, etc.), as well as short-selling risk in the form of
uncertainty about future short-selling fees (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2018)
leads to a reduction in price efficiency of stocks. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) show that
stocks with higher constraints have slower reaction to market developments. My work
is also related to the literature discussing the value relevant information contained
in the short-selling. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that short-sellers are
well-informed and able to predict negative returns at the stock level. Engelberg,
Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) provide evidence that such informativeness comes
from the ability to better process public information. Boehmer, Huszár, Wang,
and Zhang (2018) find that short-selling predictability varies internationally and is
concentrated in countries with less severe short-selling regulations and better market
quality. Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016) show that the short-interest ratio
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at the aggregate level is a better predictor of U.S. returns than many other known
variables. Huszár, Tan, and Zhang (2017) demonstrate that short-sellers target
specific industries with higher information complexity. Huszár, Tan, and Zhang
(2019) show that industry level short-selling contains a better (more economically
important) information about future returns than at the stock level due to the
presence of binding short-selling constraints. Consistent with these findings I use
industry ETFs to assess the alternative short-selling venues. Beneish, Lee, and
Nichols (2015) show that the predictive ability of short-interest ratio is concentrated
in stocks with binding constraints. Similarly, Guo and Wu (2019) show that predictive
ability of short-interest ratio is concentrated in the low-rated stocks. This highlights
the reason why in this study I use credit quality as a defining characteristic when
evaluating the impact of ETF short-selling on stocks. This paper is also related to the
literature on ETF short-selling. Karmaziene and Sokolovski (2015) demonstrate that
during short-sale ban of financial stocks in 2008 investors moved to financial sector
ETFs to alleviate the constraint. Li and Zhu (2018) show that stocks with higher
short-selling constraints at the stock level and higher short-interest ratio at the ETF
level experience lower returns. Overall, evidence suggest that investors use ETFs as
an alternative short-selling route when the direct short-selling is complicated. My
results support such findings. However, previous studies do not consider the effect
of such ETF short-selling on the distressed stocks. Sorting stocks by credit rating
allows me to highlight the role of ETFs, as an indirect short-selling mechanism, in
improving price efficiency of distressed stocks.
Numerous studies show the negative effects of ETFs on underling stocks from
different dimensions. Israeli et al. (2017) argue that ETFs increase trading costs
of underlying stocks and reduce their information efficiency. Da and Shive (2018)
shows that ETFs increase the co-movement of underlying stocks. Ben-David et al.
(2018) show that ETFs propagate liquidity shocks to underlying securities leading
to a rise of non-fundamental volatility. In contrast to such studies, by recognising
that ETF baskets include stocks of heterogeneous types (rather than considering
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the joint effect on all stocks) I show positive impacts of ETFs in restoring market
efficiency. Opposite to the literature that focuses on the noise propagation the
research of Lettau and Madhavan (2018) as well as Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016)
highlights the role of ETFs in improving the price discovery at the stock level. This
paper contributes to this stream of literature by demonstrating the improvement in
price discovery of distressed stocks. Evans, Karakaş, Moussawi, and Young (2019)
show that the short-selling of the ETFs creates the so-called “phantom ETF” and
“phantom underlying securities”. ETF stocks carry the voting rights (executed by
the ETF sponsor) as they are backed by the portfolio of stocks in the ETF basket.
In contrast, ETF stocks that are borrowed and then short-sold are backed by the
collateral held by the broker (may be a hedging instrument, rather than the original
securities) and due to broker limitation on voting do not carry voting rights. Authors
find that firms with high amount of “phantom ETF shares” tend to underperform
due to a deterioration of firm’s governance. In addition due to many underlying
shares being locked up in the broker account as collateral the value of votes increases.
Kalay, Karakaş, and Pant (2014) discuss the increase in lending fees for stocks around
special shareholder meetings and consequently a positive correlation with voting
premium. In addition, the availability of voting rights is likely to be reduced by the
ETF phantom effect. While this paper does not directly study the voting premium
it is likely to be reflected in the higher daily cost of borrowing score (DCBS) for
ETF-member security. Interestingly, in my sample I do not find the statistically
significant difference between DCBS of ETF member and non-member distressed
securities, which suggests that other factors such as liquidity and lending supply
might out-weight the voting premium effect. In addition, I find that in contrast to
Evans et al. (2019) ETF-member distressed stocks perform better than non-ETF
stocks relative to a common risk benchmark (zero vs negative alpha). Such finding
suggests that for distressed securities, on a risk adjusted bases, the reduction in
mispricing has a stronger effect than the deterioration of company governance.
Section 3.2 describes the construction of stock and industry ETF sample,
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as well as procedure for sorting stocks by credit quality. Section 3.3 provides the
empirical results. Section 3.4 shows the results of robustness tests. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Data and Methodology
In this section I describe my sample construction including the procedures to identify
industry ETFs. I then provide the methodology to clean the universe of common
stocks used in this study and to construct the short-interest ratio for each of such
stocks, as well as for each industry ETF. Finally, I explain different methodologies
for constructing the financial distress measure and for obtaining the ETF holdings.
3.2.1 Industry ETFs
In order to construct the list of industry ETFs I first obtain all plain vanilla equity
ETFs that are traded on one of the U.S. exchanges. I start with the universe of
stocks from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. I filter for
ETFs by only keeping stocks with share code of 73. I combine this list with ETFs
from Compustat database that, as in Israeli et al. (2017), are identified using issue
type of ‘%’. Using CRSP Survivor-biased-free Mutual Fund database I identify
equity ETFs from my list by keeping only those funds that have Lipper Asset Code
‘EQ’. I follow Ben-David et al. (2018) and filter funds by Lipper Objective Codes
to remove ETFs with synthetic replication, as well as leveraged or active products.
Finally, to ensure that I obtain the funds that invest in equities I check that they
have at least 80% of AUM invested in common stocks.
I follow Huang et al. (2018) to identify industry ETFs. I obtain holdings
for each equity ETF from Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund holding database (S12).
For every equity that funds have in their holdings I obtain Standard Industry
Classification codes (SIC) from Compustat. The assigned SIC codes are as of the
fiscal year ending in a calendar year t − 1. I use 12 industry classifications from
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Kenneth French’s website to allocate ETFs to industry groups (see table 3.1 for
the description of each industry). Industry ETF is defined as a fund that has at
least 30% of assets invested in the dominating industry and has at least 30 stocks in
holdings in general. I check the obtained list and manually filter the ETFs that do
not intend to invest in any particular industry. For example, I remove ETFs that
invest in broad indices such as Russell 3000 and S&P 500. Finally, I ensure that
80% of AUM are invested in U.S common domestic stocks. For example, this results
in iShares Global Tech ETF (IXN) being excluded from the list and iShares North
America Tech ETF (IGM) remaining on the list. Overall, the final list consists of 127
ETFs, which is similar to 121 funds identified in Huang et al. (2018). The common
feature of almost all funds in the final sample is that their names contain clearly
identifiable industries (e.g. Vanguard Consumer Staples ETF or iShares U.S. Basic
Materials ETF). The sample starts in January 1999 and ends in February 2017 due
to ETF and S&P rating data availability.
[insert Table 3.1 here]
An obvious concern is that if distress risk is concentrated among small stocks then
they are likely to be excluded from ETF benchmarks. However, very often this is not
the case. Many of the funds in my sample track benchmarks constructed by MSCI
or S&P. MSCI constructs sector indices based on “Investable Market Index”. This
index achieves 99% of the coverage of the market. Figure 3.1 shows that Investable
Market Index consists of Standard Index (Large Cap and Mid Cap indices) and
a Small Cap index3. For example, Vanguard Energy ETF (VDE) tracks MSCI
U.S. Investable Market Energy 25/50 Index that includes large, medium and small
companies in energy sector. Blackrock’s iShares U.S. Consumer Goods ETF (IYK)
tracks Dow Jones U.S. Consumer Goods Index. Dow Jones index covers 95% of
U.S. market capitalization. Overall, while some funds track a narrowly defined
indices that include only firms with large or medium capitalisation, it is relatively
3Based on MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes Methodology available at MSCI.com
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common for index funds to include small stocks. I find that on average 9.11%
of the number of companies that are in ETF benchmark are in financial distress.
Moreover, concentration rules such as “25/50” limit the maximum weight per stock
and the total weight of large stocks in the fund. Furthermore, although most of
financially distressed firms are concentrated in smaller size companies the distress is
not exclusive to this category.
[insert Figure 3.1 here]
In this study I use industry ETFs because such funds are the most shorted by
investors among equity ETFs. Figure 3.2 shows the list of top 15 most shorted ETFs
as of 24 July, 2018. Out of 15 funds 7 can be classified as industry ETFs. In addition,
this type of funds is more widely available than vanilla funds that exclusively follow
small stocks (9 funds as of February 20194).
[insert Figure 3.2 here]
3.2.2 Short-Interest
I am interested in the effect of indirect short-selling via ETFs on the underlying
stocks. I obtain monthly short interest for each ETF in my sample from Compustat.
The short-interest ratio (SIR) is defined as the amount of shares sold short scaled by
the number of shares outstanding:
SIRt =
SharesSoldShortt
SharesOustandingt
(3.1)
I use the number of shares outstanding from CRSP database, as it is more complete
and has less severe errors for this variable. I compute short interest ratio for ETFs
(SIRj,t, where j is one of 127 industry ETFs), as well as at the stock level (SIR
stocki
t )
to control for the direct short-selling channel. In this study I use short interest ratio
at the monthly frequency. Sometimes, the SIR can be above 100%, which means
4According to ETF.com
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that ETF shares were re-borrowed multiple times. Similarly to other literature on
the short-interest ratio (e.g. Huang et al., 2018), I replace SIR greater than 100%
with 100%.
3.2.3 Universe of Common Stocks and ETF holdings
I obtain daily prices for all U.S. stocks traded on major exchanges from CRSP daily
stock file. I only include common stocks with share class ‘11’ and ‘12’ that are
listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ (exchange codes ‘1’, ‘2’ or ‘3’). Stocks with
prices of less than $5 at the end of the month are removed. When working with
distressed stocks it is important to account for delistings. I adjust the returns by
including delisting returns based on methodology of Shumway and Warther (1999).
Overall, the sample of common stocks contains 10,595 firms from 1999-2017. I also
calculate numerous stock related control variables from Compustat, CRSP and IBES
databases. See table C.1 in the appendix for more details.
I obtain quarterly ETF holdings for each industry ETF in my sample from
S12 Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database. The reporting quarters
are not always aligned across funds. I assume that the constituents of ETF basket
are constant for the reporting quarter (from previous holdings report date or fund
inception date until the current report date). Such assumption is realistic, as major
index providers usually rebalance their indices once a quarter.
3.2.4 Measure of Financial Distress
In this study I evaluate the difference between the effect of ETF short-selling on the
distressed and non-distressed stocks. Previous research introduced many different
proxies for financial distress: Z-scores (Altman, 1968), O-scores (Ohlson, 1980),
Moody-KMV’s expected default frequency (Gao et al., 2017; Garlappi et al., 2008)
etc.. I follow Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009) and Avramov et al.
(2013) and use domestic long-term issuer credit ratings provided by S&P as a proxy
for financial distress. This measure shows the capacity and willingness of a company
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to meet its long-term financial obligations. The main advantage of this dataset is that
it is readily available from Compustat database at a monthly frequency. In contrast,
alternative measures are often constructed from annual or quarterly accounting data
that limits the frequency of the analysis. S&P assigns ratings from AAA (extremely
strong capacity to meet obligations) to SD (selective default). Similarly to Avramov
et al. (2009, 2013), I exclude SD category from the analysis and assign numeric
scores to each rating (AAA = 1 . . . BBB-=10 . . . D=22 ). Table C.2 in the appendix
shows the distribution of stocks by credit scores. Every rating category below 10
is considered as non-investment grade. Based on terciles of monthly credit score
distributions I split stocks into 3 groups: Distressed Stocks (the highest scores),
Medium Rating and High Rating stocks (the lowest scores). The allocation is
performed monthly. After removing stocks without credit rating my sample contains
2721 unique stocks.
In the robustness tests, I use Altman’s Z-scores (Altman, 1968) and the proxy
for Moody’s KMV distance to default measure that is based on the model of Merton
(1974). The Altman’s Z-score combines 5 accounting ratios:
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.99X5 (3.2)
where X1 is the ratio of Working Capital to Total assets, X2 is the ratio of Retained
Earnings to Total assets, X3 is the ratio of EBIT to Total assets, X4 is the ratio of
Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Total Debt and X5 is the ratio of Sales to
Total Assets. Typically, companies with z-scores above 2.99 are considered as safe.
Group of companies with z-scores between 1.81 and 2.99 are in a “grey zone” and
have the highest proportion of error classification. Firms with z-scores below 1.81
are considered as distressed. In order to obtain a higher frequency data, I compute
Altman Z-scores quarterly.
I follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) to construct the distance to default
measure. While not identical to Moody’s KMV measure authors estimate that the
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correlation is high reaching around 79%. This measure is based on the representation
of the value of equity as a call option on company’s assets with a strike price that is
equal to the face value of debt. The value of the distance to default measure can be
estimated as follows:
DD =
ln VF + (µ− 0.5σ
2
V )T
σV
√
T
(3.3)
where V is the value of firm’s assets, F is the face value of firm’s debt issued with
maturity T , µ is a continuously compounded rate of return and σv is the volatility of
the total value of the firm. I use the expected default frequency (EDF ) as a sorting
variable to proxy the probability of default:
EDF = N (−DD) (3.4)
In order to estimate EDF for each firm in my sample I proxy the risk-free rate
with a 1-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate obtained from Federal Reserve
Bank Reports on WRDS. The value of debt is estimated as a sum of the values of
short-term liabilities and one-half of long-term liabilities available from Compustat.
Appendix C.1 provides the detailed description of how the EDF measure is computed
numerically.
3.3 Empirical Results
In this section I evaluate the effect of ETF short-selling on the returns of distressed
and non-distressed stocks. I highlight the differences in effects conditional on industry
sensitivity to business cycles and on short-selling motives. I further investigate the
implications of industry ETF membership on the existence of the distress anomaly
and demonstrate the asymmetric impact of ETF short-selling on the price efficiency
of distressed stocks.
Panel A of table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of ETFs across 11 industries.
None of the ETFs in my sample track the performance of Consumer Durables
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industry5. The highest number of ETFs are in the Financial Sector and Business
Equipment (that includes the IT sector) industries. Most of the funds have a high
SIR on average. Retail and Financial sectors (Shop and Money) have the highest
short interest (18.25% and 17.13%), as these are the typical industries that investors
bet against during recession periods. Overall, the SIR tends to be higher in cyclical
industries in line with a speculation motive. While Huang et al. (2018) argue that the
value of SIR for industry ETFs is very high at the 95th percentile I show that the level
of short-selling varies significantly across industries. The values are consistent with
the average SIR ranking and are relatively low (in comparison to other industries) for
Non-Durables and Telecommunication sectors (20.19% and 22.35%). This suggests
that these industries are less likely to experience extreme levels of short-selling
often observed in the Financial Services industry. Panel B of table 3.2 shows the
summary statistics of stocks in my sample aggregated based on credit rating and
ETF membership. On average, all distressed stocks have a credit rating of 14.04
(approximately B+), medium rating stocks have a score of 10.77 (BB+) and high
rating stocks’ score is 6.98 (A-). Distressed stocks that are members of ETF basket
have almost identical credit scores6 to non-ETF members, suggesting that it is not
only the least distressed stocks that are members of ETFs. This is important as
it shows that the results presented in this paper are not driven by relatively less
distressed conditions among distressed stocks in ETF baskets. I further test this
in the Robustness section and show that this is indeed not the case. Consistent
with previous studies I find that distressed stocks have the lowest price and have
the smallest market capitalisation. When comparing within the distressed category
ETF stocks are larger on average than non-ETF ones. This is consistent with the
top-down approach based on capitalisation that is often used for index construction.
In addition, ETF stocks are more liquid. Finally, I present the average Daily Cost
of Borrowing Score (DCBS) obtained from Markit that measures how difficult it is
5This is consistent with 11 industries identified in Huang et al. (2018)
6 The difference in average ratings is 0.093 and t-statistics of the mean comparison test is t=0.91
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to short-sell a stock. Similarly to previous literature the results suggest that it is
harder to short-sell stocks in the distressed category. In contrast to medium and
high rating stocks both ETF and non-ETF distressed groups have DCBS above 2
at the 95th percentile suggesting that these groups contain a subset of stocks with
binding short-sale constraints that are not present for stocks with higher ratings.
[insert Table 3.2 here]
3.3.1 Stock Returns and ETF Short-Selling
I investigate how the ETF short-selling, as an alternative route to direct stock
short-selling, affects the returns of basket constituents. I perform a predictive panel
regression of monthly stock returns on SIR of ETF as of previous month:
ri,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t) + β3Distressi,t + β4sirstockit +
+ β5(sir
stocki ×Distressi,t) + µControlst + FEi + FEt + εi,t
(3.5)
where rt+1 is the log return of stock i at month t+1 and sir is the log of SIR of ETF j
that holds stock i at time t. In order to investigate if going short on an industry ETF
has a different effect on distressed stocks than on financially stable stocks I include
the interaction variable of sir with a dummy variable Distressi,t that takes the value
of 1 if stock i is in the distressed category (based on the definition of financial distress
in 3.2.4). I include SIR at the stock level and its interaction with the distressed
dummy to control for the direct short-selling channel. For other controls I include the
standard set of variables used in the literature for return predictive regressions based
on Huang et al. (2018) and Green et al. (2017): 12-month cumulative return, market
capitalisation at the stock level, asset growth, book-to-market ratio, growth in the
long-term net operating assets, gross profitability, investment growth, operating
profitability, accruals and Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Every variable is
lagged by one month or one quarter (depending on availability). Finally, I control
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for time and stock fixed effects, bootstrap and cluster standard errors by industry7.
Table 3.3 shows the result of such regression. On its own, the ETF short interest
does not affect stock returns next period. In contrast, once the full specification of
regression is considered, the interaction term is highly significant and negative. This
suggests that on average non-distressed stocks absorb ETF shocks and are immune
to ETF short selling, as they are less likely to be overpriced. In contrast, as argued
by previous studies distressed stocks have a higher short-selling constraint at the
stock-level. As a result such stocks are more likely to be overpriced. Switching to
ETFs helps to alleviate such constraint. The negative loading on the interaction
term suggests that ETF short interest is followed by negative returns of distressed
stocks next month, as distressed stock prices are pushed closer to a fundamental
level. This effect is not driven by relative illiquidity of distressed stocks or by stock
reversals, as I control for these channels in the regression.
[insert Table 3.3 here]
In the results above I use the adjusted version of SIR capped at 100%. In my sample
SIR for ETFs above 100% occurs in only 3.04% of observations. In the unreported
results I confirm that using the raw version of SIR is quantitatively very similar.
3.3.2 Short-Selling Motives: Hedging vs Speculation
The results above are agnostic about the reason for the short-selling. Since the
net asset value (NAV) of the ETF co-moves with its price due to the existence
of arbitrage mechanism the significant short-selling of the ETFs should create a
negative price pressure in both markets. According to Ben-David et al. (2018) if such
pressure is non-fundamental the price-impact is temporary and should be reversed
next period. However, if the short-selling represents the bearish view of market
participants we should not see such reversal.
7Clustering by industry is important as one firm may be included into multiple ETFs in the
same industry. In order to ensure that the results are not affected by the small number of cluster
groups, in unreported results, I cluster standard errors by ETF funds. I do not find any material
differences in results
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Huang et al. (2018) show that during the non-crisis period hedging motive
is a dominant reason for ETF short-selling. In other words, investors short-sell
industry ETFs mainly to hedge the industry risk of their long position in underlying
stocks. In contrast, they found that speculative motive dominates during the financial
crisis. During such period, investors make directional bets on the future negative
performance of an industry. I evaluate the impact of such different motives for
short-selling on distressed stocks. I run regression 3.5 conditional on the crisis period:
excluding the period from quarter 4 of 2006 until the end of 2008 and only during
the crisis period. Table 3.4 shows the results of such regressions.
[insert Table 3.4 here]
During the non-crisis period ETF short-selling is not based on fundamental
information about the industry. In contrast to previous results, the loading on ETF
short interest ratio sirj,t is positive and significant (although the significance is
low). This is consistent with Huang et al. (2018) who show similar reaction using
ETF returns as a dependent variable. The non-fundamental shock to stock prices is
reversed next period. The reversal of the non-distressed stocks is in line with initial
motive of sophisticated investors with positive private information about such stocks.
The investors are less likely to bet on distressed stocks that have a lower probability
of positive developments. The interaction term is negative and significant. This
suggests that there is no reversal for distressed stocks (net effect is negative), which
is in line with overpricing of this type of stocks. In other words, even when the
short-selling motive is non-fundamental, the effect on distressed stocks is fundamental
(although smaller in magnitude), as it allows to overcome the short-selling barriers
at the stock level.
Huang et al. (2018) conducts the analysis excluding the crisis period. In
contrast, I compare the findings by testing the effect during 2007-2008 financial
crisis. During the crisis-period when ETF short-selling is more likely to contain
fundamental information about a particular industry the loading on sirj is negative
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and significant, while the interaction term is not significant. This is in line with
speculative hypothesis, as both types of stocks are equally affected. The effect of
short-selling is not reversed and is predictive. As argued by Ben-David et al. (2018)
and Malamud (2016) the propagation of the negative shock from the ETF market
is performed via APs. The negative shock in the stock market might come either
from AP hedging his positive inventory (that arose after counterparty’s short-sale)
by going short in the stock market (if AP is also a market maker8) or due to AP
closing the arbitrage position (that arose due to ETF shares being traded at discount
after short-selling).
3.3.3 Cyclical vs Defensive Industries
In this section, I further test the effect of ETF short-selling conditional on the
sensitivities of industries to business cycles. I use MSCI classification to allocate 11
industries considered in this study into Defensive and Cyclical types (see Panel A of
table 3.2 for details of allocation). Companies in cyclical industries tend to be more
sensitive to fluctuations in business cycle. Their earnings and market performance
are more likely to be worse during recession. In contrast, firms in defensive industries
are less correlated with the market. Distressed stocks tend to have higher market
betas and therefore, I expect the majority of such stocks to be operating in cyclical
industries.
[insert Table 3.5 here]
Table 3.5 shows the results of separating ETFs into 2 sub-samples based on
such market sensitivity classification. I exclude Other industry from the analysis as
this category combines cyclical and defensive industries. In addition, I exclude Energy
industry, as although officially it is classified as defensive one, the performance of
such industry is unstable. The results are robust to including Energy in the analysis.
Similarly to previous results, the interaction term for cyclical industries is negative
8Although authorised participant is often a market maker in the ETF market it is not always
the case
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and significant, highlighting the concentration of overpriced distressed stocks in such
industries. In contrast, the interaction term for defensive industries is insignificant
as the loading on sirj,t is positive and significant reflecting the reversal of non-
fundamental short-selling and a relatively lower number of distressed stocks in such
industries. I show that the results are robust to the crisis effect. Overall, sorting by
industry types highlights that the short-selling motives differ not only during crisis
and non-crisis periods, but also depend on the sensitivity of stocks to business cycles,
with major effect concentrated in the cyclical industries.
3.3.4 Overpricing, Investor Sentiments and ETF Short-Selling
The results above confirm that distressed stocks are more likely to be overpriced than
non-distressed ones, that investors use industry ETFs to indirectly short-sell ETF
constituents and that the motive for such short-selling depends on the time period
(e.g. crisis) and on the sensitivity of stocks to business cycles. In this section, I
provide additional pieces of evidence that ETFs are used to bet against the overpriced
stocks.
Stambaugh et al. (2012) show that profitability of many anomalies depends
on the degree of overpricing of the short-legs of strategies that exploit such anomalies
and that the overpricing is the highest following the period of high investor sentiments.
If ETF short-selling is used to bet against the overpriced stocks then we should see
the increase in the SIR following months with high sentiments. I test this in table
3.6 at the aggregate level. I regress the log of cross-sectional average SIR of all ETFs
(avsirt+1) on Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure of investor sentiments (St)
9 as of
previous month:
avsirt+1 = α+ β1St + avsirt + εt (3.6)
As can be seen from table 3.6 a period of high investor sentiments is followed by
a larger average short-selling of ETFs. Such evidence links the ETF short-selling
9I thank the authors for providing the investor sentiments data on their websites
123
to overpricing hypothesis, suggesting that investors sell ETFs to bet against such
mispricing. Following Stambaugh et al. (2012) I also use the Michigan consumer
sentiments index10, a measure based on the household survey, which, as in Baker
and Wurgler (2006), I orthogonalise to variables related to macro-information: the
growth in industrial production, durable, non-durable and service consumption, as
well as to NBER recession indicator and growth in employment. As shown in table
3.6 the result is numerically similar to the one presented above.
[insert Table 3.6 here]
3.3.5 Distressed Anomaly and Price Efficiency
As discussed previously, due to high short-selling constraint for distressed stocks at
the stock level investors cannot reflect their negative views about such stocks and
they are likely to be overpriced. Over time, slow adjustment of prices downwards
is reflected in the under-performance of such stocks relative to commonly used
benchmarks (the distressed anomaly). I test whether the ETF short-selling, as
an alternative route to obtain the negative exposure to distressed stocks, helps to
improve price efficiency of such stocks by reducing the likelihood of over-pricing. If
this is the case then those distressed stock that are members of ETF baskets are
less likely to exhibit under-performance. I first compare the level of mispricing from
asset-pricing models among stocks of different credit quality and then conduct a
direct test of the impact of short-selling on the price efficiency proxies.
Every month I sort stocks into Distressed, Medium and High Rating categories
as described in section 3.2.4. I further split stocks in Distressed category into those
held by ETFs and others. Similarly to Avramov et al. (2013), I construct equally
weighted portfolios based on credit sorts as of previous month. I then measure the
performance of each of the 5 portfolios relative to different benchmarks. Table 3.7
shows the results of such exercise.
10Calculated by University of Michigan and is available from FRED database
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I first check the result using Fama-French 3 factor model. Consistent with
distressed anomaly literature Distressed-All group shows small under-performance
of 3.6% per annum (although the result is not statistically strong). In contrast,
Medium and High groups out-perform the benchmark. When I split distressed stocks
based on ETF membership, Distressed-non-ETF group shows a much stronger (both
statistically and in magnitude) under-performance of 8.4% per annum. In contrast,
Distressed-ETF portfolio does not show any under-performance. This shows that by
providing an alternative short-selling route industry ETFs reduce overpricing and
improve price efficiency of distressed stocks. Across all groups, distressed stocks have
a higher market beta that is gradually declining with lower credit scores (higher
ratings). Interestingly, Distressed-ETF portfolio has a higher market beta than the
non-ETF one. ETF membership amplifies the sensitivity of constituents to market
movements. Based on SMB loadings stocks with lower credit ratings are smaller
(higher loading). Unsurprisingly, Distressed-ETF stocks tend to be slightly larger
than non-ETF ones. It is possible, that distressed stocks are past losers. Da and Gao
(2010) show that outperformance of distressed stocks (instead of under-performance)
demonstrated by Vassalou and Xing (2004) is due to short-term reversals. I extend
Fama-French 3-factor model with short-term reversal factor obtained from Kenneth
French website. The results are almost identical. Distressed stocks are less liquid in
comparison to non-distressed stocks. Therefore, I also extend 3 factor model with
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Interestingly, alpha for Distressed-
All group becomes insignificant. However, non-ETF alpha remains negative and
significant. The Distressed-ETF result is robust to including the liquidity factor.
Finally, I benchmark portfolio returns against Carhart (1997) 4-factor model that
includes momentum. I do not find materially different results.
[insert Table 3.7 here]
Having established that industry ETFs reduce the likelihood of existence of
the distressed anomaly the important question is whether stocks that are members of
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ETFs incorporate negative fundamental information faster than non-ETF members
and, therefore are more price efficient. I test if the ETF short-selling is a channel via
which such negative information is reflected in stock prices.
I employ Price Delay measure (D) of Hou and Moskowitz (2005) to directly
test the speed of information incorporation in stock prices. I regress the stock return
(Rj,t) on the contemporaneous market return (Rm,t) and its four lags:
Rj,t = αj + βjRm,t +
4∑
n=1
δ−nj Rm,t−n + εj,t (3.7)
The 2 versions of the delay measure are then defined as follows:
D1 = 1−
R2
δ−nj =0,∀n∈[1,4]
R2
D2 =
|
∑4
n=1 δ
−n
j |
|βj |+ |
∑4
n=1 δ
−n
j |
(3.8)
D1 compares the ability of the reduced specification model (no lags) and full model in
explaining stock returns. D2 captures the relative importance of longer over shorter
lags in the regression. In both cases, a higher measure represents a longer delay.
Following Boehmer and Wu (2012) I perform the regression 3.7 at a monthly level
(using daily returns) and require at least 15 observations per month. I then perform
the predictive panel regression of different versions of the price delay measure on
the SIR at the ETF and stock level during previous month conditional on the credit
quality of stocks:
di,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t) + β3Distressi,t + β4sirstockit +
+ β5(sir
stocki ×Distressi,t) + µControls+ FEi + FEt + εi,t
(3.9)
where di,t+1 is a log of distressed measures D1 and D2. Following Boehmer and
Wu (2012) the controls include (all lagged by one month) volume-weighted average
price (VWAP), log of market value of equity, log of volume orthogonalised to log of
market value of equity and the number of analysts covering the stock. Huang et al.
(2018) show that industry ETF membership reduces the delay of member stocks, as
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using ETFs hedge funds are able to hedge industry risk exposure and therefore can
more easily incorporate private information into the stock price. In contrast, since
the intention is to measure the impact of ETF short-selling, I conduct the panel
regression exclusively on the ETF member stocks.
[insert Table 3.8 here]
Table 3.8 shows the results of regression 3.9. The results confirm the finding of
Ben-David et al. (2018) that ETFs bring noise to underlying stocks - unconditionally,
as ETF short-selling increases the delay measure of stocks. However, once the
interaction with distress dummy is considered the result is the opposite. Consistent
with overpricing hypothesis and barriers for direct short-selling, higher industry ETF
SIR reduces the delay of member stocks. Such results are in contrast to previous
research that mainly focuses on the negative impact of the ETF market on the
efficiency of underlying stocks. The split of ETF-member stocks into distressed and
non-distressed categories allows to cast a new light on the benefits of ETFs for the
stock market.
3.4 Robustness
In this section I perform the robustness tests to ensure that the previous findings
are not driven by the choice of methodology and cannot be explained by alternative
theories. I begin by providing the evidence that the results do not depend on the
choice of the distress classification. I proceed by analysing the alternative explanation
of the distressed anomaly within the ETF context and finally I investigate if the
existence of other products, that can also provide the ability to obtain a short-position,
dominates the ETF channel.
3.4.1 Alternative Distress Classification
In the previous results sorting to distressed category is based on the S&P long-term
credit rating. In order to test if the results are robust to the choice of distress
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classification I repeat the analysis using Altman Z-score as a proxy for financial
distress. The major drawback of such measure is that it relies on the accounting
variables and therefore is only available quarterly. The allocation to distressed group
is based on the lowest tercile of the distribution of quarterly scores. Consequently, I
hold the portfolios for 3 months. I consider stock to be a member of ETF if it was a
part of a fund basket in at least 1 month during the quarter. Table 3.9 shows the
performance of such portfolios relative to different performance benchmarks.
[insert Table 3.9 here]
The results are consistent with previous monthly findings based on S&P credit
ratings. As before, the under-performance of the distressed group is concentrated in
the non-ETF-member stocks. In contrast, the distressed ETF-member stocks show a
small over-performance although at a marginal significance level.
Moody’s KMV model is also a popular choice in the literature to estimate the
likelihood of default. As mentioned previously, I use a close proxy of this measure
based on methodology of Bharath and Shumway (2008). In a similar fashion to the
analysis above I allocate stocks into terciles based on EDF measure from distance-to-
default model described in equation 3.4. Higher EDF values imply deeper financial
distress. Table 3.10 shows the results of allocation based on EDF measure. In
contrast to the non-ETF group, distressed members of ETF do not show underpricing
and therefore do not display a distressed anomaly.
[insert Table 3.10 here]
Overall, using Altaman’s Z-score and Moody’s KMV model I show that my
finding that distressed anomaly is not present in the ETF-member stocks is robust
to the choice of the distress measure.
3.4.2 Shareholder Advantage Theory
The distressed anomaly is based on the idea that equity risk growths together with
default risk. From risk trade-off perspective shareholders of a firm with a high
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probability of default need to be compensated with a higher stock return. Garlappi
et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that this is true only when there is
an upward sloping relationship between default probability and equity risk. However,
once shareholders’ bargaining power at near default is considered such relationship
is inversed. A firm with a high bargaining power may be able to renegotiate debt
agreements and avoid liquidation costs. Therefore, for such firms a relatively higher
probability of default risk is associated with lower equity risk and subsequently lower
stock returns.
The difference between average credit ratings of distressed non-ETF and
distressed ETF stocks is low (14.42 and 13.94 respectively). However, it may be
possible that my results in the previous section are driven by a small sub-sample of
non-ETF stocks that have a relatively higher degree of distress. In order to ensure
that my findings do not capture the non-linear effect of shareholder recovery I first
exclude stocks that have the lowest credit rating (highly distressed stocks - top decile
of credit scores). I then split the remaining stocks into ETF and Non-ETF members
and repeat the portfolio tests.
[insert Table 3.11 here ]
Panel A shows alphas from different benchmark models. As can be seen from the
table, distressed stocks that are members of ETFs do not show any signs of distress
anomaly, while the group of non-ETF stocks has a negative alpha even after excluding
the most risky securities. The under-performance of the non-ETF group is smaller
relative to the results in table 3.7, which suggests that the hump-shaped relationship
between distress risk and equity risk is present in the sample, but cannot explain my
main findings.
In Panel B of table 3.11 I test this further and focus only on the highly
distressed group and sort those stocks based on ETF and non-ETF membership.
My previous results can be partially explained by the effect described in Garlappi
et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) under two conditions: if the proportion of
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highly distressed stocks is larger in the non-ETF group and if sorting within highly
distressed groups produces negative alphas independently on the ETF membership.
Surprisingly, on average, there are more ETF-member unique stocks (38.12) than
non-ETF-member stocks (24.49) per month in such a highly distressed group. The
average rating of both sub-groups are similar with latter group having a marginally
larger score (15.78 and 16.06 respectively). The average score of all stocks in a
highly distressed group is 15.84 (between B- and B) - 6 scores below the investment
grade threshold. The results show that consistently with previous findings under-
performance is concentrated in the non-ETF group. The ETF group’s alphas remain
insignificant suggesting that the result is not driven by the effects described by the
shareholder advantage theory.
According to the shareholder advantage theory the degree of hump-shaped
relationship between equity beta and the probability of default is determined by
the parameter that proxies for the recoverable fraction of asset value. Higher
the value that can be extracted during the distress - lower the equity risk. Such
variable is proportional to the shareholder bargaining power (if the recovery through
renegotiation is possible) and the amount of liquidation costs (higher costs provide
higher incentives to renegotiate). Garlappi and Yan (2011) show that the former
measure can be captured by a firm’s value of assets (small firms have a higher
concentration of monitoring debt holders). Liquidation costs can be proxied by
the degree of asset specificity. Following Garlappi and Yan (2011) I capture asset
specificity with a measure of industry concentration proxied by the Herfindahl index
(HI) of sales in an industry. HI for industry j at time t is defined as:
HIj,t =
Nj,t∑
i=1
sales2i,j (3.10)
where Nj,t is the number of stocks in the industry j at time t.
In panel C of table 3.11 I sort stocks independently into terciles11 based on
11I move back to tercile distress sorting (instead of deciles) to ensure that corner portfolios contain
the sufficient number of stocks. The limitation of this is that the double-sort includes all distressed
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Distress and Asset Size, as well as Distress and Industry Concentration. Similarly,
in panel D of table 3.11 I sort stocks based on Distress and Asset Specificity. For
brevity I only show the results for high-high group sorting. Both sorts confirm that
the results found in this paper are not driven by a non-linear relationship between
distress and equity risks. Even for those firms with high shareholder recovery the
ETF-member stocks do not display significant under-performance. Overall, the
evidence above show that the finding of this paper is not driven by the non-linear
relationship between equity risk and distress.
3.4.3 Alternative Short-Selling Mechanisms
The short-selling via ETFs is not the only way to obtain the negative exposure
to stocks that are hard to bet against directly. Abhyankar, Filippou, Garcia-Ares,
and Haykir (2019) study the effect of the existence of stock options on the ability
of investors to short stocks and subsequently on price efficiency. They show that
momentum strategy that is profitable due to its short leg can be partially explained
by the stock optionality. Loser stocks with available options tend to be more
informationally efficient than stocks without options. Investors can write a call
option or buy a put option to obtain a negative exposure to a stock. Such feature of
optionality provides a competing mechanism for indirect selling of securities.
In order to test if the ETF short-selling effect on distressed stocks survives once
controlling for alternative short-selling avenues I perform regression 3.9 conditional
on a call or a put option existing for stock i during month t.12 Table 3.12 shows
the results of such regression. As can be seen from the table, despite controlling for
option availability, the interaction term of ETF short-interest ratio and the Distress
dummy is still significant, although it is slightly smaller in comparison to previous
findings. This suggest that ETF is an independent channel via which investors
correct the mispricing in distressed stocks and improve price efficiency.
stocks and not just highly-distressed group
12I thank the authors for kindly providing the data on the existence of call and put options (based
on OptionMetrics IvyDB US database)
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[insert Table 3.12 here ]
3.5 Conclusion
I investigate the effect of industry ETF short-selling on the underlying stocks in
the fund basket conditional on the credit quality of such stocks. I find that 9.11%
of companies in the benchmarks of this type of funds are distressed. I first show
that the ETF short-selling helps to reduce the overpricing present in distressed
stocks. I demonstrate that short-selling via ETFs alleviates the direct short-selling
constraint and can predict negative returns of stocks in the lowest credit rating
group. My findings show that in contrast to non-distressed stocks, for which the
ETF short-selling is absorbed or reversed (apart from the financial crisis period),
the effect on distressed stocks is always negative and fundamental (no reversal)
irrespectively of short-selling motives. I find that the effect is concentrated mostly
in the cyclical industries. Such finding is consistent with higher concentration of
overpriced distressed stocks in such industries as well as with ETF investors betting
against such mispricing.
Motivated by findings that distressed anomaly being caused by overpricing
of distressed stocks I show that once sorted by ETF membership distressed firms
that are a part of ETF portfolio do not show the under-performance relative to
common benchmarks. Such result is robust to the choice of measure of credit quality
and alternative explanations of distress anomaly. I provide new evidence that the
reduction in overpricing via ETF short-selling leads to an improved price efficiency
of such stocks, which is in contrast to the negative unconditional effect of ETFs on
underlying stocks.
Overall, in contrast to literature showing the negative impact of ETFs (e.g
Filippou, Gozluklu, and Rozental, 2019) this paper provides a novel evidence of the
positive effect of industry ETFs on the distressed stocks. In addition, it highlights the
increasing heterogeneity of types of stocks within the ETF basket and the importance
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of considering differences in underlying securities when assessing the impact of this
investment vehicle on financial markets. This work can be important to policymakers
when evaluating different channels via which the growing ETF market can influence
the general economy.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Structure of MSCI Global Investable Market Index
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Figure 3.2: Top 15 most Shorted ETFs
This figure shows the 15 most shorted ETFs as of July 24, 2018 reported by ETF.com
(https://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/most-shorted-etfs). Short interest is calculated as
a percentage of shares outstanding that was shorted on that day.
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Table 3.1: Fama-French 12 industry Classification
Fama-French 12 industry classification based on SIC codes aggregation. Table includes short group
name, industry and the description of sub-industry constituents for each industry group.
Group Name Industry Industry Definition
NoDur Consumer NonDurables Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys
Durbl Consumer Durables Cars, TV’s, Furniture, Household Appliances
Manuf Manufacturing Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing
Enrgy Energy Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products
Chems Chemicals Chemicals and Allied Products
BusEq Business Equipment Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment
Telcm Telecommunication Telephone and Television Transmission
Utils Utilities Utilities
Shops Shops Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops)
Hlth Healthcare Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs
Money Finance Finance
Other Other Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A reports the summary statistics of all 127 ETFs used in this study. Mean SIR is computed as
1
T
ΣTt=1(
1
Nk,t
Σ
Nk,t
j=1 SIRk,j,t), where Nk,t is the number of ETFs in industry k at time t and SIRk,j,t
is the short-interest ratio of fund j in industry k at time t. Industry Sensitivity is based on GICS
classification. Minimum SIR is reported in 101. Panel B reports the summary statistics for stocks
allocated into Distressed (All, members (ETF) and non-members (NoNETF) of ETF basket),
Medium Rating and High Rating groups based on terciles of the distribution of S&P long-term
credit ratings. Rating is an average value that represents the converted alphabetic credit rating into
numeric score. Higher score represents lower rating (AAA=1 . . . D=22). Size is an average market
capitalization of firms within the category and is expressed in billions of USD. Illiquidity is based on
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and is displayed in 109. Daily Cost of Borrowing Score (DCBS)
is from Markit and reflects the cost and relative difficulty to borrow a stock.
Panel A: Industry ETFs
Group Name Number of ETFs Mean SIR Min SIR Max SIR 95th SIR percentile Industry Sensitivity
NoDur 8 5.06% 0.00% 53.14% 20.19% Defensive
Manuf 12 13.88% 0.00% 100.0% 43.17% Cyclical
Enrgy 15 15.43% 0.00% 100.0% 88.42% Cyclical/Defensive
Chems 5 12.63% 0.00% 100.0% 46.23% Cyclical
BusEq 21 12.38% 0.00% 100.0% 42.49% Cyclical
Telcm 3 6.81% 0.00% 49.64% 22.35% Defensive
Utils 7 7.54% 0.04% 69.22% 32.72% Defensive
Shops 10 18.25% 0.00% 100.0% 100.00% Cyclical
Hlth 16 11.98% 0.00% 100.0% 49.11% Defensive
Money 25 17.13% 0.00% 100.0% 100.00% Cyclical
Other 5 9.13% 0.00% 100.0% 40.38% Mixed
Panel B: Stocks
Type of stocks: Rating Price Size Illiquidity DCBS 95th DCBS percentile
Distressed-All 14.04 21.81 1.79 5.64 1.27 2.62
Distressed-ETF 13.94 25.06 2.73 4.74 1.24 2.44
Distressed-NoNETF 14.42 17.65 0.96 6.12 1.33 3.18
Medium Rating 10.77 37.31 4.79 4.05 1.11 1.38
High Rating 6.98 172.41 24.30 3.98 1.06 1.31
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Table 3.3: Stock Return and ETF Short-Selling
This table reports the results of a panel regression examining the effect of ETF short-selling on
distressed stocks:
ri,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t) + β3Distressi,t+
+ β4sir
stocki
t + β5(sir
stocki
t ×Distressi,t) + µControls+ FEi + FEt + εi,t
where ri,t+1 is a log return of stock i at month t+ 1. sirj,t is a previous month’s log of short interest
ratio of the industry ETF j that holds stock i in the basket during month t and sirstockit is the short
interest ratio at the stock level. Short interest ratio is measured as a quantity of shares sold short
scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Distressi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if stock i is classified as distressed during month t. Distress classification is based on the bottom
33rd percentile of the distribution of S&P long-term credit ratings. Controls include one period
lagged monthly or quarterly values (depending on availability) of illiqi,t (monthly average of daily
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratios for stock i), ri,t−1,t−12, log of market capitalisation,asset growth,
book-to-market ratio, growth in the long-term net operating assets, gross profitability, investment
growth, operating profitability and accruals. The regression frequency is monthly and the time
period is from January 1999 - February 2017. Loadings on sirj,t are expressed in 10
1. Where stated
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. All standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered
by ETF industries. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ri,t+1 ri,t+1 ri,t+1 ri,t+1 ri,t+1 ri,t+1
sirj,t -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.26) (-0.49) (-0.34) (-0.27) (0.27) (-0.12)
sirj,t ×Distressi,t -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(-5.31) (-3.74) (-4.61) (-3.26)
Distressi,t 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.015**
(3.32) (2.88) (2.97) (2.18)
sirstockit -0.001*** -0.001**
(-2.71) (-2.05)
sirstockit ×Distressi,t -0.001 -0.001
(-0.62) (-0.48)
Constant 0.003 -0.027 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.024**
(1.10) (-1.53) (-0.63) (-1.41) (-0.11) (-1.97)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 742,327 474,727 742,327 474,727 733,361 472,422
Adjusted R2(%) 0.00 11.59 0.15 11.64 0.16 11.63
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Table 3.4: Speculation and Hedging Hypotheses
This table reports the results of a panel regression examining the effect of ETF short-selling on
distressed stocks and non-distressed stocks during the financial crisis period and outside of the such
period:
ri,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t) + β3Distressi,t+
+ β4sir
stocki
t + β5(sir
stocki
t ×Distressi,t) + µControls+ FEi + FEt + εi,t
where ri,t+1 is a log return of stock i at month t+ 1. sirj,t is a previous month’s log of short interest
ratio of the industry ETF j that holds stock i in the basket during month t and sirstockit is the short
interest ratio at the stock level. Short interest ratio is measured as a quantity of shares sold short
scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Distressi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if stock i is classified as distressed during month t. Distress classification is based on the bottom
33rd percentile of the distribution of S&P long-term credit ratings. Controls include one period
lagged monthly or quarterly values (depending on availability) of illiqi,t (monthly average of daily
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratios for stock i), ri,t−1,t−12, log of market capitalisation, asset growth,
book-to-market ratio, growth in the long-term net operating assets, gross profitability, investment
growth, operating profitability and accruals. Crisis results are estimated during 2006Q4 - 2008Q4
and non-crisis results are estimated on the whole sample excluding the crisis period. The regression
frequency is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 - February 2017. Panel regressions
include firm fixed effects. All standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by ETF industries.
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2)
Non-Crisis Crisis
VARIABLES ri,t+1 ri,t+1
sirj,t 0.002** -0.005**
(2.21) (-1.96)
sirj,t ×Distressi,t -0.003*** -0.001
(-3.87) (-1.12)
Distressi,t 0.019*** -0.028***
(3.22) (2.98)
sirstockit 0.002** -0.014***
(2.13) (-2.84)
sirstockit ×Distressi,t 0.001 -0.007*
(0.42) (1.68)
Constant 0.017*** -0.132***
(3.67) (-3.81)
Controls Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Quarter-Year FE No No
Observations 396,045 76,377
Adjusted R2(%) 1.29 0.64
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Table 3.5: Cyclical and Defensive ETFs
This table reports the results of a panel regression examining the effect of ETF short-selling on
distressed stocks conditional on the type of industry that ETF is benchmarked against (Cyclical vs
Defensive):
ri,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t)+
+ β3Distressi,t + β4sir
stocki
t + β5(sir
stocki
j,t ×Distressi,t) + FEi + FEt + εi,t
where ri,t+1 is a log return of stock i at month t+ 1. sirj,t is a previous month’s log of short interest
ratio of the industry ETF j that holds stock i in the basket during month t and sirstockit is the
short interest ratio at the stock level. Short interest ratio is measured as a quantity of shares sold
short scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Distressi,t is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if stock i is classified as distressed during month t. Distress classification is based on the
bottom 33rd percentile of the distribution of S&P long-term credit ratings. Controls include one
period lagged monthly or quarterly values (depending on availability) of illiqi,t (monthly average
of daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratios for stock i), ri,t−1,t−12, log of market capitalisation,asset
growth, book-to-market ratio, growth in the long-term net operating assets, gross profitability,
investment growth, operating profitability and accruals. Cyclical and Defensive industries are
based on Global Industry Classficiation Standards (GICS) official sector classification matched to
corresponding SIC industries. Cyclical industries include Manuf, Chems, BusEq, Shops, Money.
Defensive industries include NoDur, Telcm, Utils, Hlth. Other and Energy industry is excluded
from the analysis. The regression frequency is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 -
February 2017. Loadings on sirj,t are expressed in 10
1. Where stated regressions include firm and
year fixed effects. All standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by ETF industries. *,**,***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Defensive Defensive Cyclical Cyclical
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ri,t+1 ri,t+1 ri,t+1 ri,t+1
sirj,t -0.009** 0.006** 0.001 0.004
(-2.14) (2.06) (0.23) (0.68)
sirj,t ×Distressi,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002***
(-0.79) (-0.76) (-4.83) (-6.11)
Distressi,t 0.013 0.004 0.018** 0.017**
(1.28) (0.46) (2.91) (2.67)
sirstockit 0.001 -0.001* -0.002** -0.002**
(0.64) (-1.72) (-2.20) (-2.07)
sirstockit ×Distressi,t -0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.001
(-1.23) (-0.86) (1.19) (1.06)
Constant -0.003 -0.046*** -0.013 -0.030
(-1.01) (-4.87) (-1.41) (-1.19)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 125,185 125,185 251,257 251,257
Adjusted R2(%) 0.75 9.21 0.73 12.66
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Table 3.6: ETF Short-Interest and Investor Sentiments
This table reports the results of the regression of the log of cross-sectional average of ETF SIR across
all funds in the sample at month t+ 1 (avsirt+1) on one of the sentiments proxies: the Baker and
Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment measure as of month t (St) and Michigan consumer sentiments
index (MSt) orthogonalised to 12-month growth in industrial production, durable, nondurable and
service consumption, as well as to NBER recession indicator and growth in employment:
avsirt+1 = α+ β1Sentimentst + avsirt + εi,t
The regression frequency is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 - February 2017. The
table reports regression coefficients and Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics with six-month
lags. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES avsirt+1 avsirt+1
St 0.038**
(2.29)
MSt 0.003**
(2.48)
avsirt 0.801*** 0.808***
(13.78) (15.15)
Constant -0.412*** -0.395***
(-3.33) (-3.62)
Observations 230 230
Adjusted R2(%) 79.27 79.43
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Table 3.7: Distressed Anomaly and ETF Ownership
This table presents the results of OLS regression of portfolio excess returns of Distressed, Medium
and High rated stocks on Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3). In addition, it reports
alphas obtained by running the same regression on three-factor model with short-term reversals
(FF3+STR α), three-factor model with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (FF3 + Liq
α) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (4-factor α). A numeric score is assigned for every S&P
long-term credit rating (from AAA=1. . . D=22). Every month stocks are ranked based on terciles
of the distribution of such ranks. Distressed stocks are defined as firms with credit rating in the
lowest tercile as of month t− 1. Equally-weighted portfolios are formed and held for 1 month. ETF
stocks are stocks that are part of any industry ETF basket during month t− 1. Regression frequency
is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 - February 2017. The table reports Newey and
West (1987) corrected t-statistics with six-month lags. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Distressed Distressed Medium High
NonETF ETF All All All
FF3 α -0.007*** 0.002 -0.003* 0.002** 0.003***
(-3.09) (0.87) (-1.76) (1.98) (3.84)
MRP 1.104*** 1.489*** 1.296*** 1.045*** 0.881***
(23.43) (25.72) (32.90) (25.61) (43.77)
SMB 0.684*** 0.526*** 0.660*** 0.254* -0.075
(5.50) (3.34) (4.64) (1.96) (-1.09)
HML 0.650*** 0.159 0.450*** 0.560*** 0.460***
(8.94) (1.42) (4.77) (5.77) (7.76)
FF3+STR α -0.006*** 0.002 -0.003* 0.002* 0.003***
(-2.89) (0.83) (-1.72) (1.97) (3.78)
FF3+Liq α -0.006*** 0.001 -0.002 0.002* 0.003***
(-2.74) (0.67) (-1.49) (1.68) (3.67)
4-factor α -0.007*** 0.001 -0.003* 0.002* 0.003***
(-2.98) (0.71) (-1.70) (1.93) (3.27)
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Table 3.8: Price Efficiency and ETF Short-Selling
This table reports the results of a panel regression examining the effect of ETF short-selling on
stock efficiency:
di,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t) + β3Distressi,t + β4sirstockit +
+ (β5sir
stocki ×Distressi,t) + β6di,t + µControls+ FEi + FEt + εi,t
where di,t+1 is a log of one of the 2 versions of price delay measure of stock i during month t+ 1. 2
versions of delay D1 and D2 are defined in equation 3.8. sirj,t is a previous month’s log of short
interest ratio of the industry ETF j that holds stock i in the basket during month t and sirstockit is
the short interest ratio at the stock level. Short interest ratio is measured as a quantity of shares
sold short scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Distressi,t is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if stock i is classified as distressed during month t. Distress classification is based on
the bottom 33rd percentile of the distribution of S&P long-term credit ratings. Controls include
one period lagged monthly or quarterly values (depending on availability) of VWAP (log of daily
volume-weighted average price), log of market capitalization, log of trading volume orthogonalised
to market capitalization and log of number of analysts covering the stock. Regression frequency
is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 - February 2017. Where stated regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. All standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by ETF
industries. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES d1i,t+1 d2i,t+1
sirj,t 0.003** 0.001*
(1.99) (1.78)
sirj,t ×Distressi,t -0.012** -0.019**
(-2.47) (-2.23)
Distressi,t 0.001 -0.003
(0.14) (-0.42)
sirstockit -0.018* -0.006**
(-1.86) (-2.10)
sirstockit ×Distressi,t -0.006*** -0.005***
(-2.81) (-3.24)
di,t 0.035*** 0.019***
(4.21) (3.85)
Constant -0.588** -0.690***
(-2.38) (-4.57)
Controls Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 709,719 709,719
Adjusted R2(%) 15.48 8.47
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Table 3.9: Robustness: Altman’s Z-score, Distressed Anomaly and ETF
Ownership
This table presents the results of OLS regression of portfolio excess returns of Distressed, Medium
and High rated stocks on Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3). In addition, it reports
alphas obtained by running the same regression on three-factor model with short-term reversals
(FF3+STR α), three-factor model with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (FF3 + Liq α)
and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (4-factor α). Altman (1968) Z-scores are computed quarterly
for each stock. Every quarter stocks are ranked based on terciles of the distribution of such scores.
Distressed stocks are defined as firms with credit rating in the lowest tercile as of quarter t − 1.
Equally-weighted portfolios are formed and held for 1 month. ETF stocks are stocks that are part
of any industry ETF basket during quarter t− 1. Regression frequency is quarterly and the time
period is from January 1999 - February 2017. The table reports Newey and West (1987) corrected
t-statistics with four-month lags. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Distressed Distressed Medium High
NonETF ETF All All All
FF3 α -0.021*** 0.007* -0.015*** 0.018*** 0.012***
(-3.03) (1.79) (-3.30) (6.65) (3.12)
MRP 1.290*** 1.715*** 1.669*** 0.978*** 1.009***
(6.17) (15.13) (14.75) (19.29) (23.38)
SMB 0.502*** 0.323** 0.500*** 0.234*** 0.028*
(4.58) (2.41) (7.74) (9.72) (1.76)
HML 0.490*** 0.681*** 0.593*** 0.380*** -0.321***
(5.59) (6.83) (9.63) (3.76) (-5.21)
FF3+STR α -0.019*** 0.007* -0.014*** 0.018*** 0.011***
(-2.89) (1.68) (-2.41) (6.28) (2.72)
FF3+Liq α -0.017*** 0.006* -0.015** 0.017*** 0.011***
(-3.54) (1.76) (-1.98) (5.86) (2.90)
4-factor α -0.021*** 0.005 -0.014** 0.018*** 0.011***
(-2.94) (1.57) (-2.02) (5.41) (2.62)
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Table 3.10: Robustness: Moody’s KMV, Distressed Anomaly and ETF
Ownership
This table presents the results of OLS regression of portfolio excess returns of Distressed, Medium
and High rated stocks on Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3). In addition, it reports
alphas obtained by running the same regression on three-factor model with short-term reversals
(FF3+STR α), three-factor model with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (FF3 + Liq
α) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (4-factor α). Expected default frequencies (based on
Bharath and Shumway (2008) proxy of Moody’s KMV model) are computed quarterly for each stock.
Every quarter stocks are ranked based on terciles of the distribution of EDFs. Distressed stocks
are defined as firms with credit rating in the lowest tercile as of quarter t− 1. Equally-weighted
portfolios are formed and held for 1 month. ETF stocks are stocks that are part of any industry
ETF basket during quarter t − 1. Regression frequency is quarterly and the time period is from
January 1999 - February 2017. The table reports Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics with
four-month lags. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Distressed Distressed Medium High
NonETF ETF All All All
FF3 α -0.008*** 0.002 -0.005** 0.005*** 0.004***
(-5.12) (0.82) (-2.32) (5.42) (5.20)
MRP 0.749*** 1.402*** 1.071*** 0.877*** 0.750***
(25.80) (18.87) (26.43) (31.18) (19.06)
SMB 0.656*** 0.262 0.577*** 0.536*** 0.484***
(5.48) (1.22) (5.14) (9.33) (19.99)
HML 0.444*** 0.585*** 0.549*** 0.344*** 0.137**
(5.75) (3.29) (5.61) (8.77) (2.17)
FF3+STR α -0.008*** 0.002 -0.005** 0.004*** 0.004***
(-4.38) (0.76) (-2.29) (5.60) (5.08)
FF3+Liq α -0.008*** 0.002 -0.005* 0.004*** 0.003***
(-3.42) (0.73) (-1.88) (3.48) (4.74)
4-factor α -0.007*** 0.001 -0.005** 0.004*** 0.004***
(-3.92) (0.59) (-1.99) ( 5.26) (5.17)
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Table 3.11: Robustness: Shareholder Advantage, Distressed Anomaly
and ETF Ownership
This table presents the alpha esimates of OLS regression of portfolio excess returns of Distressed,
Medium and High rated stocks on Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3 α). In addition,
it reports alphas obtained by running the same regression on three-factor model with short-term
reversals (FF3+STR α), three-factor model with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (FF3
+ Liq α) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (4-factor α). A numeric score is assigned for every
S&P long-term credit rating (from AAA=1. . . D=22). Every month stocks are ranked based on
deciles of the distribution of such ranks. Distressed (Highly Distressed) stocks are defined as firms
with credit rating in the lowest tercile (decile) as of month t− 1 (highest tercile (decile) of a credit
score). Stocks are also independently sorted into terciles by asset size to obtain High Asset Size
group and by asset specificity to obtain High Asset Specificity group. Asset Specificity is proxied
by the Herfindahl index of sales in an industry. Equally-weighted portfolios are formed and held
for 1 month. ETF members are stocks that are part of any industry ETF basket during month
t− 1. Panel A shows the results for all stocks excluding a Highly Distressed group. Panel B uses
only Highly Distressed Stocks. Panel C shows the results for a group of stocks that are both in the
Distressed group and in the High Asset Size group. Panel D shows the results for a group of stocks
that are both in the Distressed group and in the High Asset Specificity group. Regression frequency
is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 - February 2017. The table reports Newey and
West (1987) corrected t-statistics with six-month lags. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A: Distressed Group Excluding Highly Distressed Stocks
FF3-α t-stat FF3+STR-α t-stat FF3+Liq-α t-stat 4-factor-α t-stat
All -0.002* (-1.80) -0.002* (-1.74) -0.001 (-1.61) -0.002* (-1.74)
NonETF -0.004** (-2.24) -0.004** (-2.02) -0.004** (-2.11) -0.004** (-2.15)
ETF 0.002 (0.70) 0.002 (0.68) 0.001 (0.50) 0.002 (0.42)
Panel B: Highly Distressed Stocks
All -0.005** (-2.12) -0.005* (-1.86) -0.004* (-1.76) -0.004** (-2.03)
NonETF -0.011*** (-3.25) -0.011*** (-3.14) -0.011*** (-3.21) -0.010*** (-3.18)
ETF 0.004 (0.94) 0.004 (0.88) 0.003 (0.77) 0.006 (0.85)
Panel C: Distressed Stocks & High Asset Size
All -0.004** (-2.07) -0.003** (-2.01) -0.002* (-1.87) -0.003** (-2.04)
NonETF -0.010*** (-2.93) -0.010*** (-2.86) -0.009*** (-2.77) -0.009** (-2.15)
ETF -0.001 (-0.69) -0.001 (-0.49) -0.000 (-0.58) -0.001 (-0.18)
Panel D: Distressed Stocks & High Asset Specificity
All -0.003** (-2.43) -0.003** (-2.42) -0.002** (-1.82) -0.003** (-2.30)
NonETF -0.004*** (-2.67) -0.004*** (-2.65) -0.003** (-2.47) -0.004*** (-2.45)
ETF -0.002 (-0.90) -0.002 (-0.82) -0.001 (-0.71) -0.001 (-0.86)
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Table 3.12: Price Efficiency and Alternative Short-Selling
This table reports the results of a panel regression examining the effect of ETF short-selling on
stock efficiency conditional on the existence of call or put options:
di,t+1 = α+ β1sirj,t + β2(sirj,t ×Distressi,t) + β3Distressi,t + β4sirstockit +
+ (β5sir
stocki ×Distessi,t) + β6di,t + µControls+ FEi + FEt + εi,t
where di,t+1 is a log of one of the 2 versions of price delay measure of stock i during month t+ 1. 2
versions of delay D1 and D2 are defined in equation 3.8. sirj,t is a previous month’s log of short
interest ratio of the industry ETF j that holds stock i in the basket during month t and sirstockit is
the short interest ratio at the stock level. The regression is performed conditionally if a put or a call
option exists for stock i during month t. Short interest ratio is measured as a quantity of shares
sold short scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Distressi,t is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if stock i is classified as distressed during month t. Distress classification is based on
the bottom 33rd percentile of the distribution of S&P long-term credit ratings. Controls include
one period lagged monthly or quarterly values (depending on availability) of VWAP (log of daily
volume-weighted average price), log of market capitalization, log of trading volume orthogonalised
to market capitalization and log of number of analysts covering the stock. Regression frequency
is monthly and the time period is from January 1999 - February 2017. Where stated regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. All standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by ETF
industries. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES d1i,t+1 d2i,t+1
sirj,t 0.001 0.001
(1.58) (0.38)
sirj,t ×Distressi,t -0.004** -0.017**
(-1.98) (-2.03)
Distress 0.004 -0.001
(0.42) (-0.22)
sirstockit -0.018** -0.010**
(-2.39) (-2.11)
sirstockit ×Distressi,t -0.005** -0.004**
(-1.99) (-2.24)
di,t 0.031*** 0.015***
(5.14) (3.46)
Constant -0.596*** -0.689***
(-4.31) (-2.96)
Controls Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 646,649 646,649
Adjusted R2(%) 13.97 6.28
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Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, I investigate the impact of strong ETF industry growth observed in
recent years on the underlying equity markets. In contrast to the majority of ETF
literature that mostly focuses on the negative effects of the funds my research finds
that the consequences of industry and country-level ETF trading on the underlying
stocks is multidimensional. This thesis provides a better understanding of this type
of product and highlights the systematic importance of the ETF as an investment
tool.
In chapter 1, I study the ETF arbitrage mechanism and present evidence that
it is not risk-free and therefore, is not always functional (which is in contrast to what
is often advertised by ETF sponsors). I argue that APs and other arbitragers would
only attempt to eliminate such deviation of law of one price when the reward is
substantial to compensate for arbitrage risks. I relate significant differences of ETF
prices from NAVs to the level of aggregate financial frictions. While liquidity is often
cited as a main driver of deviations I show that currency and equity market illiquidity
risks are only able to explain up to 24% of variation in premiums, suggesting that
other risk factors are also important. In particular, I show that the absolute value of
ETF premium is a robust proxy for multiple dimensions of country-level frictions risk
including credit risk, funding illiquidity and information uncertainty. Such measure is
better at a country-level than many other known proxies due the availability of cross-
sectional data that, in contrast to, for example, ADRs, does not rely on individual
stock mispricing. I investigate what stock characteristics drive the sensitivity of
securities to aggregate frictions and find that small cyclical stocks with strong price
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uncertainty (low analyst coverage and high dispersion in forecasts), as well as high
leverage are the most exposed. Finally, I show that friction risk based on this ETF
measure is priced internationally as investors demand a compensation for being
exposed to it.
In chapter 2, I show that the impact of country-level ETFs on the diversifica-
tion ability of U.S. investors is negative. I develop a shock propagation mechanism
and show that it is responsible for an increased correlation between foreign countries
and the U.S. market. I investigate how investors make their decisions regarding
country-level ETF holdings when facing U.S. economic uncertainty in contrast to
foreign uncertainty. Using U.S. and local VIX I show that they mainly react to U.S.
developments by selling country-ETFs and switching to cash products. In contrast,
they only react to significant negative news in the foreign economies. I also study
the reaction of investors when facing an increase in political uncertainty and show
that, differently to economic uncertainty, they leave the U.S. market and move their
capital abroad. The time-series analysis shows that U.S. shocks are propagated to
foreign stock markets via ETF arbitrage mechanism, which, as a result, leads to
an increase in correlation of stock returns across countries. Controlling for busi-
ness cycles and trading channel, the cross-sectional sorts demonstrate that such
propagation is stronger when limits to arbitrage are lower and when the transmitted
information is fundamental. I find that countries with a more liquid stock market
(which makes the arbitrage easier) and that have a high price discovery in the ETF
market are more correlated with the U.S..
In chapter 3, I demonstrate the positive role of industry ETFs in improving the
price efficiency of the underlying stocks. I emphasize the heterogeneity of the type of
stocks in the ETF basket and show the contrasting effect of ETFs when sorting stocks
by credit quality. I show that since investors are limited in the direct short-selling of
overpriced distressed securities, they can achieve the negative exposure indirectly via
industry ETFs. I demonstrate that ETF short-selling negatively predicts the returns
of distressed stocks and that the level of short-selling is higher in the period when
149
overpricing is more likely. I further study the under-performance of stocks with high
credit risk (the distressed anomaly) that is often related to stock overpricing. I show
that when stocks are sorted by industry ETF membership, distressed securities that
are part of the basket are less likely to show the sings of anomaly. In addition, in
the direct test of price efficiency I show that ETF short-selling reduces the price
delay measure for distressed stocks. The results presented in the paper are robust to
different measures of credit risk, different distressed anomaly explanations and when
accounting for the presents of alternative shot-selling mechanisms.
Overall, my work highlights the complexity of assessing the consequences
of ETF development and promotes further studies in this direction. In addition,
this thesis provides novel evidence on the importance of the ETF industry to the
global economy and may be useful for policy makers when attempting to regulate
the markets.
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Appendix A
Supporting Documentation:
Chapter 1
A.1 Tables
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Table A.1: Correlation of Absolute Premiums
This table shows the correlation between different versions of NAV adjustment for each country in
the sample. NA means no adjustment, GIR is the adjustment based on Goetzmann et al. (2001)
and ES is the adjustment based on Engle and Sarkar (2006). Frequency is daily and the sample
period is from June 2002- June 2018.
Countries ρ(GIR,NA) ρ(ES,NA) ρ(GIR,ES)
AUS 0.61 0.51 0.95
AUT 0.78 0.76 0.95
BEL 0.81 0.78 0.93
CAN 0.90 0.92 0.92
DNK 0.79 0.78 0.93
FIN 0.83 0.81 0.91
FRA 0.75 0.63 0.78
DEU 0.83 0.65 0.78
HKG 0.87 0.59 0.84
IRL 0.95 0.93 0.96
ISR 0.94 0.79 0.92
ITA 0.84 0.66 0.83
JPN 0.79 0.56 0.84
NLD 0.77 0.64 0.83
NZL 0.81 0.63 0.92
NOR 0.80 0.77 0.90
SGP 0.89 0.69 0.91
ESP 0.84 0.67 0.86
SWE 0.83 0.68 0.85
CHE 0.81 0.74 0.92
GBR 0.80 0.67 0.86
USA - - -
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Table A.5: ETF Premium and Illiquidity Risks
This table shows the results of a panel regression of ETF premiums on the currency illiquidity
(IML) and global market illiquidity (MILLIQG), as well as monthly fixed effects and country fixed
effects:
pi,t −NAVi,t = α+ β1IMLt + β2MILLIQGt + FEi + FEt + εi,t
The results are presented for 2 versions of ETF premiums: the one based on Goetzmann et al.
(2001) adjustment (FFPG) and the one based on Engle and Sarkar (2006) adjustment (FFPE).
The IML (MILLIQG) is measured as a long-short portfolio of currency pairs (stocks) sorted by
bid-ask spread (Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio) and rebalanced daily. The regression is performed
at a daily level. The sample is from June 2002- June 2018. ***,**,* show the significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
Variables FFPG FFPE
(1) (2)
IML 0.094*** 0.050***
(4.73) (6.41)
MILLIQG 0.078** 0.033***
(2.16) (3.35)
Constant 0.001 0.001
1.05 0.84
Country FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Observations 75,915 75,915
Countries 22 22
Adjusted R2 4.63 4.95
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Appendix B
Supporting Documentation:
Chapter 2
B.1 Madhavan and Sobczyk Model
In this appendix I briefly introduce the Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016) model of
ETF price and NAV.
Unobservable expected value of the underlying assets is modelled as a random walk:
vt = vt−1 + rt, where rt ∼ (µr, σ2r ) (B.1)
Price is the fundamental value plus a “true premium”:
pt = vt + ut (B.2)
The true premium is represented as an autoregressive model with a coefficient ψ
that represents the speed of error correction and a liquidity shock εt ∼ (µε, σ2ε).
ut = ψut−1 + εt (B.3)
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Defining the official NAV of the fund as nt I can show the premium at any point in
time as:
πt = pt − nt = (pt − vt) + (vt − nt) = ut + (vt − nt) (B.4)
The deviation of price from NAV can be due to staleness in NAV or due to the
impact of secondary market on ETF price through shock ε and slow arbitrage ψ > 0.
When ut = 0 the entire premium represents the staleness in NAV and the deviation
represents a price discovery in ETF market. The portion of variance not due to
transitory component ut is:
D = 1−
(
σu
σπ
)2
, where σu =
σε√
1− ψ2
(B.5)
This is defined as a price discovery component and is negatively related to variance
of liquidity shock and is positively related to the speed of arbitrage.
158
B.2 Methods for Order Imbalance Construction
Lee and Ready (1991) provide an algorithm for classifying trades into buys and sells.
Trade price is compared to prevailing quote. Prevailing quote is a current quote if it
is older than 5 seconds. It is a quote 5 seconds ago, otherwise.
1. If price=bid - trade is classified as a sell trade
2. If price=ask - trade is classified as a buy trade
3. If price is at mid-point of bid-ask spread tick test is used:
(a) If price is larger than of a previous trade price it is a buy trade
(b) If price is smaller than of a previous trade price it is a sell trade
4. If price is inside bid-ask spread, but not at mid-quote classification is based
on proximity to either bid or ask. Trades closer to the bid (ask) are sell (buy)
trades.
Holden and Jacobsen (2014) provide an Interpolated Time technique to match
trades and quotes happening within a millisecond. There are N trades and K orders
happening in 1 millisecond and I know the order for trades and for quotes. The
method assumes a uniform distribution of trades and quotes. Trade n in second s is
assigned to time:
s+
2n− 1
2N
, n = 1, 2 . . . N
Similarly, trade k in second s is assigned to time:
s+
2k − 1
2K
, k = 1, 2 . . .K
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B.3 Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: GNI per capita and Liquidity Mismatch
Scatter plot of average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and liquidity
mismatch (as defined in equation 2.12) for 41 countries over the sample period
of 2006-2018. Trend line is shown in red. Regression and adjusted R2 is
provided. GNI per capita is from World Bank database and is expressed in 104.
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Figure B.2: BOJ ETF Purchases
The first panel shows |V R− 1|, where VR (variance ratio) is the ratio of 15-sec EWJ returns over
three times of 5-sec EWJ return variances. The horizontal lines show the mean variance ratio
(|V R− 1|) over three episodes, from 30/11/2010 to 31/10/2014, from 1/11/2014 to 29/07/2016 and
30/07/2016 to 29/06/2018. The vertical lines indicate the BOJ announcements of annual target
changes. The second panel shows |V R− 1|, where VR (variance ratio) is the ratio of 15-sec SPY
returns over three times of 5-sec SPY return variances. The grey bars exhibit the actual purchases
in billion yen. EWJ (SPY) is the ETF that tracts MSCI Japan index (S&P 500). Both ETFs trade
on NYSE Arca platform.
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Figure B.3: BOJ ETF Purchase Days, VIX and Price Distortions
The first (second) pair of bar charts show |V R− 1| (y-axis on the left), where VR (variance ratio) is
the ratio of 15-sec EWJ (SPY) returns over three times of 5-sec EWJ (SPY) return variances, on
non-intervention and BOJ invention days. The last pair of bar charts shows the daily change in
VIX (y-axis on the right), on non-intervention and BOJ intervention days. The reported p-values
indicate the significance of two-sample t-test comparing non-intervention and BOJ intervention days.
Both ETFs trade on NYSE Arca platform.
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Figure B.4: BOJ ETF Purchase Days and ETF Correlations
The first (second) pair of bar charts show (annualized) daily returns of EWJ (SPY) ETF (y-axis
on the left), on non-intervention and BOJ invention days. The last pair of bar charts shows the
intraday correlation of EWJ and SPY ETF obtained by using 5-minute midquotes (y-axis on the
right), on non-intervention and BOJ invention days. The reported p-values indicate the significance
of two-sample t-test comparing non-intervention and BOJ intervention days. Both ETFs trade on
NYSE Arca platform.
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Table B.1: ETF Details
Countries in the sample, corresponding iShares country-level ETFs, their tickers, local market indices
that funds track and the version of local volatility indices. Not all local market volatility indices are
available. For some countries, general European index VSTOXX is used as a substitute. LVIX data
is from Bloomberg.
Country Ticker Name: iShares MSCI Tracking Index: MSCI Volatility Index Inception Date
AUS EWA Australia Australia Index S&P/ASX 200 12/03/1996
AUT EWO Austria Capped Austria IMI 25/50 VSTOXX 12/03/1996
BEL EWK Belgium Capped Belgium IMI 25/50 BEL 20 12/03/1996
BRA EWZ Brazil Capped Brazil 25/50 - 10/07/2000
CAN EWC Canada Canada Index S&P/TSX 60 VIX 12/03/1996
CHL ECH Chile Capped Chile IMI 25/50 - 12/11/2007
CHN MCHI China China Index ALPHASHARES CHINA 29/03/2011
COL ICOL Colombia All Colombia Capped Index - 18/06/2013
DNK EDEN Denmark Denmark IMI 25/50 Index - 25/01/2012
FIN EFNL Finland Finland IMI 25/50 Index VSTOXX 25/01/2012
FRA EWQ France France Index CAC40 12/03/1996
DEU EWG Germany Germany Index VDAX-NEW 12/03/1996
HKG EWH Hong Kong Hong Kong Index HSI 12/03/1996
IND INDA India India Index India VIX 02/02/2012
IDN EIDO Indonesia Indonesia IMI - 05/05/2010
IRL EIRL Ireland Capped All Ireland Capped Index VSTOXX 05/05/2010
ISR EIS Israel Capped Israel Capped IMI - 26/03/2008
ITA EWI Italy Capped Italy 25/50 VSTOXX 12/03/1996
JPN EWJ Japan Japan Index NIKKEI STOCK AVERAGE 12/03/1996
MYS EWM Malaysia Malaysia Index - 12/03/1996
MEX EWW Mexico Capped Mexico IMI 25/50 MEXICO 12/03/1996
NLD EWN Netherlands Netherlands IMI AEX 12/03/1996
NZL ENZL New Zealand Capped New Zealand IMI 25/50 - 01/09/2010
NOR ENOR Norway Norway IMI 25/50 Index - 23/01/2012
PER EPU All Peru Capped All Peru Capped Index - 19/06/2009
PHL EPHE Philippines Philippines IMI - 28/09/2010
POL EPOL Poland Capped Poland IMI 25/50 - 25/05/2010
QAT QAT Qatar All Qatar Capped Index - 29/04/2014
RUS ERUS Russia Capped Russia 25/50 Index RTS 09/11/2010
SAU KSA Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia IMI 25/50 Index - 16/09/2015
SGP EWS Singapore Singapore Index - 12/03/1996
ZAF EZA South Africa South Africa Index SOUTH AFRICA 03/02/2003
KOR EWY South Korea Korea 25/50 Index VKOSPI 09/05/2000
ESP EWP Spain Capped Spain 25/50 VSTOXX 12/03/1996
SWE EWD Sweden Sweden Index SIXVX 13/03/1996
CHE EWL Switzerland Capped Switzerland 25/50 VSMI 12/03/1996
TWN EWT Taiwan Capped Taiwan 25/50 Index - 20/06/2000
THA THD Thailand Capped Thailand IMI 25/50 - 26/03/2008
TUR TUR Turkey Turkey IMI - 26/03/2008
ARE UAE UAE All UAE Capped Index - 29/04/2014
GBR EWU United Kingdom United Kingdom Index FTSE 100 12/03/1996
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics of VIX and LVIX
Summary statistics of daily changes in CBOE volatility index (VIX) and local alternatives (LVIX)
for the period of 2006-2018. Details for LVIX are available in table B.1.
Country Corr(∆V IX, ∆LV IX) p-val Mean Std
AUS 0.145 < 0.01 0.19% 6.69%
AUT 0.537 < 0.01 0.22% 6.65%
BEL 0.422 < 0.01 0.25% 6.39%
BRA − − − −
CAN 0.331 < 0.01 0.42% 10.27%
CHL − − − −
CHN 0.475 < 0.01 0.12% 5.06%
COL − − − −
DNK − − − −
FIN 0.537 < 0.01 0.22% 6.65%
FRA 0.252 < 0.01 0.50% 13.53%
DEU 0.514 < 0.01 0.18% 6.08%
HKG 0.182 < 0.01 0.17% 5.81%
IND 0.168 < 0.01 0.13% 5.93%
IDN − − − −
IRL 0.537 < 0.01 0.22% 6.65%
ISR − − − −
ITA 0.537 < 0.01 0.22% 6.65%
JPN 0.138 < 0.01 0.20% 6.71%
MYS − − − −
MEX 0.444 < 0.01 0.11% 4.98%
NLD 0.452 < 0.01 0.26% 7.57%
NZL − − − −
NOR − − − −
PER − − − −
PHL − − − −
POL − − − −
QAT − − − −
RUS 0.221 < 0.01 0.23% 7.06%
SAU − − − −
SGP − − − −
ZAF 0.219 < 0.01 0.04% 3.05%
KOR 0.159 < 0.01 0.15% 5.78%
ESP 0.537 < 0.01 0.22% 6.65%
SWE 0.405 < 0.01 0.29% 7.62%
CHE 0.454 < 0.01 0.16% 5.60%
TWN − − − −
THA − − − −
TUR − − − −
ARE − − − −
GBR 0.450 < 0.01 0.27% 7.41%
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics of USPU and LPU
Summary statistics of a proxy for U.S. political uncertainty (USPU) and local alternatives (LPU)
for the period of 2006-2018. Details for political uncertainty construction are available in 2.3.4.
Country Corr(USPU,LPU) p-val Corr(∆LV IX,LPU) p-val Mean Std
AUS 0.348 < 0.01 0.043 0.03 0.61% 15.71%
AUT 0.392 < 0.01 0.031 0.09 0.08% 15.91%
BEL 0.430 < 0.01 −0.005 0.86 0.61% 16.64%
BRA 0.469 < 0.01 − − −0.03% 14.83%
CAN 0.513 < 0.01 −0.012 0.58 0.17% 15.39%
CHL 0.473 < 0.01 − − −0.31% 15.27%
CHN 0.396 < 0.01 0.007 0.79 −1.64% 15.88%
COL 0.435 < 0.01 − − −2.09% 18.58%
DNK 0.500 < 0.01 0.060 0.02 −3.13% 16.62%
FIN 0.533 < 0.01 0.086 0.01 −3.23% 16.24%
FRA 0.454 < 0.01 0.007 0.72 0.23% 15.79%
DEU 0.464 < 0.01 0.025 0.17 0.41% 15.72%
HKG 0.337 < 0.01 0.022 0.22 0.39% 16.16%
IND 0.503 < 0.01 0.016 0.53 −3.03% 16.54%
IDN 0.372 < 0.01 − − −1.3% 16.06%
IRL 0.462 < 0.01 0.050 0.02 −1.77% 14.14%
ISR 0.387 < 0.01 − − −0.63% 16.32%
ITA 0.442 < 0.01 − − 0.51% 15.89%
JPN 0.365 < 0.01 0.019 0.29 0.86% 16.09%
MYS 0.317 < 0.01 − − 0.90% 14.88%
MEX 0.540 < 0.01 −0.001 0.94 −0.02% 13.98%
NLD 0.471 < 0.01 0.022 0.22 0.19% 15.76%
NZL 0.406 < 0.01 − − −0.99% 13.88%
NOR 0.500 < 0.01 0.085 0.01 −3.03% 16.72%
PER 0.408 < 0.01 − − −0.52% 15.30%
PHL 0.387 < 0.01 − − −1.19% 14.93%
POL 0.449 < 0.01 − − −1.87% 14.84%
QAT 0.595 < 0.01 − − −3.66% 18.07%
RUS 0.380 < 0.01 −0.018 0.49 −1.62% 14.67%
SAU 0.512 < 0.01 − − −4.82% 14.43%
SGP 0.404 < 0.01 − − 0.55% 15.38%
ZAF 0.450 < 0.01 0.040 0.03 0.05% 14.60%
KOR 0.387 < 0.01 0.031 0.09 0.24% 13.50%
ESP 0.457 < 0.01 0.052 0.01 0.25% 14.90%
SWE 0.425 < 0.01 0.037 0.04 0.51% 16.78%
CHE 0.394 < 0.01 0.043 0.02 0.68% 14.85%
TWN 0.395 < 0.01 − − 0.75% 16.07%
THA 0.426 < 0.01 − − −0.45% 15.38%
TUR 0.436 < 0.01 − − −0.96% 14.57%
ARE 0.561 < 0.01 − − −3.15% 13.28%
GBR 0.455 < 0.01 0.053 0.01 0.19% 15.71%
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Table B.5: Panel Results- Developed Markets
Panel regressions with random effects for predictive regression of order imbalance for 21 developed
market (classified by MSCI) country-level MSCI based iShares ETFs region on percentage change
in volatility index (∆V IX), percentage change in orthogonalised local volatility index (∆LV IXo),
change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), dummy variable for a common
language (L) and a distance to the US (G), as well as lags of ∆V IX and ∆LV IXo.
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k +
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k + δ1∆IRi,t−1 + δ2OIi,t−1 + δ3Li + δ4Gi + εi,t
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and z-statistics (based on robust standard errors) are
presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and covers the
period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
∆V IXt−1 -0.203*** -0.123*** -0.266*** -0.261***
(-6.63) (-4.12) (-8.77) (-6.97)
∆LV IXot−1 -0.041* -0.043** 0.005 -0.037
(-1.67) (-2.57) (0.15) (-1.13)
∆IRt−1 -0.004** -0.002* -0.006* -0.002
(-2.29) (-1.70) (-1.89) (-0.90)
OIt−1 0.171*** 0.205*** 0.138*** 0.114***
(10.52) (7.25) (7.42) (9.04)
L 0.001 -0.005** 0.018 -0.002
(0.10) (-2.09) (1.19) (-0.20)
G -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(-1.20) (-0.74) (-3.39) (-0.35)
∆V IXt−2 -0.044*** -0.022 -0.085*** -0.062**
(-2.90) (-1.52) (-3.30) (-2.05)
∆LV IXot−2 -0.054** -0.034 -0.050* -0.065**
(-2.01) (-1.40) (-1.90) (-2.15)
∆V IXt−3 -0.061*** -0.025** -0.056** -0.077***
(-2.82) (-2.08) (-2.11) (-2.75)
∆V IXt−4 -0.090*** -0.066*** -0.080*** -0.100***
(-5.03) (-3.50) (-5.01) (-4.14)
∆V IXt−5 -0.053*** -0.037** -0.029 -0.076***
(-2.89) (-2.30) (-1.24) (-2.66)
Constant 0.021*** 0.004 0.048*** 0.014**
(2.80) (1.19) (3.18) (1.99)
Observations 44,007 43,192 41,646 41,997
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.045 0.022 0.017
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Table B.6: Panel Results- Emerging Markets
Panel regressions with random effects for predictive regression of order imbalance for 21 emerging
markets (classified by MSCI) country-level MSCI based iShares ETFs from Asia Pacific region on
percentage change in volatility index (∆V IX), percentage change in orthogonalised local volatility
index (∆LV IXo), change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), dummy
variable for a common language (L) and a distance to the US (G), as well as lags of ∆V IX and
∆LV IXo. Specifically, I run the following model:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k +
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k + δ1∆IRi,t−1 + δ2OIi,t−1 + δ3Li + δ4Gi + εi,t
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and z-statistics (based on robust standard errors) are
presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and covers the
period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
∆V IXt−1 -0.120*** -0.088*** -0.248*** -0.184***
(-4.04) (-3.37) (-3.76) (-5.59)
∆LV IXot−1 -0.053*** 0.014 -0.095 -0.062
(-4.04) (0.45) (-1.36) (-1.40)
∆IRt−1 0.049 0.079*** -0.156*** 0.086*
(1.18) (6.93) (-3.02) (1.84)
OIt−1 0.165*** 0.133*** 0.096*** 0.110***
(7.67) (6.28) (6.47) (5.86)
L 0.007 -0.001 -0.017 0.010
(0.21) (-0.47) (-0.32) (0.39)
G 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.48) (-1.05) (0.17) (0.32)
∆V IXt−2 0.011 -0.044 -0.157*** 0.009
(0.48) (-1.38) (-3.96) (0.21)
∆LV IXot−2 -0.052 0.034 -0.063 -0.093**
(-0.93) (0.54) (-0.58) (-2.13)
∆V IXt−3 -0.040* -0.040** -0.082*** -0.017
(-1.85) (-2.54) (-2.96) (-0.51)
∆V IXt−4 -0.015 -0.023 -0.096* -0.040
(-1.13) (-1.34) (-1.95) (-1.29)
∆V IXt−5 -0.018 -0.006 -0.023 0.002
(-0.65) (-0.24) (-1.08) (0.03)
Constant 0.004 0.004*** 0.016 0.001
(0.43) (3.56) (0.84) (0.15)
Observations 13,676 9,386 12,809 13,349
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.019 0.013 0.014
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Table B.8: Average Monthly Correlations
Per country average monthly correlation of changes in MSCI index and changes in S&P 500. RW-
36 (100) shows the results for partial rolling window correlation measure using 36 (100)-month
estimation period. RW-36[m,x] ([IP ]) shows the 36-month partial-correlation controlling for export
and import ratios with the U.S. (for percentage changes in industrial production index of the U.S.
and a local country from month t-12 to month t). DCC shows the results for Dynamic Conditional
Correlation model of Engle (2002) using GARCH(1,1) and constant mean for returns. G shows the
geographical distance between capitals of corresponding countries and the capital of the U.S.. L is a
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the country has a common language with the U.S.
and 0 otherwise. G and L measures are from CEPII’s Geodist database.
Country RW-36 RW-100 RW-36 [m,x] RW-36 [IP ] DCC G L
AUS 0.77 0.81 0.76 0.77 0.69 15962 1
AUT 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.77 0.72 7130 0
BEL 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.77 6223 0
BRA 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.56 6794 0
CAN 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.70 737 1
CHL 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.46 8081 0
CHN 0.55 0.64 0.53 0.48 0.57 11159 0
COL 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33 3815 0
DNK 0.57 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 6519 0
FIN 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.66 6943 0
FRA 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.77 6169 0
DEU 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.79 6718 0
HKG 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.63 13131 1
IND 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 12060 1
IDN 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.36 16371 0
IRL 0.68 0.77 0.68 0.69 0.70 5449 1
ISR 0.66 0.71 0.66 0.67 0.66 9451 1
ITA 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.69 7225 0
JPN 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.62 10919 0
MYS 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.53 15357 0
MEX 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.66 3038 0
NLD 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.79 6197 0
NZL 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.62 14220 1
NOR 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.63 6240 0
PER 0.43 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.45 5673 0
PHL 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.44 13794 1
POL 0.56 0.71 0.57 0.55 0.62 7184 0
QAT 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.19 11113 0
RUS 0.55 0.66 0.59 0.57 0.59 7835 0
SAU 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.18 10859 0
SGP 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.69 15564 1
ZAF 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.61 13040 1
KOR 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.58 11186 0
ESP 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.64 6092 0
SWE 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.77 6644 0
CHE 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.76 6603 0
TWN 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.59 12659 0
THA 0.51 0.59 0.51 0.51 0.55 14174 0
TUR 0.47 0.56 0.45 0.48 0.49 8733 0
ARE 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.22 11359 0
GBR 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.78 5901 1
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Table B.7: Recession Periods
Panel regressions with random effects for predictive regression of order imbalance for 41 country-level
MSCI based iShares ETFs on percentage change in volatility index (∆V IX), percentage change
in orthogonalised local volatility index (∆LV IX), dummy for recession in local countries DR,m,
change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), dummy variable for a common
language (L) and a distance to the US (G), as well as lags of ∆V IX and ∆LV IXo. DR takes
the value of 1 if there is a recession in a country during month m (time t is during month m).
Specifically, I estimate the model below:
OIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k+
2∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k+δ1DR,m+δ2∆IRi,t−1+δ3OIi,t−1+δ4Li+δ5Gi+εi,t
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and z-statistics (based on robust standard errors) are
presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency and covers the
period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of June 2018.
The data sample is split into 3 sub-samples: period of low VIX ,period of medium VIX, and period
of high VIX. The split is based on terciles of of historic VIX level distribution from Jan 1990 - June
2018. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOI smallOI retailOI largeOI
∆V IXt−1 -0.214*** -0.144*** -0.296*** -0.281***
(-7.45) (-5.42) (-8.60) (-8.23)
∆LV IXot−1 -0.031 -0.024 -0.003 -0.021
(-1.32) (-1.48) (-0.10) (-0.69)
DR,m -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.038*** -0.048***
(-3.45) (-5.41) (-2.82) (-3.96)
∆IRt−1 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.002
(-1.97) (-2.73) (-3.51) (-1.05)
OIt−1 0.178*** 0.203*** 0.126*** 0.120***
(11.27) (8.60) (8.21) (10.35)
L 0.005 -0.005 0.018 0.005
(0.44) (-1.04) (1.08) (0.44)
G 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.70) (1.27) (-0.92) (0.97)
∆V IXt−2 -0.040** -0.042*** -0.121*** -0.056*
(-2.02) (-2.61) (-4.55) (-1.79)
∆LV IXot−2 -0.067** -0.030 -0.047 -0.085**
(-2.06) (-1.13) (-1.43) (-2.49)
∆V IXt−3 -0.057*** -0.033** -0.070** -0.057**
(-3.60) (-2.23) (-2.46) (-2.31)
∆V IXt−4 -0.094*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.095***
(-3.99) (-3.95) (-4.08) (-3.08)
∆V IXt−5 -0.072*** -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.072**
(-3.42) (-2.79) (-2.89) (-2.30)
Constant 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.030***
(3.11) (4.87) (3.01) (3.21)
Observations 44,572 39,509 41,664 42,654
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.056 0.022 0.021
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Table B.9: Price Discovery, Market Illiquidity and Trading Channel
Average 36-month partial rolling correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns of 3 (or 4)
monthly portfolios formed based on price discovery and limits to arbitrage proxies. Correlation is
defined as ρLt =
1
NLt
∑NLt
i=1 partialCorr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500 |
mUS,t
mTotal,t
,
xUS,t
xTotal,t
), where mUS (xUS)
is the import(export) to (from) U.S. and mTotal (xTotal) is the total import (export) of a country with
all its trading partners. Each portfolio is presorted based on information available during previous
month. Panel A shows the sort into terciles by βi from equation R
NAV
i,t = α+βi
(
Pi,t−1−NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ε.
I use a 36-month period to estimate βi. Sort in panel B is based on Amihud’s illiquidity ratio
(Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets (ILLIQ). Panel C shows the result of a double sort by
median based on proxies from Panel A and Panel B. Panel D shows the result of a double sort by
median based on price discovery as in panel A and illiquidity mismatch as defined in equation 2.12.
t-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors
Panel A: Price Discovery
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.59 0.69 0.76 0.17 (29.49)
Panel B: Limits to Arbitrage
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 0.75 0.69 0.65 -0.10 (-11.03)
Panel C: Double Sort 1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.67 0.60 -0.07 (-5.01)
high 0.76 0.73 -0.03 (-3.23)
HML 0.09 0.12
t-stat (8.43) (11.10)
Panel D: Double Sort 2
Liquidity Mismatch
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.61 0.65 0.06 (2.99)
high 0.71 0.77 0.07 (6.15)
HML 0.10 0.11
t-stat (8.88) (6.22)
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Table B.10: Price Discovery, Market Illiquidity and Business Cycles
Average 36-month partial rolling correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns of 3 (or
4) monthly portfolios formed based on price discovery and limits to arbitrage proxies. Correlation
is defined as ρLt =
1
NLt
∑NLt
i=1 partialCorr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500 |∆IPi,t,∆IPUS,t), where ∆IPUS,t
(∆IPi,t) is the percentage change in industrial production index of the U.S. (a local country) from
month t− 12 to month t. Each portfolio is presorted based on information available during previous
month. Panel A shows the sort into terciles by βi from equation R
NAV
i,t = α+βi
(
Pi,t−1−NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ε.
I use a 36-month period to estimate βi. Sort in panel B is based on Amihud’s illiquidity ratio
(Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets (ILLIQ). Panel C shows the result of a double sort by
median based on proxies from Panel A and Panel B. Panel D shows the result of a double sort by
median based on price discovery as in panel A and illiquidity mismatch as defined in equation 2.12.
t-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors
Panel A: Price Discovery
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.58 0.69 0.76 0.18 (23.10)
Panel B: Limits to Arbitrage
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 0.75 0.69 0.64 -0.11 (-11.19)
Panel C: Double Sort 1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.66 0.60 -0.06 (-5.17)
high 0.76 0.73 -0.03 (-2.89)
HML 0.10 0.13
t-stat (8.24) (11.13)
Panel D: Double Sort 2
Liquidity Mismatch
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.61 0.64 0.05 (2.87)
high 0.71 0.78 0.07 (4.97)
HML 0.10 0.12
t-stat (8.58) (6.34)
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Table B.11: Correlation, Developed Markets and Financial Development
Average 36-month rolling correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns of 3 (or 4) monthly
portfolios formed based on price discovery and limits to arbitrage proxies. Correlation is defined
as ρLt =
1
NLt
∑NLt
i=1 Corr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500). Each portfolio is presorted based on information
available during previous month. Using a sub-sample of G10 countries panel A shows the sort into
terciles by βi from equation R
NAV
i,t = α + βi
(
Pi,t−1−NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ ε. I use a 36-month period to
estimate βi. Sort in panel B is based on a sub-sample of MSCI developed countries. In panel C and
D correlation is defined as ρLt =
1
NLt
∑NLt
i=1 partialCorr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500 |FDi,t), where FDi,t
is the financial development proxy measured as a ratio of stock market capitalisation over GDP.
Using a full sample Panel C shows the result of a double sort by median based on price discovery
from Panel A and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets (ILLIQ).
Panel D shows the result of a double sort by median based on price discovery as in panel A and
illiquidity mismatch as defined in equation 2.12. t-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987)
robust standard errors
Panel A: G10 countries
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.72 0.80 0.81 0.09 (6.37)
Panel B: MSCI Developed Countries
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.71 0.74 0.78 0.08 (11.20)
Panel C: Partial Correlation- Double Sort 1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.67 0.61 -0.07 (-5.64)
high 0.76 0.73 -0.03 (-3.00)
HML 0.09 0.12
t-stat (8.65) (13.04)
Panel D: Partial Correlation- Double Sort 2
Liquidity Mismatch
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.61 0.64 0.05 (2.79)
high 0.71 0.78 0.06 (4.86)
HML 0.10 0.12
t-stat (9.15) (7.03)
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Table B.12: Price Discovery, Market Illiquidity and Expanded Rolling
Window
Average 100-month rolling correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns of 3 (or 4)
monthly portfolios formed based on price discovery and limits to arbitrage proxies. Correlation
is defined as ρLt =
1
NLt
∑NLt
i=1 Corr(∆MSCIi,∆S&P500). Each portfolio is presorted based on
information available during previous month. Panel A shows the sort into terciles by βi from
equation RNAVi,t = α+ βi
(
Pi,t−1−NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ ε. I use a 100-month period to estimate βi. Sort in
panel B is based on Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets (ILLIQ).
Panel C shows the result of a double sort by median based on proxies from Panel A and Panel B.
Panel D shows the result of a double sort by median based on price discovery as in panel A and
illiquidity mismatch as defined in equation 2.12. t-statistics is based on Newey and West (1987)
robust standard errors
Panel A: Price Discovery
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.55 0.67 0.79 0.24 (18.53)
Panel B: Limits to Arbitrage
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 0.77 0.70 0.62 -0.08 (-12.05)
Panel C: Double Sort 1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.63 0.58 -0.05 (-7.09)
high 0.78 0.75 -0.02 (-3.31)
HML 0.15 0.18
t-stat (25.77) (37.44)
Panel D: Double Sort 2
Liquidity Mismatch
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.58 0.62 0.04 (2.45)
high 0.75 0.78 0.04 (3.97)
HML 0.16 0.16
t-stat (20.99) (9.61)
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Table B.13: Price Discovery, Market Illiquidity and DCC
Average DCC correlations of MSCI index returns on S&P 500 returns of 3 (or 4) monthly portfolios
formed based on price discovery and limits to arbitrage proxies. Correlation estimates are computed
using dynamic conditional correlation GARCH(1,1) model with constant mean. Each portfolio is
presorted based on information available during previous month. Panel A shows the sort into terciles
by βi from equation R
NAV
i,t = α+ βi
(
Pi,t−1−NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
)
+ ε. I use a 36-month period to estimate βi.
Sort in panel B is based on Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)) of the underlying markets
(ILLIQ). Panel C shows the result of a double sort by median based on proxies from Panel A and
Panel B. Panel D shows the result of a double sort by median based on price discovery as in panel
A and illiquidity mismatch as defined in equation 2.12. t-statistics is based on Newey and West
(1987) robust standard errors
Panel A: Price Discovery
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium 0.52 0.64 0.71 0.18 (18.12)
Panel B: Limits to Arbitrage
Sorting Variable low medium high HML t-stat
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 0.70 0.64 0.59 -0.11 (-10.88)
Panel C: Double Sort 1
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.62 0.54 -0.08 (-7.11)
high 0.71 0.68 -0.03 (-3.49)
HML 0.09 0.14
t-stat (9.60) (11.19)
Panel D: Double Sort 2
Liquidity Mismatch
Sorting Variables low high HML t-stat
NAV sensitivity to Premium
low 0.54 0.60 0.06 (4.26)
high 0.66 0.72 0.06 (3.71)
HML 0.12 0.13
t-stat (6.60) (11.47)
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Table B.14: Cash ETFs and VIX
Predictive regression of average order imbalance for U.S. cash ETFs (cashOI) on percentage change
in volatility index (∆V IX), orthogonalised percentage change in local volatility index (∆LV IXo),
change in local interest rates (IR), lagged order imbalance (OIt−1), as well as lags of ∆V IX and
∆LV IXo. In particular, I estimate the model below:
CashOIi,t = α+
5∑
k=1
βk∆V IXt−k+
3∑
k=1
γk∆LV IX
o
i,t−k+γ5∆LV IX
o
i,t−5+δ1∆IRi,t−1+δ2CashOIi,t−1+εi,t
Cash ETFs are defined as funds that invest in U.S. treasuries with less than 1 year of maturity.
The number of lags in the model is determined using Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian
information criterion jointly. Coefficients and t-statistics (based on Newey and West (1987) robust
standard errors) are presented. The lag for predictive regression is 1 day. Data is at a daily frequency
and covers the period from 2006 or the first trading day of ETF (whichever is later) until the end of
June 2018.***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Country Constant ∆V IXt−1 ∆LV IX
o
t−1 ∆IRt−1 cashOIt−1 ∆V IXt−2 ∆LV IX
o
t−2 ∆V IXt−3 ∆LV IX
o
t−3 ∆V IXt−4 ∆V IXt−5 ∆LV IX
o
t−5 Obs. R
2
AUS 0.020** 0.289*** 0.039 -0.065 0.301*** 0.383*** 0.002 0.233*** 0.007 0.21*** 0.257*** 0.022 2,637 0.113
(2.22) (3.83) (0.37) (-0.27) (13.28) (3.84) (0.02) (2.74) (0.07) (2.58) (3.37) (0.22)
AUT 0.039*** 0.299*** 0.05 0.191*** 0.343*** 0.368*** 0.164 0.185** 0.096 0.227*** 0.169* 0.06 2,886 0.140
(4.17) (3.94) (0.42) (3.22) (13.01) (4.15) (1.24) (2.31) (0.88) (2.68) (1.9) (0.55)
BEL 0.096*** 0.217 0.193 0.12 0.392*** 0.451*** 0.058 0.264 0.131 0.419** 0.045 0.184 966 0.176
(5.58) (1.38) (0.77) (0.72) (8.83) (2.85) (0.28) (1.62) (0.68) (2.47) (0.22) (1.06)
BRA 0.039*** 0.300*** - -0.799*** 0.344*** 0.385*** - 0.229*** - 0.255*** 0.176** - 2,886 0.140
(4.12) (3.94) - (-4.55) (13.05) (4.27) - (3.3) - (3.09) (2.00) -
CAN 0.007 0.290*** -0.037 0.034 0.276*** 0.391*** -0.005 0.208*** 0.114 0.179** 0.259*** 0.016 2,196 0.097
(0.74) (3.59) (-0.63) (0.39) (11.5) (3.89) (-0.06) (2.76) (1.56) (2.20) (3.24) (0.25)
CHL 0.039*** 0.304*** - -0.101*** 0.343*** 0.387*** - 0.229*** - 0.254*** 0.173** - 2,886 0.142
(4.14) (4.00) - (-3.02) (13.02) (4.28) - (3.31) - (3.07) (1.97) -
CHN 0.035*** 0.314*** -0.097 0.003 0.35*** 0.478*** 0.073 0.254*** -0.174 0.306*** 0.197** 0.023 2,723 0.146
(3.68) (3.58) (-0.61) (0.08) (13.05) (5.65) (0.46) (3.12) (-1.12) (3.05) (1.99) (0.15)
COL 0.015* 0.304*** - 0.007 0.299*** 0.408*** - 0.244*** - 0.22*** 0.248*** - 2,533 0.115
(1.68) (4.00) - (0.29) (13.1) (4.37) - (3.36) - (2.91) (3.23) -
DNK 0.041*** 0.303*** - -0.002 0.344*** 0.380*** - 0.224*** - 0.253*** 0.162* - 2,836 0.139
(4.34) (4.03) - (-0.21) (12.88) (4.17) - (3.18) - (3.03) (1.85) -
FIN 0.039*** 0.305*** 0.041 0.019 0.343*** 0.366*** 0.146 0.187** 0.075 0.235*** 0.168* 0.072 2,836 0.139
(4.17) (4.01) (0.34) (1.64) (12.97) (4.1) (1.10) (2.32) (0.68) (2.80) (1.91) (0.66)
FRA 0.039*** 0.307*** 0.039 0.02* 0.341*** 0.369*** 0.063** 0.208*** 0.051* 0.24*** 0.169* 0.019 2,878 0.140
(4.18) (4.02) (1.20) (1.66) (12.92) (4.16) (2.01) (2.99) (1.66) (2.95) (1.93) (0.77)
DEU 0.039*** 0.304*** 0.125 0.02* 0.343*** 0.349*** 0.143 0.189** 0.016 0.247*** 0.168* 0.085 2,878 0.139
(4.18) (3.99) (0.93) (1.67) (12.98) (3.8) (1.00) (2.39) (0.14) (2.93) (1.91) (0.70)
HKG 0.038*** 0.303*** -0.016 0.202 0.342*** 0.396*** -0.013 0.235*** -0.078 0.279*** 0.181** 0.176* 2,886 0.140
(4.11) (4.00) (-0.13) (1.18) (12.98) (4.06) (-0.11) (3.13) (-0.68) (3.13) (2.08) (1.65)
IND 0.022** 0.275*** -0.079 0.255*** 0.304*** 0.404*** 0.132 0.217*** -0.06 0.222*** 0.257*** 0.021 2,678 0.116
(2.45) (3.67) (-0.67) (2.61) (13.59) (4.44) (1.12) (2.91) (-0.54) (2.91) (3.43) (0.2)
IDN 0.038*** 0.303*** - 0.294 0.343*** 0.383*** - 0.228*** - 0.251*** 0.175** - 2,886 0.140
(4.12) (3.99) - (1.41) (13.00) (4.27) - (3.28) - (3.03) (1.98) -
IRL 0.039*** 0.299*** 0.05 0.191*** 0.343*** 0.368*** 0.164 0.185** 0.096 0.227*** 0.169* 0.06 2,836 0.139
(4.17) (3.94) (0.42) (3.22) (13.01) (4.15) (1.24) (2.31) (0.88) (2.68) (1.90) (0.55)
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Table continued from previous page
Country Constant ∆V IXt−1 ∆LV IX
o
t−1 ∆IRt−1 cashOIt−1 ∆V IXt−2 ∆LV IX
o
t−2 ∆V IXt−3 ∆LV IX
o
t−3 ∆V IXt−4 ∆V IXt−5 ∆LV IX
o
t−5 Obs. R
2
ISR 0.039*** 0.303*** - 0.086 0.343*** 0.383*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.175** - 2,886 0.139
(4.13) (3.99) - (0.40) (13) (4.27) - (3.25) - (3.07) (1.99) -
ITA 0.039*** 0.305*** 0.041 0.019* 0.343*** 0.366*** 0.146 0.187*** 0.075 0.235*** 0.168* 0.072 2,878 0.139
(4.17) (4.01) (0.34) (1.64) (12.97) (4.10) (1.10) (3.32) (0.68) (2.80) (1.91) (0.66)
JPN 0.04*** 0.326*** 0.022 0.010 0.348*** 0.369*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.114 0.209** 0.158* -0.011 2,829 0.142
(4.29) (4.2) (0.21) (1.17) (13.06) (3.63) (0.15) (2.76) (1.06) (2.32) (1.78) (-0.11)
MYS 0.039*** 0.300*** - 0.904* 0.343*** 0.389*** - 0.228*** - 0.254*** 0.174** - 2,886 0.140
(4.12) (3.95) - (1.77) (13.01) (4.29) - (3.29) - (3.08) (1.97) -
MEX 0.033*** 0.286*** 0.272** 1.416 0.355*** 0.459*** 0.112 0.247*** 0.119 0.300*** 0.166 0.061 2,616 0.152
(3.44) (3.22) (2.01) (1.19) (12.93) (5.68) (0.66) (3.09) (0.73) (3.06) (1.61) (0.48)
NLD 0.039*** 0.306*** -0.008 0.019 0.343*** 0.376*** 0.120 0.191** 0.064 0.236*** 0.168* -0.054 2,878 0.139
(4.16) (4.00) (-0.08) (1.64) (13.01) (4.18) (0.84) (2.35) (0.55) (2.74) (1.88) (-0.42)
NZL 0.039*** 0.305*** - -0.226 0.344*** 0.382*** - 0.227*** - 0.257*** 0.175** - 2,886 0.140
(4.13) (4.02) - (-1.08) (13.02) (4.25) - (3.26) - (3.10) (1.98) -
NOR 0.039*** 0.302 *** - 0.002 0.343 *** 0.384 *** - 0.226 *** - 0.254 *** 0.174* - 2,886 0.139
( 4.11 ) ( 3.98 ) - ( 0.00 ) ( 13.00 ) ( 4.27 ) - ( 3.26 ) - ( 3.07 ) ( 1.98 ) -
PER 0.039*** 0.302*** - 0.001*** 0.343*** 0.384*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.174** - 2,886 0.139
(4.12) (3.98) - (5.34) (13.01) (4.27) - (3.26) - (3.07) (1.98) -
PHL 0.051*** 0.322*** - 0.013 0.395*** 0.52*** - 0.234** - 0.324*** 0.047 - 1,573 0.179
(4.12) (2.65) - (1.28) (11.46) (4.84) - (2.08) - (2.62) (0.33) -
POL 0.039*** 0.302*** - 1.645 0.342*** 0.382*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.172* - 2,886 0.140
(4.13) (3.96) - (0.99) (13.04) (4.25) - (3.26) - (3.08) (1.95) -
QAT 0.036*** 0.303*** - 0.778 0.279*** 0.166 - 0.148 - 0.17 0.327*** - 927 0.095
(2.59) (3.00) - (1.28) (7.39) (1.26) - (1.55) - (1.52) (3.1) -
RUS 0.027*** 0.291*** -0.148 -0.003 0.349*** 0.534*** 0.075 0.266*** -0.118 0.333*** 0.182* 0.049 2,500 0.149
(2.74) (3.25) (-1.01) (-0.01) (12.22) (6.36) (0.62) (3.08) (-1.18) (3.31) (1.72) (0.55)
SAU 0.039*** 0.302*** - -0.182 0.343*** 0.385*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.175** - 2,886 0.139
(4.12) (3.97) - (-0.35) (13.01) (4.27) - (3.25) - (3.06) (1.98) -
SGP 0.039*** 0.302*** - 0.08 0.343*** 0.383*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.175** - 2,886 0.139
(4.12) (3.99) - (0.28) (13.01) (4.26) - (3.24) - (3.08) (1.98) -
ZAF 0.038*** 0.305*** 0.908*** -0.638** 0.322*** 0.315*** 0.648*** 0.159** 0.394 0.211** 0.152* 0.423** 2,868 0.139
(4.05) (3.98) (3.86) (-2.02) (12.73) (3.7) (3.13) (2.27) (1.59) (2.52) (1.69) (2.14)
KOR 0.039*** 0.309*** -0.168 2.298*** 0.342*** 0.442*** 0.024 0.235*** 0.018 0.253*** 0.176** 0.165 2,886 0.141
(4.17) (4.11) (-1.31) (2.97) (13.08) (4.34) (0.19) (3.11) (0.15) (2.94) (1.99) (1.53)
ESP 0.039*** 0.305*** 0.041 0.019 0.343*** 0.366*** 0.146 0.187** 0.075 0.235*** 0.168* 0.072 2,878 0.139
(4.17) (4.01) (0.34) (1.64) (12.97) (4.1) (1.1) (2.32) (0.68) (2.8) (1.91) (0.66)
SWE 0.039*** 0.300*** 0.064 -0.009 0.344*** 0.366*** 0.229** 0.167** 0.104 0.225*** 0.173** 0.019 2,885 0.140
(4.17) (3.93) (0.61) (-0.62) (13.01) (4.12) (2.16) (2.17) (1.09) (2.7) (1.98) (0.20)
CHE 0.039*** 0.289*** 0.090 -0.006** 0.344*** 0.35*** 0.128 0.185** 0.088 0.204** 0.189** -0.013 2,801 0.139
(4.03) (3.74) (0.66) (-2.12) (12.73) (3.63) (0.94) (2.26) (0.66) (2.26) (2.09) (-0.10)
TWN 0.039*** 0.302*** - 0.047 0.343*** 0.384*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.174** - 2,886 0.139
(4.12) (3.98) - (0.10) (13.01) (4.27) - (3.25) - (3.07) (1.98) -
THA 0.039*** 0.302*** - 0.017** 0.343*** 0.384*** - 0.226*** - 0.254*** 0.174** - 2,886 0.139
(4.13) (3.98) - (2.16) (13.02) (4.27) - (3.25) - (3.07) (1.98) -
TUR 0.039*** 0.301*** - 0.353 0.343*** 0.383*** - 0.225*** - 0.254*** 0.172* - 2,886 0.139
(4.13) (3.95) - (0.43) (12.96) (4.25) - (3.23) - (3.07) (1.95) -
ARE 0.006 0.293*** - -0.024 0.272*** 0.392*** - 0.218*** - 0.192** 0.258*** - 2,069 0.096
(0.65) (3.56) - (-1.07) (10.9) (3.83) - (2.75) - (2.33) (3.17) -
GBR 0.039*** 0.296*** 0.134 0.018 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.125 0.184** 0.092 0.223*** 0.169* 0.032 2,886 0.139
(4.15) (3.92) (1.42) (0.28) (13.01) (3.78) (1.09) (2.41) (0.99) (2.65) (1.91) (0.34)
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Appendix C
Supporting Documentation:
Chapter 3
C.1 KMV Distance to Default Model
I follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) to construct the distance to default measure.
The total value of the firm (V ) can be assumed to follow the geometric Brownian
motion :
dV = µV dt+ σV V dW (C.1)
where µ is the continuously compounded return, σV is the volatility of the total
value of the firm and dW is a Wiener process. The value of firm’s equity can be
represented as a call option written on the underlying assets of the firm with a strike
price F , that is equal to the face value of the debt issued by the firm with maturity
T . When the value of the firm’s assets is above the total amount of debt outstanding,
the equity value is positive. In contrast, when the value of assets is lower then debt
level, the firm is in bankruptcy and the payout to the equity holders is zero. Using
Black-Scholes formula the value of the equity can be shown as:
E = VN (d1)− e−rTFN (d2) (C.2)
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where N is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, d1 and d2 is:
d1 =
ln(V/F ) + (r + 0.5σ2V )T
σV
√
T
(C.3)
d2 = d1 − σV
√
T (C.4)
where r is the risk-free rate. All but two variables (V and σV ) can be estimated in
the equation C.2. Therefore, the second equation is required to solve the system of
equations. Using Ito’s lemma it can be shown that:
σE =
V
E
N (d1)σV (C.5)
In order to solve these equations I start with the estimated value of volatility of
firm’s assets:
σV = σE
E
E + F
(C.6)
Using equation C.2 the value of V can be estimated for the past year and the values
of σV and µ can be re-estimated. The iterative procedure loops through the estimates
of σV until the values converge. Once all parameters are estimated the distance to
default measure can then be calculated as follows:
DD =
ln VF + (µ− 0.5σ
2
V )T
σV
√
T
(C.7)
The expected default frequency (EDF ) is a more useful measure as it captures the
implied probability of default by the firm:
EDF = N (−DD) (C.8)
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C.2 Tables
Table C.1: List of Control Variables
This table shows the list of control variables used in this paper, as well as the source for each variable.
The variables are constracted based on Green et al. (2017).
Acronym Description Source
acc Accruals Compustat
agr Asset Growth Compustat
bm Book-to-Market Ratio Compustat
grltnoa Growth in L-T Net Operating Assets Compustat
gma Gross Profitability Compustat
illiq Amihud (2002) illiquidity CRSP
invest Investment Growth Compustat
me Market Capitalisation CRSP
numan Number of Analysts Covering Stock I/B/E/S
op Operating Profitability Compustat
vol Trading Volume orthogonalised to me CRSP
vwap Value-Weighted Average Price CRSP
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Table C.2: Distribution of Credit Scores
This table shows how the credit scores are assigned to each S&P long-term credit rating, as well as
the average distribution of stocks across different ratings.
S&P Ratings Credit Score Average Percentage of Firms
Investment grade
AAA 1 0.69
AA+ 2 0.21
AA 3 1.01
AA- 4 1.64
A+ 5 3.97
A 6 7.51
A- 7 6.75
BBB+ 8 9.25
BBB 9 13.13
BBB- 10 10.50
Non-investment grade
BB+ 11 6.89
BB 12 9.09
BB- 13 11.41
B+ 14 9.19
B 15 5.69
B- 16 2.29
CCC+ 17 0.53
CCC 18 0.12
CCC- 19 0.04
CC 20 0.03
C 21 0.00
D 22 0.06
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